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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an empirical investigation examining the impact of state development 
and institutional flexibility on economic growth, across fifteen developed countries 
from 1880 to 2008. The development of the state, particularly since the late nineteenth 
century, has resulted in the exponential growth of institutional complexity and living 
standards. While there is evidence to suggest institutional flexibility may have 
increased for a time during this period, evidence also indicates a subsequently decline 
over the course of the twentieth century, resulting in ‘rise and decline’ explanations 
for economic growth. This ‘rise and decline’ hypothesis is tested in this thesis in an 
attempt to rehabilitate the works of Mancur Olson. This thesis presents a new 
framework for establishing years of peak institutional flexibility and creates new data 
for measuring state development and institutional flexibility. It finds both 
improvements in state development and institutional flexibility explain changes in 
cross-country growth over the long run. This should come as encouragement to those 
interested in institutional justifications for economic growth and all interested in 
revitalising Olsonion explanations for the economic performance of countries over the 
long run.     
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research is a cross-country empirical study examining the impact of state 
development and institutional flexibility on economic growth, across fifteen 
developed countries from 1880 to 2008. Beginning with Adam Smith (1776), research 
into economic growth is fortunate to have been addressed by some of the most notable 
economists. The list of researchers includes David Ricardo, David Hume, Robert 
Malthus, Friedrich List, Karl Marx, Walt Rostow, Thorstein Veblen, Joseph 
Schumpeter, Robert Solow, Mancur Olson, Paul Romer, Kenneth Arrow, Robert 
Barro, Robert Lucas and Darren Acemoglu. Smith’s original enquiry as to the causes 
of the ‘wealth of nations’ is not only a central question in economic growth theory but 
also developmental economics, economic history and evolutionary economics 
(Roland, 2004). Such enquiries shed light on the emergence of Spain, France, the 
Netherlands and Great Britain as the first states to experience modern economic 
growth and their subsequent decline (North & Thomas, 1973; De Long, 2000; Roland, 
2004).  
 
To borrow the phrase from Mancur Olson, the core of this research is grounded in the 
idea of a ‘rise and decline’ of states. The principal research hypothesis asserts two 
opposing views of institutional development. The first maintains that the transition to 
a modern capitalist economy depends largely on state development and the integration 
and modernisation of flexible institutions which support the state. These arrangements 
facilitate the ‘rise’. The second facet of the research hypothesis focuses on the 
‘decline’ of states. It argues modern capitalist economies suffer slowing growth rates, 
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due to a decline in institutional flexibility and the ossification of once fluid and 
adaptable institutional structures. This leads to a conundrum where, on the one hand 
institutional development results in faster economic growth, but on the other hand, 
these same institutions retard economic growth in the long run.     
 
The rise of the developed world is strongly linked to the development of complex and 
impersonal institutional arrangements. It is hard to argue that the historical economic 
emergence of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and Spain could have been 
achieved without the development of complex institutional structures, allowing each 
state to pursue its economic and political goals. An excellent historical account of 
each of these states can be found in the works of Freidrich List. List (1841) provides 
an insight into the conditions pertaining in selected countries during the 1800s as 
modern development gathered pace. List argues countries do not experience 
increasing levels of real GDP per capita without suitable “public institutions”. This 
institutional view is supported by List (1841:132) when he asserts 
“However industrious, thrifty, inventive, and intelligent, individual citizens 
might be, they could not make up for the lack of free institutions”. 
 
The theory of Mancur Olson is central to all parts of this research. In fact, this work is 
as much a rehabilitation of Olson’s theory of economic development as it is an 
empirical investigation of the institutional determinates of cross-country growth. 
Olson (1982) was the first to recognise both facets of the research hypothesis, what he 
called the ‘rise and decline of nations”. Others such as Hodgson (1989) Barro (1989), 
Knack & Keefer (1995) and Rodrik (2000) have empirically tested Olson’s original 
hypothesis, moving the institutional line of investigation to centre stage. This research 
15 
 
takes a similar approach. The empirical tests presented in Chapter 6 consider whether 
institutional and other related conditions, specific to each country, help explain 
economic growth, with the focus on state development and institutional flexibility. 
The countries selected as part of this investigation are Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and the Unites States of America. 
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1.2 RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH 
The importance of the institutional line of research has been noted by many writers in 
the area such as Olson (1982) Choi (1983), Hodgson (1989 & 1996) Acemoglu & 
Robinson (2001 & 2012) North (1990 & 2005), Reinert (2007), Rodrik (2007) and 
North, Wallis & Weingast (2009). The rationale for this research stems from the 
increased use of institutional models to explain the economic performance of 
countries. Institutional explanations have become more prevalent primarily due to the 
dispersion and divergence of world incomes levels. Since the Industrial Revolution 
Western economies have seen output grow at a much faster rate than labour. This has 
caused many to question the validity of neo-classical interpretations when explaining 
the economic performance of individual countries, as it has become clear, factors of 
production alone cannot accurately explain cross-country income levels per person.  
 
Hodgson (1996) states that neoclassical “production function” faces difficulties in 
explaining cross-country productivity differences with many abnormalities present in 
the world today. North (2005) agrees with this view and provides and explanation for 
these abnormalities. North argues the static nature of the neoclassical approach 
prevents economists from accurately explaining causes of growth across the planet, as 
the function analyses the volume of factors of production alone. The production 
function ignores human behaviour, the stock of human knowledge and institutional 
structures in an economy and therefore cannot accurately explain the performance of 
the economy. If the economy were static as assumed by the static neoclassical 
production function, any increase in productivity is simply attributed to increases in 
the rate of labour productivity. The reality is somewhat different.  
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Olson (1996a), an ardent supporter of institutional explanations for economic growth, 
claims that if institutions are important, countries with similar cultures, resources and 
climates should only display significantly differing levels of economic growth, if they 
operated under diverse institutions. Poor countries only remain poor because they “do 
not have a structure of incentives that…would pick up the big bills” (Olson, 1996a:6). 
This is certainly the case in the world today. Evidence from former East and West 
Germany, Mexico and the southern United States and North and South Korea 
illustrate how important institutions are in enabling economic growth. Additionally, 
when considering investigating the development of rich countries in the world today it 
is useful to ponder the question posed by Rokkan, Flora, Kuhnle and Urwin (1999). 
The writers question why it is that today, so little has been done in an attempt to 
develop an amalgamated understanding for the prosperity of developed countries, yet 
so much attention has been focused on regions with the shortest recorded histories and 
poorest documentary accounts of national records. For these reasons this research is 
deemed to be necessary. 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Fundamentally, this research attempts to explain if state development and institutional 
flexibility explain the rate of GDP per capita growth from 1880 to 2008 for the fifteen 
selected countries. Given the limitations of traditional approaches to this question, this 
research only considers variables directly related to state capacity and institutional 
flexibility, when explaining the causes of economic growth. The fifteen countries 
selected for the empirical analysis all possess extended data series on many 
institutional variables, which are necessary to examine the impact of state 
development and institutional flexibility on economic growth in the long run.  
 
State development is measured in various ways, which are elaborated upon in Chapter 
5. Such measures include the capacity of the state to raise revenue from citizens living 
inside its territory, the volume of external trade generated by the state, the capacity of 
the state to provide primary education to the child population and the capability of the 
state to ensure the provision of mass democracy among the adult population. In 
conjunction with these, institutional flexibility is deemed a key determinant of 
economic growth. By their nature, institutions become less flexible through time, a 
concept Olson (1982) called institutional sclerosis. Sclerosis can be due to rent-
seeking behaviour by individuals, narrow special-interest groups or explicit lobby 
groups. It is due to largely routinised behaviour which Veblen (1914), Winter (1982) 
and Hodgson (1989) suggest lead to sustained periods of relative economic 
stagnation. This results in a problem where institutions that are capable, or were once 
capable, of fully exploiting a country’s productive power may not be well adept at 
changing, instead solidifying as time passes (Abramovitz, 1986). Institutional 
flexibility is essential because it is the flexibility of current institutions that govern the 
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pace at which new institutions can be established, resulting in higher levels of output 
per capita (Davis, 2010).  
 
Overcoming institutional sclerosis is difficult as habits, routines and behaviour which 
created the state endure long after its creation. As with the measures of state capacity, 
institutional flexibility is captured in numerous ways. There are again discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 5. Such measures include the incidence of revolutions, 
occupations or the granting of national independence, regime durability, political 
competition in the state and three new methodological approaches to measure 
institutional flexibility based on Olson’s ‘rise and decline’ hypothesis. All these are 
discussed in detail in the chapters that follow this introduction.     
 
On a more specific level, this work seeks to extend the empirical work started by 
Black (1966) and Olson (1982), and subsequently extended by Choi (1983) and 
Hodgson (1989 & 1996). Black (1966) provides one of the first attempts to explain 
state development over the past 500 years, by grouping countries into different 
phases. This approach provides the basis for understanding the phases of state 
development through time. Olson (1982) offers a framework for understanding the 
rise and decline of countries through time and is an implicit extension of Black’s 
original investigation. Olson (1982) explains how different states have prospered from 
the development of growth-promoting institutional structures, incentivising 
productive behaviour among citizens. This explanation then turns to the sclerotic 
characteristics that stable institutions develop through time, the result of destructive 
special-interest groups, preventing rapid economic development.  
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Choi (1983) and Hodgson (1989) both test Olson’s hypothesis and examine the 
impact of institutional flexibility in promoting growth through time using the 
comparative model of state development presented by Black (1966). Choi’s original 
attempt, developed by Hodgson (1989 & 1996), is the subject of much analysis in this 
research. This research builds on all previous work by capturing a measure of 
institutional flexibility and using this measure to explain changes in the rate of 
economic development across countries. Many of the institutional variables used in 
the analysis that follow in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 take inspiration from Hodgson 
(1996).  
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1.4 SUMMARY OF STRUCTURE 
The remainder of thesis is presented in six separate chapters each of which is now 
briefly discussed.   
 
1.4.1 Chapter 2 
The primary focus of Chapter 2 is to explain the evolution of the state from primitive, 
insecure foundations to the complex, robust institutional structures that form the 
bedrock of society today. These foundations have enabled the state to grow and 
develop into the modern institutional arrangements that dominate life in the developed 
world. It is almost impossible to argue that the enhancement of state capacity has not 
resulted in higher levels of GDP per capita in countries which have progressed along 
the path of modernisation. Chapter 2 provides an explanation of this process making 
specific reference to North, Wallis & Weingast (2009) and the conditions prevailing 
in modern states that have allowed them to capture and maintain large shares of global 
economic output. To complement the theoretical discussion, three conceptual 
frameworks of the state are presented. The first two focus on the development of the 
state at a basic level, and how developed countries have progressed from disorder to 
order, based on a set of institutional constraints. The third model is that developed by 
Black (1966). This model is central to previous investigations in this area and the 
methods and empirics presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this thesis.  
 
1.4.2 Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 is largely a rehabilitation of Mancur Olson’s theory of economic growth. It 
provides a detailed description of Olson’s theory, paying particular attention to his 
earlier works, The Logic of Collective Action and The Rise and Decline of Nations. 
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The chapter explains the logic behind the rational ignorance of citizens and 
institutional sclerosis, the latter directly linked to institutional flexibility. Institutional 
flexibility is examined on a country basis with Great Britain used as the Olsonian 
exemplar for institutional sclerosis. An examination of cross-country growth rates in 
developed economic since World War II illustrates how institutional sclerosis spread 
across the developed world since 1945. Lastly, the chapter fuses the works of Black 
(1966), Olson (1982) and North, Wallis & Weingast (2009) creating a model of 
institutional flexibility, based on the rate of state development, with the underpinnings 
of Olson’s ‘rise and decline’ hypothesis.     
 
1.4.3 Chapter 4 
The concept and impact of democracy is central to this work. It is used both as a 
measure of state development (rise) and a proxy for creating new measures of 
institutional flexibility (decline). Chapter 4 is devoted to, and provides a detailed 
analysis of, the relationship between democracy and economic growth. The direction 
of causation in the relationship is discussed as are quantitative measures of democracy 
used to test the relationship. The main focus of the chapter is to investigate the impact 
of democracy on economic growth. Three hypothesis are presented, each of which are 
discussed in turn. An analysis of results into previous democracy and economic 
growth investigations is presented and discussed. This extensive survey of the 
literature provides a thorough grounding of the impact of democracy on economic 
growth which becomes important when interpreting the empirical results in Chapter 6   
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1.4.4 Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 presents all data used in the empirical tests. Much of this data is original 
and has been constructed by combining or manipulating existing data. This is one of 
the main contributions of this work. Six new data sets from 1880 to 2008 for fifteen 
OECD countries now exist when can be used by investigators that follow. This new 
data is presented in Section 5.4. Before this data is presented the chapter explains how 
all data is collected and the sources that have been used. The methods used in the 
empirical tests in Chapter 6 are explained in detail and the new method for calculating 
institutional flexibility is presented and discussed. This is another key contribution as 
it provides an original and robust method for establishing the high point of 
institutional flexibility in each country, allowing the ‘rise and decline’ hypothesis to 
be tested.   
 
1.4.5 Chapter 6 & Chapter 7 
Chapter 6 presents all empirical results. The three measures of institutional flexibility 
used in the empirical tests are discussed and a graphical presentation of the rise and 
decline of each country is presented using the new measures of institutional 
flexibility. Following this, the empirical results are presented and demonstrate the 
impact of state capacity and institutional flexibility on economic growth for all fifteen 
countries from 1880 to 2008. Each set of results is presented with a different measure 
of institutional flexibility. These results build directly on the work of Olson (1982), 
Choi (1983) and Hodgson (1989 & 1996). A discussion of the results is then provided.  
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. It summarises the main contributions, findings and 
areas of future research. 
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1.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides an overview of what is to follow. As stated, this research 
questions the extent to which state development and institutional flexibility explain 
the rate of GDP per capita growth from 1880 to 2008.  A cross-country empirical 
investigation is deemed the most appropriate way to tackle this question and provide a 
meaningful answer. The work seeks to extend that of Black (1966), Olson (1982) 
Choi (1983) and Hodgson (1989 & 1996) with the motivation for much of what 
follows coming from these researchers. The thesis is presented in the following 
structure: Chapter 2 discusses the evolution of the state; Chapter 3 is a rehabilitation 
of Mancur Olson’s work; Chapter 4 is a detailed examination of the relationship 
between economic growth and democracy; Chapter 5 describes and presents all data 
collected and used in Chapter 6, where the empirical results are presented and 
discussed. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and elaborates on the future direction of 
work which could extend this analysis.     
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CHAPTER 2 – STATE-BUILDING & MODERNISATION 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
Chapter 1 raises an important conundrum regarding institutional development. While 
robust, impersonal and flexibility institutions are needed to achieve the highest levels 
of GDP per capita, the same institutions can retard economic growth through time, 
due to institutional sclerosis which causes the ossification of once flexible institutions. 
Chapter 2 addresses the first part of this, providing a foundation for examining the 
importance of a robust institutional framework in promoting growth. The purpose of 
this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, this chapter will provide the reader with an overview 
of the emergence of the state, its evolution and an explanation for the development of 
the complex, impersonal set of institutional arrangements, which ensure the state’s 
existence. Secondly, it discusses three conceptual frameworks of the state, two 
theoretical models of state evolution and a comparative model of state development.  
 
The importance of institutions and institutional conditions supporting the creation of 
the state has been addressed by von Schmoller (1900), Veblen (1914), Weber (1965), 
Olson (1982), Hardin (1982), North (1990 & 2005), Hall & Jones (1999), Hodgson 
(2000 & 2006a), Acemoglu & Robinson (2001 & 2012) Rodrik (2007) and North, 
Wallis & Weingast (2009). Each has made key contributions over the past century. 
Chapter 2 provides this foundation. Section 2.2 provides a definition of both an 
institution and state. Section 2.3 describes the evolution of the state from a pre-
modern to modern institutional structures. Section 2.4 examines conceptual 
frameworks of the state and provides a detailed description of the comparative model 
forwarded by Black (1966). Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.    
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2.2 INSTITUTIONS & STATES 
The emergence and evolution of the state is a curious thing. Humanity survived for a 
long time without the existence or interference of the state. Basic state structures are 
in existence for about the last 10,000 years meaning the concept of the state, even at 
its most basic primordial level, is a relatively new phenomenon. Its existence is 
inherently linked to the evolution of formal and informal institutions (Smith, 2004; 
Farghar & Blanton, 2007; Blanton & Faghar, 2008; Hodgson, 2009).  This section 
explores the concepts of institutions and states in an attempt to provide an 
understanding of both. This is necessary as both institutions and states are often 
confused or misinterpreted, with the latter often incorrectly labelled a nation. 
Furthermore, North (2005) argues any model attempting to understand the process of 
economic development, as this research does, must acknowledge the importance of 
the human environment. This environment is a construct of rules, norms and 
conventions, providing structure and reducing uncertainty associated with human 
interactions. An understanding of human behaviour is at the very essence of how and 
why states emerge and evolve. 
 
2.2.1 What are Institutions? 
Whilst an exact and acceptable definition of what comprises an ‘institution’ remains 
elusive, most writers acknowledge institutions are a set of formal and informal rules, 
norms and habits with the objective of providing an incentive structure which human 
activity relies upon (North, 2005; Hodgson, 2006a). As a starting point the distinction 
between rules, norms and habits is provided by Hodgson (2006a). A rule is defined as 
“a socially transmitted and customary normative injunction or immanently normative 
disposition, that in circumstances X do Y” Hodgson (2006a:3). The enforcement of 
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rules differs from norms and a distinction can be made between the two. A norm 
“involves approval or disapproval” whereas rules do not (Hodgson (2006a:5). This 
definition of a norm builds on the work of Tuomela (1995) and Searle (1995). A habit 
is “a disposition to engage in previously adopted behaviour or thoughts, triggered by 
an appropriate stimulus or context” and require “repeated behaviour” in order to be 
established (Hodgson (2006a:6). From rules, norms and habits formal and informal 
institutions emerge.  
 
North (1990) and Furubotn & Richter (2005) suggest two types of institutions exist, 
those that are created by central authority and “protected from above” and those 
created by individuals and ‘protected from below’. The former are generally 
considered formal institutions, while the latter are generally informal. Formal 
institutions are delineated as constraints on government or individual behaviour and 
are enforced by legal rules. Informal institutions are private constraints which flow 
directly from the spontaneously emerging norms, customs and habits (North, 2005). 
Much earlier, Menger (1981) discussed the same process by which institutions evolve, 
concluding institutions could fall into two categories; those that emerge through 
conscious design (protected from above/formal institutions) or those that appear 
through spontaneous order (protected from below/informal institutions). While 
institutions evolve both deliberately and impulsively, Menger (1981) and Hodgson 
(2000) argue that such a process does not begin at an “original state of nature” but is 
dependent upon rudimentary institutions (such as language) that must be assumed to 
inevitably exist. Hodgson (2000:144) clarifies this point stating: 
“All theories must first build from elements which are taken as given, 
However, the particular problem of infinite regress identified here, undermines 
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any claim that the explanation of the emergence of institutions can start from 
some kind of institution-free ensemble of (rational) individuals in which there 
is supposedly no rule or institutions to be explained. Consequently, the project 
to explain the emergence of institutions on the basis of given individuals runs 
into difficulties, particularly with regards to the conceptualization of the initial 
circumstances from which institutions are supposed to emerge”. 
 
For the purposes of this work, institutions act as the rules of the game and exist in 
conjunction, and are reliant upon, the individuals that use them. The nature and 
structure of institutions shape the behaviour and choices that citizens make and define 
the existence of the state. Sound institutions encourage productive actions and 
discourage predatory behaviour (North, 1990; Nee & Ingram, 1998; Williamson, 
2000; Furubotn & Richter, 2005; Hodgson, 2006a). Popper (1957:60) provides an 
appropriate metaphor, claiming that “institutions are like fortresses. They must be 
well-designed and properly manned”. The countries that are examined later in this 
work have created economic, military, political and religious powers through 
institutions, structuring the relationships of their citizens. These institutions have 
concurrently allowed individuals control over resources within the state, providing 
incentives to engage in productive activity, reducing the instance of internal violence, 
a pattern known as “social order” (North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009). It is these social 
orders that have enabled the developed world to reach productive capacities today that 
are exponential larger than anything ever seen before.  
 
Williamson (2009) argues the institutional arrangements existing today have allowed 
developed countries reach unprecedented levels of output but at a cost. The 
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formalisation of institutions has hurt economic performance as institutional sclerosis 
sets in. This conundrum is central to all aspects of the thesis presented here. On the 
one hand, many institutions promote economic development, leading to higher levels 
of GDP per capita. On the other, institutions begin to solidify through time, 
preventing change and rapid bursts of economic growth. This work examines both the 
growth-promoting nature of institutions, directly linked to state capacity, and the 
growth-retarding nature of institutions, central to the work of Mancur Olson. The 
remainder of Chapter 2 deals with state capacity, the evolution of the state and the 
role of the state in promoting economic growth. Chapter 3 examines the growth-
retarding aspect of institutions and attempts to rehabilitate the works of Mancur 
Olson.  
 
2.2.2 Defining the State  
The ‘state’ refers to the highest level of legislative authority and involves a system of 
roles and codification of rules, with monopoly access to specified resources. It is an 
autonomous and centralised body, with a political dimension, and attempts to control 
the population within a geographic region. Seagle (1941) notes that the birth of the 
state is linked to the increasing layered nature of society and emergence of a class 
system. The shift towards this system is in no small part due to the ever increasing 
numbers of people living in communities. Free riding became easier and punishment 
of free riders harder, hence the need for and emergence of codifying laws. Max 
Weber, often cited as the most preeminent authority when defining the state, argues a 
state holds a monopoly over the legitimate use of force in the geographic region under 
its influence and has the power to raises revenues as it sees fit among citizens living 
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under its authority. For Weber, the monopoly use of legitimate force is the 
fundamental test of statehood.  
Weber (1965:1) claims that:  
“If no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, the concept 
of “state” would be eliminated...Of course, force is certainly not the normal or 
the only means of the state – nobody says that – but force is a means specific 
to the state... Specifically, at the present time, the right to use physical force is 
ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the 
state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the “right” to use 
violence. Hence, “politics” for us means striving to share power, either among 
states or among groups within a state”. 
 
It should be noted, while controlling violence is a central task of the state, no society 
has managed to solve this problem by the extermination of violence completely. To 
date, the best case scenario has been to limit and control the level of violence (North, 
Wallis & Weingast, 2009). The legislative order, which forms the foundation of the 
states, is subject to modification, when deemed necessary, by constitutional 
amendment. The objective of the state should be the optimisation of the public interest 
through the appropriate allocation and administration of citizen rights and resources. 
The properly functioning state is essential for the operation of a modern economic 
society (Weber, 1965; Tilly & Zophy 1975; Linz, 1993; Bendix, 2002; Furubotn & 
Richter, 2005).  
 
Notably, a state is characterised as existing only in a simulated or artificially sense. 
The modern states that exist in the world today have, in many respects, reduced 
31 
 
internal violence, recognised individual freedoms and ensured legislation exists to 
protect these freedoms. Protection of private property is guaranteed allowing a 
properly functioning market economy to exist. Everyone lives under the jurisdictions 
of a state. There is no land area on the face of the planet that is not under the 
authority, or is claimed to be under the authority, of a state. The institutions 
preserving the state are a consequence of two separate explanations. The first is 
through conscious design, with examples including institutions such as the judiciary 
or national parliament. The second process of institutional formation occurs 
spontaneously. In this case, institutions develop through self-enforcement and may 
not be the consequence of design or public support. As far back as the turn of the 
twentieth century von Schmoller (1900:61) wrote on the evolutionary nature of 
institutions which shape the state, defining them as  
“A partial order for community life which serves specific purposes and which 
has the capacity to undergo further evolution independently. It offers a firm 
basis for shaping social actions over long periods of time; as for example 
property, slavery, serfhood, marriage, guardianship, market system, coinage 
system, freedom of trade.” 
 
Weber (1919:1) emphasizes his definition of the states is one of "means" and not 
"ends". For Weber the means is the legitimate use of force when deemed necessary 
and argues 
“Sociologically the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends. There is 
scarcely any task that some political association has not taken in hand, and 
there is no task that one could say has always been exclusive and peculiar to 
those associations which are designated as political ones: today the state, or 
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historically, those associations which have been the predecessors of the 
modern state”. 
Weber’s contributions have led to the extension of discussions on an exact definition 
of the state. Jackson (1990) suggests that Weber’s definition of the state as means 
driven – with reference in particular to the means of force – emphasises the existence 
of empirical or de facto statehood. In other words, the state has the capacity to govern. 
This is opposed to juridical or de jure statehood where the state has the legal right to 
govern but may not have the capacity to enforce this legal right. While Weber does 
not dismiss the juridical state outright, he fails to incorporate juridical characteristics 
into his definition of the state (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982).  In this sense Weber’s 
definition requires refinement since, in reality, the state needs not just sociological or 
empirical authority from its citizens to survive but jurisdiction authority grounded in 
legal rules. Brownlie (1983) provides a description of the juridical characteristics 
necessary for de jure statehood such as a legally recognised territory, supporting a 
stable population, with the enforcement of governance and the sovereign right to enter 
into relations with other states. 
 
2.2.3 State Capacity 
A definition of state capacity can be acquired from an examination of state 
sovereignty. Goldmann (2001) distinguishes between state sovereignty and state 
capacity. The reason for such a distinction is based on the premise that sovereignty 
can exist in “internal” and “external” forms. Internal sovereignty is the legitimate 
right of the state to govern its own affairs. External sovereignty pertains to the 
acknowledgement of other states to the legitimacy of authorities in existence in a state 
to govern their own affairs, without external influence. State capacity refers to the 
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ability of the sovereign state to dispense the authority bestowed upon it by itself, and 
while this is distinct from state sovereignty in some countries, any distinction between 
the two in developed countries is negligible (Goldman 2001; Axtmann 2004).  
 
The history of state formation is littered with examples of prolonged efforts by 
authorities to turn juridical statehood into de facto or empirical statehood (Axtmann, 
2004). Many states created after the Second World War, particularly those in Africa, 
display characteristics more akin to juridical statehood than empirical statehood. The 
sovereignty of these “quasi-states1” generally originates not in the capacity or their 
government to rule, but in a legal right granted to them by external forces, upon which 
these states rely on to exist (Jackson, 1990; Axtmann, 2004). Weber argues that if de 
facto statehood is to truly exist, two coexisting forces of coercion cannot survive 
within the same jurisdiction. “Quasi-states” often fail to meet this requirement. The 
inability of the “quasi-state” to establish a permanent right to the legitimate use of 
force over a territory, results according to Weber, not in a quasi-state but more 
appropriately a situation of "statelessness” (Weber, 1965; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982). 
If an internal or external group can successfully challenge the incumbent authority by 
means of force or otherwise, and create a geographic area where they possess a 
monopoly on the lawful use of violence, it thereby attains the qualities of statehood. 
 
In spite of the legal structures that are put in place to cement of the power of the state, 
Weingast (2005) points out, that states can and do still fail. In fact, Weingast suggests 
that most constitutions fail, ultimately leading to the failure of the state. The laws 
                                                          
1
 The quasi-state exists in a juridical sense. The state has the legal right to rule but may not have the 
capacity. The quasi-state is endorsed by a collection of other sovereign states, each with empirical 
statehood. 
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enacted by the state require the backing and approval of the public. Such approval is 
often influenced by the state, through careful manipulation of public opinion, which 
provokes emotive and psychological reactions and can help explain why some laws 
are obeyed and not others (Hodgson, 2009).  
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2.3 THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE  
Understanding the evolution of the state from a primitive to highly complex order is 
necessary to appreciate the continued development and increasing capacity of 
developed countries today. The empirical tests following in Chapter 6 are grounded in 
the logic that the economic, political and social conditions, enabling an expansion of 
state capacity, resulted in higher living standards for all citizens. These tests examine 
the state from the late nineteenth century. Unfortunately, the availability of data 
before this time is, in many cases, non-existent even for developed countries. 
However, despite the lack of data preceding the early 1800s, an understanding of the 
evolution of the state is essential in order to appreciate the empirical tests. North, 
Wallis & Weingast (2009) provide an overview of the evolution of the state from 
what the authors’ term the “natural state” and “open-access” state, on which this 
section is loosely based. However, the terms “natural” and “open-access” are replaced 
with what this research believes are more appropriate names, discussed later in this 
section. Furthermore, it is important to note that the evolution of the state had been 
recognised far earlier. Friedrich List was one of the first to write about individual state 
development. List (1885) notes by the middle of the nineteenth century the developed 
states in Europe had passed through five unique phases; barbarism, pastoral 
conditions, agricultural conditions, industrial conditions and commercial conditions. 
North, Wallis & Weingast (2009) analysis is a restoration of the central tenants of 
List’s main argument.  
 
North, Wallis & Weingast  (2009) argue that the emergence of the state and the laws 
that it depends upon, are almost inevitable given societies shift away from primitive 
tribal communities into highly stratified social systems. No longer can social norms, 
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customs or habits be used to enforce rules. Instead more rigid, formal, structured 
codes of conduct are required.  More than forty years earlier this process of change 
had been considered by Cyril Black under a different guise – that of modernisation. 
Black (1966) argues with the passage of time, traditional institutions evolve modern 
functions, reflecting the exponential increase in knowledge, acquired by human 
beings. Eventually a state acquires the most sophisticated political, economic, 
technological and social developments. The process of development is discussed more 
in Section 2.4. 
 
The work of primatologist Frans de Waal can help explain some of the psychological 
motivations behind the evolution of the state and conformity (or lack thereof) to its 
laws. De Waal (1982, 2009) describes the living conditions of humans and their 
ancestors. For millions of years humanity has lived in social groups which have had 
leaders and followers. Such groups did not emerge through intelligent design, but 
evolved slowly. Grief & Tabellini (2011) highlight the fact groups formed because of 
the benefits to cooperation and reduction in enforcement costs. This resulted in a 
scenario where all members of the group benefited from pursuing the cooperation 
strategy. States today exploit the instinctive, impulsive behaviour inherent in their 
citizen to belong and conform to a social group. Such instinctive behaviours often 
ensure citizens bow to authority imposed upon them by the state, with lower layers of 
the social spectrum deferring to the authority of those above them. The state could not 
survive without this instinctive behavior since if the state is to exist, the subjugated 
must conform to the authority of those that govern (Weber, 1965). In fact Hodgson 
(2009:158) states that “the very existence and functioning of complex state machines 
depends on...obeisance”. Milgram (1974) illustrates the innate tendency of humans to 
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adhere to authority despite the potential consequence of their actions. The reason for 
such behaviour is the “inherited, instinctive propensity for obedience”, increasing the 
chances of acceptance into a cohesive social group and ultimately, increasing the 
chances of survival (Hodgson, 2009). The obedience of citizens living within a state 
to its laws is necessary for the state to exist and develop. Fortunately for those in 
authority, obeisance to the state is instinctive within humans, and needs less coercion 
from authority to engrain it in the minds of citizens, than one may expect. As Hayek 
(1973:11) wrote that “Man is as much a rule-following animal as a purpose-seeking 
one”. 
 
Before this section addresses the pre-modern and modern states, it is importance to 
note the difference between citizens conforming to authority and obeisance to 
authority. Weingast (2005) presents a game involving two citizens and a dictator 
whose primary objective is to remain in power. Weingast (2005) demonstrates the 
difficultly for citizens attempting to remove the dictator; coordination being one 
problem, while a divide-and-conquer strategy of the incumbent being another. Both 
strategies ensure that the dictator can remain in power. In this case citizens are 
conforming to the authority of the dictator. Obeisance to authority is quite different as 
it requires acceptance of that authority. Obeisance to the state plays a crucial role in 
the later stages of state development when authority and the stratification of society 
have become more apparent. The instinctive obedience among citizens living within a 
state to bow to the authority of the legislative is grounded in habit; the habit of 
obeisance.  Hodgson (2006a) states that in order for habits to be established, repeated 
behaviour is necessary. Such behaviour has had ample time to be established during 
the ‘deep time’ necessary for evolution of the human race or as William James 
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(1892:143) puts is “habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious 
conservative agent”. The significance of habits and routines on the evolution of 
institutions fundamental to the state are recognised by Veblen (1914) and Hardin 
(1982). Hodgson (1996) develops the work of Veblen (1919) by pointing out that 
institutions supporting the state have emerged from an evolutionary process and are 
inherently linked to habits, routines and stability passed on through generations. 
 
2.3.1. The Autocratic State 
Western Europe today is a complex and well-defined geographic region. The 
economic systems, which are almost universal across Western Europe and the 
developed world, are grounded in the ideas of capitalism. These systems began to 
emerge in Europe during the merchant era with the production, buying, selling and 
trading of domestically produced goods and services (Galbraith, 2004). In conjunction 
with this, fair taxation by the state emerged and facilitated an expansion of state 
capacity. List (1841) identifies that a state could reach its highest level of prosperity 
by simply taxing fairly and ensuring both justice and peace reign. Excluding major 
conflicts in Western Europe over the past number of centuries, which saw the 
temporary division of some states, the countries prevailing in Europe today emerged 
centuries ago. However, the roots of European state-building can be traced back much 
further than the emergence of capitalism or the borders of European states today. 
State-building initially emerged due to Roman and Germanic tribes, and a collection 
of tribal leaders, kings, princes, nobility, religious orders, merchants, guilds, even 
agrarian landowners (Strayer, 1963; Bendix 2002; Axtmann, 2004; North Wallis & 
Weingast, 2009). 
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A vast array of emigration, conflict and occupation that has characterised European 
state development over the past two millennia from the Roman Conquests, Celtic 
expansion, Germanic tribe invasions during the 4
th
 and 5
th
 centuries, Arab conquest of 
Iberia, Viking raids of Normandy and the British Isles, to the westward drift of the 
Slavs and eastward drift of the Germans during the 12
th
 century. The continued 
changes to European states, both in the form of occupation, diffusion of ideas or 
incursion into foreign territory, has shaped the states that are present in modern 
Europe, and has resulted in the formation of a complex, multifaceted and cultural 
diverse continent (Rokkan, Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin 1999). The state-building of early 
Europe resulted in differing sets of political, economic and social outcomes for each 
country. Whilst outcomes differed, the practical logic behind state-building was 
largely consistent across all countries. As a starting point Strayer (1963:19) provides a 
useful summation for this logic: 
“The process of building a state…took a long time, especially as it was done 
almost entirely with internal resources. The process seems to have been started 
by purely practical considerations. The mass of the population suffered from 
petty wars and general insecurity: it wanted more and better government, 
especially better administration of justice.” 
 
This definition offers an insight into the early considerations behind the development 
of states, with practical consideration the foundation of such decisions. Weber (1954) 
North & Thomas (1973) and Bendix (2002) argue early European states were 
generally characterised by regal legislators holding absolute power. This set of 
institutional structures is what North Wallis & Weingast (2009) call the “natural 
state”. For the purposes of this work the idiom ‘natural state’ is replaced with the 
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more appropriate term ‘autocratic state’. The reason for this change is due to the fact 
that there is very little ‘natural’ about the state. As mention at the start of Section 2.2, 
humanity survived for millennia within the existence of the state, their emergence a 
relatively new occurrence. In this sense, the state is far from ‘natural’. A far better 
terminology is the autocratic state. This description is compatible with Olson 1993 
paper Dictatorship Development and Democracy. Olson provides an excellent 
overview of the transition of that state and assumes the presence of a dictator. Such an 
assumption supports the “autocratic state” description.   
 
Autocratic states exist in three forms; fragile, basic and mature with the essence of all 
three grounded in personal relationships. Regardless of the level of development in a 
natural state, authorities have two functions. Firstly, rulers have absolute power over 
their subject but also a responsibility to provide protection to these subjects. Weber 
(1954) suggests this is the very essence of a feudal state as it, forms a “sacred bond” 
between ruler and subject. Secondly, as the power granted to a king or other ruling 
monarch is granted by God, authority is likewise granted from the same divine source. 
Any attempt to interfere with this could result in the damnation of the soul for 
eternity.  
 
2.3.1.1 Fragile Autocratic State 
The fragile autocratic state is scarcely capable of withstanding internal or external 
violence. A dominant coalition holds power whose commitments can change swiftly 
and are influenced by personal relationships and individual identity. North Wallis & 
Weingast (2009) suggest that citizens in the fragile autocratic state risk death when 
making political mistakes while wielding power in the dominant coalition is crucial 
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for individual prosperity. An absence of credible commitments mechanisms, to keep 
check on the ruling elite, ensures institutional structures are primitive. This fosters an 
environment of instability, the underdevelopment of public goods and absence of 
property rights.  
 
2.3.1.2 Basic Autocratic State 
The “basic” autocratic state emerges from a slow movement away from the fragile 
autocratic state. It is a consequence of increased ability to provide robust institutional 
structures within the organisational framework of the state. Such structures include 
succession arrangements following the death of a leader, taxation policy and judicial 
procedures to solve individual conflicts. Each of these arrangements reduces the threat 
of internal violence. While the control of internal violence is the key difference 
between the fragile and basic autocratic states, the latter does possess the same 
characteristics for organisational development. Identical to the fragile autocratic state, 
the basic autocratic state does not allow organisations outside of direct control of the 
dominant coalition to exist. Basic autocratic states are not adept at sustaining private 
arrangements, outside of the control of the state, as institutional structures cannot 
permit private activity to occur. Such activity could undermine the governance 
structure of the dominant coalition. Public institutions, developed by the state, do 
become more complex but the strength of these is based on the ability of those 
wielding power to make credible commitments about the future. All organisations are 
instead, integrated into the fabric of the dominant coalition (North, Wallis & 
Weingast, 2009). 
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2.3.1.3 Mature Autocratic State 
The final phase of the autocratic state is the “mature” phase. The mature autocratic 
state possesses both robust institutional arrangements and the ability to maintain both 
public and private organisations. The key difference from the basic autocratic state is 
the ability to sustain organisations outside the direct institutional scaffold of the state. 
In essence, the mature autocratic state facilitates both public and private organisations, 
through the development of both public and private legal arrangements. The robust 
institutional structures of the mature autocratic state are often capable of survival even 
if the dominant coalition is removed. This is a unique characteristic, as institutional 
arrangements in both the fragile and basic autocratic states collapse in the face of a 
shift in power. This stability and the incentives associated with it can lead to rapid 
economic growth (North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009). The mature autocratic state is 
further characterised by the development of ‘negative’ sovereignty, where formal 
legal institutions exists which sustain the state and ensure it is answerable to it citizens 
alone (Jackson 1990; Atxmann, 2004). ‘Positive’ sovereignty follows on from this 
once the state begins to provide public goods for all citizens.  
 
As states move from fragile to basic conditions relationships become more impersonal 
and organisations become more clearly defined and institutionalised. Movement to the 
mature autocratic state means the development of credible institutions that can survive 
or out-life the dominant coalition as well as the formation of private and public 
organisations outside the direct control of the state. The progression through the 
stages of the autocratic state is by no means inevitable. North, Wallis & Weingast 
(2009:73) point out that 
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“The dynamics of natural states are the dynamics of the dominant coalition, 
frequently renegotiating and shifting in response to changing conditions. If 
adjustments lead to more power and rents based on personal identity, 
institutions become simpler and organizations less sophisticated, and the 
society moves towards the fragile end of the progression of natural states. If 
adjustments lead to more power based on durable agreements, institutions 
become more complex and organisations become more sophisticated, and 
societies move toward the mature end of the progression. No compelling logic 
moves states in either direction”. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to note movement from fragile autocratic state to mature 
autocratic state and beyond cannot be thought of as a simple transition from a 
primitive, unstable institutional structure to a more robust set of arrangements. The 
process instead must be considered as an on-going phenomenon with an infinite time 
horizon. Black (1966) argues that it is a continuing set of changes, occurring 
simultaneously, which change static and intransigent autocratic institutions, allowing 
for the capacity to perform more complex and impersonal duties and exchanges. 
However, in spite of the different dynamics possessed by the fragile, basic and mature 
autocratic states, one common thread running through all three, ensuring a perpetual 
‘autocratic’ level of advancement; the ruler is above the legal system. In fact, in many 
autocratic states not only is the ruler above the law but so too are the institutions and 
organisations of the dominant coalition. This issue has plagued every country for 
thousands of years and has only been overcome recently by a handful of states. Those 
that have overcome this problem have created a dual system of governance; a personal 
identity and a social identity (North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009).  The latter (the office) 
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has been able to constrain the former (the office holder). This development has moved 
the state to a new order which this research now considers.    
 
2.3.2 The Democratic State 
Just twenty-five countries in the world today can be considered to be what North, 
Wallis & Weingast (2009) term “open-access orders”. The remaining one hundred 
and seventy-five states are stuck in perpetual degrees of the autocratic state. Again, as 
with the term “natural state”, this research replaces, North, Wallis & Weingast (2009) 
“open-access order” idiom with the term ‘democratic state’. Various other names 
could have been used such as the inclusive state, impersonal state or modern state. 
The democratic state is chosen as mass enfranchisement is consistent across all 
countries at this stage of development. While this may not be so at the commencement 
of the ‘democratic state’ the prevailing conditions act as the catalyst allowing this to 
happen. Furthermore, the impact of democracy on economic growth and institutional 
flexibility are central themes throughout this thesis and therefore the use of the term 
‘democratic state’ is deemed appropriate.  
 
To understand why so few states have made the jump from autocratic to democratic 
state, one must consider when the transition to the democratic state became possible. 
While different dates have been suggested for this transformation, this research 
identifies the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 as the starting point for the possible 
emergence of the democratic state. However, while the Treaties provided the 
opportunity for democratic state to emerge, the first of these did not appear until the 
early nineteenth century (North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009). 
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Following the Treaties, the theory of ‘state sovereignty’ was enshrined internationally 
among states and ensured the legislative authority in a state alone held authority over 
its people and resources. No external force had the right to exert its authority over that 
of the sovereign state. In effect, the state was accountable to no authority but itself. 
While negative sovereignty existed since the mature autocratic state, positive 
sovereignty takes root once the state reaches the democratic phase (Jackson 1990; 
Atxmann, 2004). Not only does the democratic state possess institutions, which 
maintain negative sovereignty of the autocratic state, it now has positive sovereignty 
and the capacity and resources to bestow political goods upon its citizens such as 
peace, security from internal and external forces, freedom and equality to all citizens, 
justice, democratic rights, thus preserving the state itself. Positive sovereignty is an 
indicator of a transformation of the goals of authority, away from absolute rule, 
towards the incentivising citizens to achieve their productive capabilities (Jackson, 
1990; Axtmann, 2004). Additionally, the Treaties Westphalia guaranteed governments 
would not seek to reward some groups in society and alienate others, such as minority 
ethnic or religious factions, undermining their citizenship. More importantly, The 
Treaties altered the power structure in European states away from small groups or 
dominant coalitions of the autocratic state, in favour of the centralised institutions of 
the state (Anderson, 1996; Axtmann, 1996 & 2004). This section now considers the 
three key characteristics of the democratic state. 
 
2.3.2.1 Shared Belief System & Universal Inclusion 
Central to the democratic state is a shared belief system and inclusion of all citizens. 
All citizens are considered equal under the law and have the right to form 
organisations, lobby groups, make private contracts and agreements, access the 
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judiciary when necessary and avail of public goods provided by the state (North, 
Wallis & Weingast, 2009). While the autocratic state is characterised by stable local 
groups, a relatively simple and stable occupational differentiation and a predominately 
subsistent society, the democratic state is industrialised, market-orientated with 
machine technology, rational, secular, possess a high degree of social mobility, well-
developed occupational systems and an egalitarian class system. Sustained increases 
in incomes per person follow, exceeding anything that could be achieved under the 
autocratic state (Black, 1966; Inkeles, 1966; Huntington, 1971; Wrigley, 1972; Tipps, 
1973; Dixon, 1999).  
 
The inclusive nature of democratic state evolved further during the nineteenth 
century, recognising the rights of citizens to be part of democratic process. While 
inclusiveness took nearly a century or more in some cases to roll out fully, the 
processes commenced when enfranchisement became widespread during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. This process, discussed at greater length in 
Chapter 4, has resulted in a growth of inclusion, equality of opportunity and the 
replacement of ‘merit’ over ‘birth’. Bendix (2002) argues modern states can only truly 
exist when the link between the sovereign authority and privileges bestowed upon 
citizens through hereditary rights is broken. At no point in the history of humanity 
have power, status and income been distributed in a more equitable way. This 
situation has arisen due to the creation of political and social awareness amongst the 
majority of the population and a rejection of longstanding beliefs of hereditary 
entitlements (Black, 1966; Huntington, 1971; Lee, 1973). This transformation has 
been made possible by the exponential increase in the knowledge of mankind over the 
past two and a half centuries. The increase in human knowledge has allowed for 
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greater control over the environment, with the changes occurring in Western Europe 
during the mid-1800s, acting as the catalyst for the transformation these states (Black, 
1966; Desia, 1971). This transformation is comparable in size to the decision of 
nomadic peoples to settle and engage in agriculture some 10,000 years earlier 
(Bendix, 2002).  
 
2.3.2.2 Spread of Citizen Rights, Extension of Franchise & Clerical Decline  
The second key characteristic of the democratic state revolves around the relationship 
centralised authorities have with citizens and the codification of citizen rights living 
under the jurisdictional authority of the state. A core element of the transformation of 
European states after the French Revolution was the codification of rights between 
each individual citizens and the state (Torpey, 2000; Bendix, 2002; Axtmann, 2004). 
The emergence of democratic European states, made possible by the Treaties of 
Westphalia, was galvanised by the radical social and political upheaval of twin 
revolutions in Western Europe during this period; the Industrial Revolution beginning 
in the United Kingdom and the French Revolution. De Tocqueville (1955) calls this 
period of European state-building ‘The Great Transformation’ and the beginning of 
the start of an age of equality, which ultimately lead to the establishment of rights for 
every citizen (Bendix, 2002).  The development of the democratic state rests upon 
successfully delivering these rights to citizens, in the process differentiating citizens 
from non-citizens, in an attempt to protect those that need to be protected and to 
develop a capacity to “embrace” each citizen so the state can extract resources from 
them.  
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Events in France in 1789 advanced the rights of citizens on two fronts, by increasing 
those considered fit for “functional representation” and by advancing the 
“plebiscitarian principle”.  Functional representation exists when a public assembly 
consists of only those deemed “proper” to hold such office. In medieval Europe such 
assemblies would have consisted of elders, grand masters of guilds and wealthy land 
owners.   The plebiscitarian principle refers to a direct vote to all those qualified to 
vote under the electoral system present in a country.  According to this principle, any 
such authority which is deemed to interfere in the relationship between the state and 
individual citizens must be destroyed so that each individual citizen can enjoy the 
rights and privileges granted to all under that citizenship.  
 
Marshall (1964) claims as the democratic state evolved, the rights of citizenship 
developed along three separate dimensions. Each citizen was entitled to equality of 
‘civil rights’ such as freedom of speech, the right to a fair trial, the right to worship. 
Each was entitled to ‘political rights’ such as the right to vote or stand for election 
(the many changes in voting rights across European countries are presented in 
Appendix 3.1). Finally, each had ‘social rights’ bestowed upon them such as the right 
to personal security or the right to live as a civilised citizen. Each of these three 
dimensions were enacted through four separate public institutions; the courts 
(protecting civil rights); regional and state representative bodies facilitating political 
interaction (political rights); social services to ensure a basic level of protection for all 
citizens from hunger and starvation; and the provision of schools to provide basic 
education to the young (social rights).  As societies became wider, the qualifications 
necessary to be regarded eligible to vote were reduced resulting in a far broader 
electorate (Bendix, 2002). 
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The spread of the rights of citizenship, allowing the election of a popular government, 
is a defining moment in the evolution of the state, as the ruling elite become 
answerable to the law of the state and can be removed through legal procedures. The 
spread of political competition in the democratic system ensures losers in the electoral 
process are not punished (North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009). This assumption is 
grounded in the idea that citizens have the capacity to govern themselves and 
intelligently partake in the democratic process, with no one person in society deemed 
“better qualified” than others to wield the power of authority (Dahl, 2000; Axtmann, 
2004). The transformation of the state from an individual with absolute power to a 
collective society, based on citizen rights and democratic freedoms, further enhances 
the notion of sovereignty. No internal or external force is deemed to have the 
authority to undermine the transformed, democratic state.     
 
It emerged quite quickly it was easier to pioneer political and legal rights among 
citizens that social and economic rights. Due to this, the combination of political and 
legal equality and economic and social inequalities prevailing in Western Europe 
during the early 1800s stimulated much of the great state-building debate. It was only 
after these basic civil, political and social rights were extended to the lower classes of 
society that a country could be considered to be experiencing that latter phases of 
state-building. The right of all citizens to a basic level of education and the right to 
participate in elections are identified by Bendix (2002) as two key indicators of 
equality emerging in society. Once these rights are established among the lower 
classes, a state can be deemed to have reached a milestone in its development. The 
latter was greatly assisted by an enactment in French law in August 1792 extending 
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the rights of enfranchisement to all French males older than 21 years.
2
 Such an act, 
which extended the voting rights of the general population, is the first such by a 
European state to formally extend the plebiscitarian principle and was duly followed 
by others. The former, access to elementary education, has become a right of 
citizenship. Dual forces are responsible for the upholding of this right. On the one 
hand, government enforcement of a basic level of education ensures each citizen 
fulfils this obligation. On the other, parental responsibility, enacted in law, ensures all 
children receive primary education. The extension of compulsory elementary 
education and voting rights not only acted as building blocks in state-building but 
extended the power of central authorities over the Church, causing a State-Church 
divide, particularly on the delivery of education. The Church viewed these efforts of 
modernising countries as a systematic attempt to undermine its authority, as it created 
a direct link between each citizen and the state, which the Church could not exert its 
influence over.  Such a move, while controversial, is identified by Strayer (1963) as 
marking the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern state. Basic 
loyalties are transferred from the Church to the secular state, a change which, more 
than anything else, characteristics the emergence of a democratic state. 
 
2.3.2.3. Incentive Systems Preventing Rent-Seeking & Impersonal Exchange 
The third characteristic of the democratic state is the creation of incentive systems that 
minimise rent-seeking activity and result in impersonal exchange, the latter 
reinforcing the former. A fundamental problem with fragile and basic autocratic states 
is the widespread existence of personal exchange. Citizens are often treated 
differently based on who they are. The democratic state has evolved to a level of 
                                                          
2
 Excluded from this right were all “servants, paupers and vagabonds”, however the Constitution of 
1793 did extend the right to vote to paupers who had lived in a particular region or district for greater 
than six months (Bendix, 2002). 
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complexity that ensures citizens are treated the same regardless of background, belief 
or kin. Impersonal exchange permits governments to allocate resources and provide 
public goods on an impersonal basis, without reference to political beliefs or other 
characteristic. This impersonality extends to the rule of law and guarantees all citizens 
are not only bound by the rule of law, but that the law will be administered in an 
impartial and just manner. The widespread existence of impersonal exchange 
safeguards the system as individuals find it far more difficult to manipulate interests. 
Rights bestowed on all citizens limit the power of government, reducing the 
opportunity for rent-seeking behaviour and advancement through politically 
engineered channels (North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009). The emergence of stable 
democracies resulted in the establishment of self-enforcing limits on ruling coalitions, 
with elites having an incentive to respect rules (Przeworski, 1991; Weingast, 1997, 
2005; North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009).  
 
This evolution of incentive structures led to the birth of the ‘modern’ state, which 
began to display the most sophisticated political, economic, technological and social 
developments. It is facilitated by common law and common institutions, creating a 
greater sense of identity, governmental procedures, legal rights and cultural norms 
(Strayer, 1963). This process of development broke many hereditary rights. It is 
interesting to note that as the democratic state became more developed in Europe 
during the 1800s, an inconsistency emerged between the extensions political and legal 
rights on the one hand and economic and social rights on the other. As mention, 
Bendix (2002) believes it took considerable time for the latter to emerge in post 18
th
 
century Europe. Roland (2004) offers a useful insight into what he terms “fast-
moving” and “slow-moving” institutions. This insight may be able to explain the 
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historical conflict experienced during later stages of state-building, where legal and 
political rights were at odds with economic and social rights. Roland considers 
political and legal institutions to be generally “fast-moving”. For example, political 
institutions could change overnight following the election of a particular party or due 
to an event such as a revolution or coup d’etat. In this sense, changes can be fast-
moving. In contrast, economic and social rights or norms are generally slow-moving. 
For example, a social norm like societies’ attitude towards trade union membership or 
blood sports tend to change more slowly. Roland (2004) suggests that such 
intransigence is possibly due to the connection between social norms and religious 
beliefs which shape the values of many people in society. These religious beliefs have 
been unchanged for millennia in some cases and consequently cause social norms to 
change very slowly.
3
 
 
2.3.3 The Process of Modernisation in Democratic States  
The evolution of the state, from a set of ‘autocratic’ institutions to a democracy, has 
allowed a small set of countries to advance along the path of modernisation (North, 
Wallis & Weingast, 2009). While it has to be stated the Treaties of Westphalia in 
1648 acted as the catalyst for this, the democratic state and subsequent modernisation 
did not begin apace until the mid-1800s. The two major European conflicts of the 
twentieth century continued the process, having just as dramatic impact on the shape 
and design of European countries. By the end of the Second World War almost every 
Western Europe country was considered to be ‘modern’ as citizens began to think in 
terms of the interest of the state, rather than provincial interests (Black, 1966). 
                                                          
3
 It is important to note that this is not necessarily always the case with social norms. For example the 
introduction of legislation with prevents the smoking of cigarettes in public houses and restaurants in 
some countries caused an immediate and dramatic shift in society’s attitude and tolerance of cigarettes 
and their use. Quickly new norms emerged as smokers were forced to engage in this activity in 
designated areas or outdoors.   
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Modernisation is therefore the path democratic states have embarked upon since 
shedding the characteristics of early autocratic states.  
 
The relevant literature on modernisation itself is extensive, scattered and beset by 
profound confusion regarding an exact definition of what is modern, what is not, and 
what ‘modernisation’ exactly refers to. The concept of modernisation first came to 
widespread prominence during the 1950s and 1960s due to increased interest in the 
idea, particularly among American economists, after the development of global 
economies post World War II. Many attempts have been made to define exactly what 
economists and other social scientists mean when they use the term modernisation. As 
yet, no consensus has been agreed upon. However, it is undeniable, regardless of how 
one defines the concept, developed states have experienced rapid modernisation over 
the past 250 years, transforming from autocratic rule to modern democratic states 
(North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009). The encompassing nature of the term 
modernisation, which incorporates political, economic, technological and social 
changes across society, has resulted in the process being described as an umbrella 
concept as it performs an aggregating function, combining many sub-concepts under 
one idea. This conveys a very complex picture as it is both a ‘process’ and a ‘product’ 
and is often cited as a primary obstacle in resting upon a definition which is 
universally acceptable to all. Instead it is argued that the popularity of modernisation 
as a concept is rather due to its capacity to summarise the development of democratic 
states. The process has undoubtedly had a transformational, progressive and 
multifaceted impact on developed countries, changing almost every institution. 
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While the outcome of the process tends to have a revolutionary impact on a state, the 
passage of time required for such an impact is described as evolutionary (Huntington, 
1971; Desia, 1971; Tipps, 1973). In the same way the mature autocratic state was 
impacted by events in Europe such as the Treaties of Westphalia, the French 
Revolution and Industrial Revolutions, Persson (2010) offers three plausible 
explanations for the explosion in living standards in democratic states and the 
beginnings of modernisation during the nineteenth century. Persson (2010) argues that 
advent of science-based knowledge, the flow of innovations and new products and the 
increasingly efficient processes and technologies that emerged during the 1800s, all 
resulted in increased investment in capital and labour, resulting in large increasing in 
the productive capacity of both factors of production. By the late 1800s the “open-
access order” described by North, Wallis & Weingast (2009) was well established in 
Western Europe. The continued improvement of the democratic state prompts Dixon 
(1999) to suggest that the process had transformed the predominately subsistent, 
agrarian natural states into urban, industrialised, market-orientated or ‘modern’ 
economies. Sustained increases in income per person followed, exceeding anything 
that could be achieved under traditional institutions. Interestingly, Lee (1973) claims 
this process of modernisation was a consequence of “the growth of equality of 
opportunity” in Western Europe during the 1800s, following the Reform Acts in the 
United Kingdom.  
 
The early democratic orders of the 1800s were unique in that an unparalleled number 
of innovations and ideas appeared which continue to dominate life today. Such 
breakthroughs include mechanised production, new ways to apply scientific 
knowledge to healthcare, electricity, the combustion engine and motor car, new 
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farming methods, household appliances, information technology, wireless 
communication devices and the telephone. Such change occurred with the 
introduction of steam power and later the arrival of electrical power to drive 
machinery or the development of new, faster methods to produce industrial goods.  
(Smelser, 1963; Persson, 2010).  This transition occurred across the full spectrum of 
society. Smelser (1963) argues that these changes consist of “structural 
differentiation”, as with each case of technological or industrial change, pre-existing 
structures were substituted with greater specialisation.  
 
As with the autocratic state moving between fragile, basic and mature order, the 
modernisation of the democratic state is not necessarily inevitable (Lerner, Pevsner & 
Riesman, 1958; Tipps, 1971). The drift towards a scientific understanding of things 
was very much a European ‘innovation’ (Persson, 2010). By the end of the nineteenth 
century Europe possessed the institutional arrangements necessary for the transfer of 
knowledge and technology to the mass of the population. Abramovitz (1986) calls 
these arrangements ‘social capabilities’. By the turn of the twentieth century these 
social capabilities included the delivery of a minimum level of education to the entire 
population and a financial system supporting enterprise and innovation. Nineteenth 
century modernisation did come at a cost. Dixon (1999) suggests the bureaucratic 
institutions, a feature of modern states, wield a much tighter fiscal control over 
citizens and often seek to consolidate and increase this hold. A discussion of this is 
provided in Chapter 3, while many aspects state development and the increase in 
bureaucracy are tested in Chapter 6 to establish the impact of both on the rate of 
economic growth.  
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2.4 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS OF STATE DEVELOPMENT 
The discussion in the chapter has been centred on the evolution of the state from 
fragile autocratic institutional arrangements through to the modern, democratic states 
existing today. For the benefit of the reader and the empirical tests that following in 
Chapter 6, it is necessary to discuss three comparative model of the state. The first 
two models provide a conceptual theoretical framework for the development of the 
autocratic state from fragile to basic to mature phase. The last model, developed by 
Black (1966), provides a cross-country empirical framework of state development, 
from the fragile autocratic state to, in some cases, a modern democratic state. Black’s 
model is currently the best tool mapping out the phases of state development from 
fragile autocratic state to democratic order.  The model has been used by Choi (1983), 
Hodgson (1996) and Dixon (1999) in an attempt to explain the rate of GDP per capita 
growth. The empirical tests following in Chapter 6 not only use this framework, but 
build on previous investigations using Black’ model.  
 
2.4.1 Theoretical Framework of the Autocratic State 
When considering the fragile and basic autocratic states, Parsons (1971) provides a 
useful paradigm and offers four unique processes, which primitive civilisations 
embarked upon during the early stages of state building. This model is presented in 
Figure 2.4.1. The emphasis in the model is on the earlier stages of development and a 
shift away from local, intransigent organisation of economic and political systems 
towards the basic autocratic state. The first of the four steps is the creation of 
institutions for dispute resolution such as a basic courts system. This is followed by a 
growth in military power which exerts control over adjacent populations, food supply 
and other resources. A disconnection with mythical believes and the consequent rise 
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of organised religion follows next. Lastly, the emergence of technically skilled 
craftsman, traders and merchants leading to the emergence of cities is the final step in 
Parson’s model. The concept of the city is a fundamental dimension in the history of 
state-building as they act as a source of power from which structure and control can 
emanate from.  
 
Figure 2.4.1 Parson’s Paradigm of the Basic Autocratic State 
 
Source: Parsons (1971) 
 
An excellent model conceptualising the process of state-building, moving from the 
basic autocratic state to the mature autocratic state, has been developed by Rokkan, 
Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin (1999) and builds on Parson’s (1971) earlier conceptual 
model. Rokkan, Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin (1999) go further than the parsimonious 
model presented by Parsons (1971) and attempt to offer a model which captures the 
complex nature of state-formation and state-building in Europe. The model is 
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illustrated in Figure 2.4.2 and is developed around three groups of “focal variables”, 
the most important of the three “total system variables”. Total system variables 
represent components and phases of change in the whole system within the territorial 
area of ruling elites (Rokkan, Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin, 1999). The total system 
variables focus primarily on the interaction of four components identified by Rokkan, 
Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin (1999) as the cornerstones of the state. These are listed as 
“force”, “culture”, “law”, and “economy”.  Force refers to some form of protection of 
national borders through aggressive action if necessary. Culture refers to the universal 
acceptance of widespread beliefs. Law in the model indicates some basic standard by 
which disputes are controlled. Economy refers to the fact that each variable in the 
system is dependent for its survival on other agencies in the system. The model allows 
one to consider the integrated nature of the “total system variables” inherent in state-
building and the interaction of these four with more peripheral aspects of the state 
such as organisations for the control of resources or maintenance of internal order.  
 
The four corner elements of force, culture, law and economy presented in Figure 2.4.2 
provide the foundations for understanding the evolution of the state from the basic to 
mature autocratic phase. The mature state manages to establish law and order for all 
citizen, even if the ruling elite is outside this law, provides the basis for cultural 
beliefs to flourish, maintains a functioning and impersonal economic system and 
establishes full control of a specific geographic region. Each corner provides 
additional structures supporting the mature state, such as organisations for territorial 
management (force), internal order and diffusions of literacy standards (law), 
extraction of resources (economy) and the maintenance of ideologies (culture). 
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Figure 2.4.2 Conceptual Model of the Mature Autocratic State 
 
Source: Rokkan, Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin (1999) 
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Six periods
4
 are defined in the model each of which is regarded as playing a role in 
state-building in Europe. Rokkan, Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin (1999) suggest it is 
impossible to understand the intricate design and variation in the make-up of 
European states without travelling far back in the continent’s history, examining the 
initial early difference and initial territorial acquisitions. The early periods of this 
model are well defined by specific dates, with the later stages less clear. However, 
three events during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are regarded as having an 
exponentially large impact on the organisation of society and the rights of individuals. 
The first are the Treaties of Westphalia, the second the Industrial Revolution 
originating in England around 1760 and the third the political revolution in France 
from 1789 – 1794. These events are regarded as watershed moments in the history of 
European state-building (De Tocqueville, 1945; Bendix, 1980; Axtmann, 2004). A 
prominent characteristic of medieval Europe is the inherent nature of the mass of the 
population to work the land and exclusion from political participation. The Treaties of 
Westphalia, the French Revolution and the Industrial revolution saw the beginning of 
the end of this (Bendix, 2002).  
 
Rokkan, Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin (1999) develop their conceptual framework of the 
mature autocratic state by combining elements of Hirschman’s (1970) work with that 
of their own.
 5
 A paradox is posed regarding the early state-building of Western 
                                                          
4
 The six periods are as follows: Early Middle Ages; High Middle Ages; 1500 – 1700; 1648 – 1789 
(overlap of “territory” variable only here); Intensified State Building; and Urbanisation, 
Industrialisation, Secularisation.  
5 Rokkan, Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin (1999) work has been influenced by Hirschman’s (1970). In his 
paper Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Hirschman (1970) analyses the connections between decision-making in 
politics and the economy. Developed around three core elements of “loyalty” “voice” and “exit”, 
Hirschman identifies that at all levels of human life structures and procedures are present which capture 
these three. Examples of the three are offered by Rokkan, Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin (1999). If one 
considers the genetic code in cells and the immune defences in organisms, the basic structures which 
keep these systems intact should be considered to be “loyalty” mechanisms. The communication of the 
nervous system with all parts of the body ensuring information flows through this functioning system is 
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Europe. The continent developed “strong centres of territorial control at the edges of 
an old empire” hence paradoxically, the countries originally pioneered state-building 
were those that were not under the influence or control of the Roman Empire. England 
was clearly a state in the fifteenth century, at a time when French princes (such as the 
Duke of Burgundy) could still hope to split provinces from France and combine them 
with his holdings in the Low Countries (Strayer, 1963).  
 
However a number of key points have be raised as to the success of mainland 
European state building which followed the successful peripheral regions. Rokkan, 
Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin (1999)  note the advanced cultural, technological and 
organisation capacity of mainland Europe even during the early Middle ages. The 
well-developed and technologically advanced agrarian economy present in early 
Europe facilitated the mature autocratic state as a  large population could be fed and 
maintained through this advanced agriculture system (White, 1940; van Bath 1963). 
The fundamental rights and norms existing under Roman law, which permeated 
various territories, facilitated a coherent flow of information and trade, helping to 
advance the mature autocratic state (Smith & Wilhelm, 1928; David & Brierley, 
1978). The presence of cultural diverse and autonomous cities, facilitated the mature 
autocratic state, as each acted as centres from where institutional structure and 
procedures emerged.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
captured in the Hirschman model by the “voice” mechanism. These mechanisms allow for internal and 
external information to be supplied by component parts about conditions affecting the system. Finally, 
inherent in any system from basic DNA forms to complex state building, sources of change are 
identified. Mutations in DNA or the invasion of countries precipitate change. Hirschman captures this 
change using an “exit” mechanism; that is the transfer of a part of the system from one to another. 
 
62 
 
2.4.2 Black’s (1966) Model of Comparative State Development  
Black (1966) provides a comparative model of state development from a starting point 
of 1649 up to 1965, for approximately 150 countries. Black’s model examines four 
stages of development, and is an attempt to identify the progression of countries 
through the stages of state development, from autocracy to democracy. The model 
identifies seven patterns of development, the first commencing in the United 
Kingdom in 1649 and France in 1798 and the last in Africa post World War II. Black 
(1966) suggests the comparison of states facing similar sets of conditions at a given 
moment in time is far more appropriate than comparing states phases of development. 
The phases of development are broken into four categories. The four used by Black 
(1966) are the Challenge of Modernity (CoM), Consolidation of Modern Leadership 
(CML), Economic and Social Transformation (EST) and Integration of Society (IoS). 
Table 2.4.1 presents an abridged version of suggested years for the commencement 
and end of each phase of state development for the fifteen countries, considered in the 
empirical tests in Chapter 6. It is important to note that Table 2.4.1 includes only three 
of the four phases. Black (1966) argues that the initial stage of modernisation, 
Challenge of Modernity, is more generally defined in terms of its starting point than 
the remaining three phases, and therefore it is not possible to establish a year of 
commencement. The United Kingdom was the first state to consolidate modern 
leadership, coinciding with the commencement of Cromwell’s reign in 1649, and 
along with France, are the only states in Black’s first pattern of development.  
 
Column Two in Table 2.4.1 presents the patterns development identified by Black 
(1966). These ‘patterns’ are groups of countries, which Black assumes modernise 
together. For example, France and the United Kingdom are assumed to be in Pattern 1 
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and were the first two countries to enter Black’s CML phase. New World offshoots 
are group together in Pattern 2 and are thought of as the second group of countries to 
entry the CML phases. The bulk of countries in Table 2.4.1 enter CML in Pattern 3 
(between 1795 and 1848). Japan starts to consolidate modern leadership as late as 
1866 (Pattern 5).  
 
Table 2.4.1: Phases of State Development 
Country Pattern 
Consolidation of 
Modern 
Leadership 
Economic  and 
Social 
Transformation 
Integration 
of Society 
Australia 2nd 1801 - 1901 1901 - 1941 1941 -  
Austria 3rd 1848 - 1918 1918 -   
Belgium 3rd 1795 - 1848 1848 - 1948 1948 - 
Canada 2nd 1791 - 1867 1867 - 1947 1947 -  
Denmark 3rd 1807 - 1866 1866 - 1945 1945 - 
France 1st 1798 - 1848 1848 - 1945 1945 - 
Germany 3rd 1803 - 1871 1871 - 1933 1933 - 
Italy 3rd 1805 - 1971 1871 -   
Japan 5th 1868 - 1945 1945 -    
Netherlands 3rd 1795 - 1848 1848 - 1948 1948 - 
Norway 3rd 1809 - 1905 1905 - 1945 1945 - 
Sweden 3rd 1809 - 1905 1905 - 1945 1945 - 
Switzerland 3rd 1798 - 1848 1848 - 1932 1932 - 
United Kingdom 1st 1649 - 1832 1832 - 1945 1945 - 
United States 2nd 1776 - 1865 1865 - 1933 1933 -  
 Source: Black (1966) 
 
Table 2.4.2 is an attempt to explain why Black (1966) chose the selected dates in 
Table 2.4.1 as a means of explaining entry into the various phases of modernisation. 
Following on from Table 2.4.2 each of Black’s phases are discussed and examined in 
conjunction with the phases of state development forwarded by North, Wallis & 
Weingast (2009).  
 
 
 
Table 2.4.2: Major Events Table for Commencement of Phases 
Country Consolidation of Modern Leadership (CML) 
Economic  and Social Transformation 
(EST) 
Integration of Society  
(IOS) 
Australia Unknown 
Australia becomes a federation 
US permitted on territory after Fall 
of Singapore 
Austria Hungary proclaims independence from Austria Austria is declared a republic    
Belgium Belgium becomes a part of France 
Uprisings in Provinces of Liège and 
Hainaut 
Benelux customs union established 
Canada Canada divided into lower and upper parts 
Dominion of Canada united 
Canada declared of equal status with 
UK 
Denmark 
Surrender to British after siege of Copenhagen  
Defeat in the Second Schleswig War And 
revision of the Danish constitution 
End of World War II 
France French Revolution Founding of Second Republic  End of World War II 
Germany Territorial reform of German States German Unification Adolf Hitler becomes Chancellor  
Italy Napoleon declares himself the Emperor of Italy  Rome replaces Florence as capital city    
Japan Meiji Restoration End of World War II   
Netherlands Velvet Revolution  
Revision of the constitution and 
establishment of parliamentary democracy 
Benelux Customs Union established 
Norway End of Dano-Swedish War Norway becomes independent kingdom  End of World War II 
Sweden Removal of monarchy’s absolute power  Union of Norway and Sweden dissolved End of World War II 
Switzerland Republic of Switzerland formed Swiss constitution is enacted Hosting of Olympic Games 
United 
Kingdom 
Cromwell's reign begins Reform Act  End of World War II 
United States Declaration of Independence Civil War Ends New Deal Begins 
Source: Timelines (2012)
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2.4.2.1 The Challenge of Modernity – Fragile to Basic Autocratic State 
The Challenge of Modernity forces pre-modern states to adopt and develop more robust 
institutions. It is a consequence of increased ability to provide robust institutional structures 
within the organisational framework of the state and demonstrates the movement from fragile 
autocratic state to a basic autocratic state. Such structures include clear succession 
arrangements, defined taxation policy and a judiciary with the authority and power to deal 
with legal conflicts. Internal violence is reduced as robust institutional structures reduced the 
incentive to act in a coercive manner. When faced with this first phase, the ruling coalition 
more often than not accept some of the reorganisation required by society and reject others 
suggestions (Black, 1966; North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009). 
 
2.4.2.2 Consolidation of Modern Leadership – Basic to Mature Autocratic State 
Consolidation of Modern Leadership begins with a transfer of power away from the 
traditional, hereditary base established by the ruling coalition to the emerging, educated 
middle classes. Communities move from a predominantly agrarian way of life towards a 
politically organised society, with stable institutions. The state extends its control over the 
population and has a direct relationship with every citizen. This relationship starts when 
centralised taxation exists and government expenditure extends to satisfy the needs of the 
state such as the establishment of an education system (Black, 1966). The robust institutional 
structures that develop after the consolidation of modern leadership, ensures the state is 
capable of survival even if the dominant coalition is removed. This characteristic equates the 
consolidation of modern leadership to the commencement of the mature autocratic state. The 
stability that consolidation of modern leadership brings leads to rapid economic growth, the 
expansion of the state and formal legal institutions exists which are self-reinforcing and 
66 
 
ensures the state alone is answerable to it citizens (Jackson 1990; Atxmann, 2004; North, 
Wallis & Weingast, 2009).  
 
2.4.2.3 Economic and Social Transformation – Mature Autocratic State to Democratic State 
Economic and Social Transformation is deemed to exist when societies are largely urban in 
nature and the majority of the population is focused on the national agenda. The need for 
organisation at political levels of society is essential for achieving an economic and social 
transformation as institutions forming the basis for an democratic state emerge (Black, 1966). 
Economic and Social Transformation (EST) is akin to the commencement of the democratic 
order as both North, Wallis & Weingast  (2009) and Black (1966) stress the importance of the 
mass of society playing a political role. Black (1966) suggests that at the start of this phase 
only a small fraction of the population exercise political power but a broadening of the 
political base soon follows, where larger sections of the population become enfranchised. All 
citizens are considered equal under the law and have the right to form organisations, lobby 
groups, make private contracts and agreements, access the judiciary when necessary and avail 
of public goods provided by the state (North, Wallis & Weingast , 2009).  EST recognises the 
rights of citizens to be part of democratic process. This development precipitates the 
democratic state, delivering rights to all citizens such as a basic level of education, the right 
to participate in elections, a set of incentive minimising economic rent-seeking, permit 
impersonal exchange and providing public goods to where they are most needed.  
 
2.4.2.4 Integration of Society – Modernisation of Democratic State  
The integration of society is the final phase in Black’s model and occurs when a state moves 
from regional and occupational groupings to relative isolation. It is important to note that this 
phase is similar to the modernisation of the democratic state. The process has undoubtedly 
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had a transformational, progressive and multifaceted impact on developed countries. 
However, Black (1966) argues the integration of societies does come at a cost as states 
become institutionalised over time, a consequence of the division of power among citizens 
leading to increased bureaucratisation. The slowing growth rates experienced by earlier 
integrating states is an example of however these countries have experienced the ossification 
and institutionalisation of the once flexible democratic states. This concept fits with the 
model of institutional sclerosis as described by Olson (1982) and is discussed in detail in the 
next chapter.  
 
2.4.3 Deficiencies in Black’s Model of Comparative State Development  
Black’s model, while lacking rigor, is still important as it provides the best attempt to date at 
distinguishing when countries passed through the phases of state development. That said 
there are two key defects, which the reader needs to be made aware of. The first drawback of 
Black’s model of comparative state development is the arbitrary selection of years delineating 
phases of development. Table 2.4.2 attempts to lists events coinciding with Black’s starting 
years of CML, EST and IOS. While some Black (1966) years are obvious events, causing 
states to move through the phases of development, others are far more arbitrary. With the 
exception of CML in Australia, which Black assumes commenced in 1801, it is possible to 
identify key events in each country that shaped economic, social and political into the future. 
For example, in the United Kingdom the commencement of Cromwell’s regain (1649), the 
Reform Act (1832) and the End of World War (1945) are assumed by Black to correspond 
with the start of CML, EST and IOS respectively. However, these dates could have easily 
been the Glorious Revolution (CML – 1688), defeat of the French at Battle of Trafalgar (EST 
– 1805) and the granting of female suffrage (IOS – 1928). This is true for many of the 
countries in the sample and it can be argued some of the suggested years selected by Black 
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are superseded by other events in specific countries, which had more important and far-
reaching economic, political and social consequences. Furthermore, the selection of some 
years appears to be very arbitrary. Examples include Denmark’s commencement of the 
consolidate modern leadership in 1807 upon entering the Napoleonic Wars, Italy’s economic 
and social transformation in 1871 following the replacement of Florence with Rome as the 
capital city and the enactment of the New Deal in the United State of America in 1936 
marking the integration of society. Black (1966) does not clearly explain why these events 
are selected over others.   
 
The second problem with the Black model is a lack of consistency when dealing with certain 
events. For example, a declaration of independence in the United States of America marks the 
starting point of Black’s second phase, the Consolidation of Model Leadership. Yet 
Norwegian independence is the starting point for the third phase, Economic and Social 
Transformation. Black does not explain why one declaration of independence is deemed to 
move a country to consolidate its leadership base and the other to the starting point of 
economic and social transformation.  Other inconsistencies include the selection of the end of 
World War II as the starting point for Integration of Society in some countries directly 
involved in the war and not others. For example, Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom all enter Integration of Society in 1945 yet Belgium, Canada and the 
Netherlands do not enter this phase until 1947 or 1948. Black (1966) provides no explanation 
for this delay. Additionally, explanation is required as to why Austria, Italy and Japan were 
still deemed not to have reached the final phase (Integration of Society) as late as 1965. 
While these defects limit the power of the model, they provide an opportunity to improve 
upon Black’s contribution. The empirical tests presented in Chapter 6 do this by not only 
testing the suitability of Black’s chosen years, but also providing years for the peak of EST.  
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter seeks to clarify and a number of key theoretical concepts and act has a 
foundation for the chapters to follow. Firstly, it seeks to provide a clear definition of an 
institution, for the purposes of this research, and the state.  The next objective is to provide 
the reader with a clear picture of the nature and pattern of the evolution of the state, from a 
primordial gathering of individuals, to a fragile construct of loose rules based on physical 
force onto the more robust states that follow, finally ending with the modern democratic state. 
It should be clear from this section that this process is by no means inevitable, with very few 
states making the jump from autocratic order to an impersonal, democratic and integrated 
society. 
 
This chapter seeks to provide clarity on conceptual frameworks used to model the state and 
the model developed by Black (1966) which is the cornerstone of much of the work presented 
in Chapter 6. Two natural state conceptual frameworks developed by Parsons (1971) and 
Rokkan, Flora, Kuhnle & Urwin (1999) are presented. Both provide a graphical illustration of 
the different stage of the autocratic state. The final model considered is the comparative 
model of state development produced by Black (1966). While useful, this model is in need of 
revision. The years Black (1966) selects, as the commencement date for phases of state 
development, are inconsistent and in some cases not obvious. The empirical tests in Chapter 6 
attempt to build on the model started by Black (1966) by providing a more rigorous approach 
to the years of Economic and Social Transformation. Finally, the chapter briefly mentions the 
damaging effect that stability can have on the capacity of institutions to perform the tasks 
they were established to do. This concept, known as institutional sclerosis and developed by 
Mancur Olson is now addressed in Chapter 3.    
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CHAPTER 3 – A REHABILITION OF MANCUR OLSON 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The objective of Chapter 3 is to demonstrate the importance of institutions in determining the 
rate of economic growth using the theoretical framework of Mancur Olson. It has been 
shown, convincingly by Olson (1982), much earlier by Veblen (1899) and later by Hodgson 
(1996), Rodrik (2007) and Acemoglu (2012) that institutions matter. The potency of 
institutions depends not just on their design, but upon many other factors, including the 
stability of a state and the passage of time. Furthermore, institutions of the past influence 
institutional change and lead states along marked institutional courses (Grief, 2006). These 
set courses ensure social networks and organisations inherited from the past form the basis 
for institutions of the future (Grief, 1989; Granovetter, 2002) as institutions ‘pass on’ the 
important elements that they possess to future generations (Veblen, 1919; Hodgson, 2006a).  
 
The passage of time and evolution of institutions, allowing routines and habits to form, is 
central to the works or Mancur Olson. The central argument or Olson’s ‘big idea’ suggests  
the passage of time and stability, while allowing institutions to evolve, ultimately proves to 
hinder economic growth as institutional sclerosis ossifies once flexible institutional 
arrangements. Historical evidence abound supports the view that institutional flexibility 
promotes economic development (Milgrom, North & Weingast, 1991; Grief, Milgrom & 
Weingast, 1994; Davis, 2010). This chapter will investigate institutional flexibility using 
Olson’s ‘big idea’ as the focal point. This is deemed an important contribution to the 
literature as there has been very little enquiry into the causes and effects of institutional 
flexibility on economic growth (Davis, 2010) The chapter is presented as follows: Section 3.2 
outlines Olson’s main idea, the original starting point for all his later works and presents 
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some alternative views of his hypotheis. Section 3.3  presents a new conceptual framework 
for considering institutional flexibility using the theoretical foundations of Olsonian theory, 
the “open-access order” described by North, Wallis & Weingast  (2009) and the model of 
state development presented by Black (1966) discussed in Chapter 2. Section 3.4 concludes 
the chapter. 
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3.2 THE IDEAS OF MANCUR OLSON  
A number of summary accounts exist tracing the life and works of Mancur Olson. Among 
these are Alt (1999), Dixit (1999), McLean (2000) and Oates, Oppenheimer and Schelling 
(2000). While the four differ on certain aspects of Olson’s contributions to institutional 
performance and economic growth, all agree his research was centred on his ‘big idea’; the 
logic of collective action. These summaries suggest Olson’s work can be broken into three 
separate phases. The first phase commences with the publication of his seminal work, The 
Logic of Collective Action in 1965. The start of the second phase coincides with the 
application of this logic to the economic development of countries and the publication of 
probably Olson’s most famous and cited work, The Rise and Decline of Nations in 1982. The 
last truncated phase of work concerns institutions and economic growth. This phase started in 
the late 1980s with the publication of “How Ideas Affect Societies: Is Britain the Wave of the 
Future” in 1989 and ended with Power & Prosperity, posthumously published in 2000, 
following Olson’s death in 1998 (Considine & Butler, 2010). This chapter is concerned with 
providing an overview of the first two phases of Olson’s work; the logic of collective action 
and Olson’s application of this logic to the economic performance of countries. All three 
phases are discussed by Considine & Butler (2010).  
 
3.2.1 The Logic of Collective Action 
In the Logic of Collective Action (hereafter LCA), Olson (1965) suggests collective actions 
by member of a group, which would be to the advantage of a group as a whole, will often not 
occur because individuals in the group remain inactive and seek to free ride on the work of 
others.  Using the economic tenets of methodological individualism and rational behaviour, 
Olson demonstrates this idea and explains individuals, acting rationally, could produce an 
irrational outcome for the group as a whole, similar to Hardin’s (1968) Tragedy of the 
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Commons dilemma. While this outcome might seem counterintuitive, Olson explains the 
rationale for it suggesting that in large groups, information and free rider problems prevent 
collusion, leading to a situation where individuals do not pursue actions in the best interests 
of the group as a whole, instead deciding to remain rationally ignorant (Olson, 1982). 
Rational ignorance is encountered when the cost of educating oneself about an issue 
sufficiently to make an informed decision outweighs any potential benefit one could 
reasonably expect to gain from that decision. This discussed in detail in Section 3.2.3. 
Because it is not possible to exclude representative individuals from the benefits of the 
collective good, the logical course of action for the rational individual is to do nothing and 
instead free ride on the efforts of other. 
 
In the LCA Olson explains under certain conditions rational ignorance can be overcome as 
groups form which seek to act collectively. Olson (1965) claims professional associations, 
farm organisations and trade union movements are similar for their members as public goods 
are for citizens living in a state; once something is provided for members or citizens everyone 
benefits from its provision. An increase in salary won by a trade union is granted to all 
workers under that union, not just those that negotiated the increase. Groups such as 
professional associations, farm organisations and trade unions form for this reason; what 
Olson (1965) calls selective incentives. Olson (1982:21) describes a selective incentive as: 
“One which applies selectively to the individuals depending on whether they do or do 
not contribute to the provision of the collective good…it can be either positive or 
negative; it can, for example, be a loss or punishment imposed only on those who do 
not help provide the collective good”. 
Positive selective incentives encourage collective action among individuals as rewards can be 
obtained if these selective incentives are exploited. In the case of the farm organisation it may 
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mean a price floor for dairy produce; for the professional association it could be a cap on the 
number of new entrants into a profession over a given period of time, ensuring competitive 
pressures in the industry are minimised. Of course, the same professional association engages 
in collective action under the pretence that their behaviour is in the public interest. Olson 
(1982:35) states that the professional association has been assisted in organising 
“By the distinctive susceptibility of the public to the assertion that a professional 
organisation, with the backing of government, ought to be able to determine who is 
“qualified” to practice the profession and thereby to control a decisive selective 
incentive”. 
 
Group size is an important dynamic in the logic of collective action. When the group is very 
large in size each individual in the group will benefit only slightly from the share of any 
benefits extracted from collective action. However, in smaller groups, the benefits of 
successful collective action are greater as each individual in the group manages to get a larger 
slice of the pie. Furthermore, because free riding often prevents collective action from 
occurring, in smaller groups those seeking to piggy-back on the work of others can be 
identified and punished more readily. This mechanism ensures greater cooperation among 
groups members and reinforces the collective action of the group. Therefore, successful 
groups need to be small enough so that strategic interaction between individuals can sustain 
the group, or alternatively, a group needs selective incentives that increase the benefit to 
members, while possibly excluding non-members. As Olson & Zeckhauser (1966) suggest, 
this paradoxically results in the exploitation of the many by the few. 
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3.2.1.1 Second-order Implications 
Olson’s theory would suggest numerous general implications for the establishment of special-
interest groups. Firstly, it is almost impossible for the most dispersed interests to coordinate 
and commence collective action. Examples include taxpayers or consumers. The sheer 
number of interests involved, the absence of a defined leader and an inability to know where 
and when to organise ensures such large groups, which would undoubtedly benefit from 
collective action, fail to do so. Secondly, the organisation of individuals into groups, seeking 
to engage in collective action, does not happen immediately. On the contrary, historical 
evidence confirms that it takes quite some time for common interests to come together and 
form groups. The first labour union in the UK did not appear until 1851, almost an entire 
century after the start of the Industrial Revolution (Olson, 1983). Once these groups do 
appear, those that incurred the cost of organisation will seek to ensure the group’s survival. 
The special-interest group will not simply waste or fade away (Weber, 1965; Olson, 1983; 
Considine & Butler, 2010). The consequences of these implications are relatively 
straightforward; over the long run, stable, democratic societies will accumulate groups for 
collective action. As time passes, more special-interests will emerge. While some groups will 
never be able to form, due to sheer size and dispersion, the groups that do form will persist 
through time and not fade away.   
 
Second-order implications, regarding the logic of collective action, affect the rate of 
economic growth. Because setting up and maintaining a special interest bears a cost on 
members, it follows that members of the same group will seek to redistribute income towards 
themselves through collective action, to compensate themselves for the costs associated with 
being a member of the group. For this reason, collective action decreases economic 
efficiency. Olson (1983) provides ample examples of this behaviour, such as the introduction 
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of tariffs on imported goods by industrial lobbyists or tax loopholes which encourage 
investment into activities displaying a low marginal social benefit. Additionally, narrow 
special-interest groups often block and prevent innovation, stifling growth in the economy. 
Two sources, separated by nearly one hundred years, confirm this view. Veblen (1915:17) 
argues along the following lines: 
“It follows also that these standing conventions out of the past unavoidably act to 
retard, deflect or defeat adaptation to new exigencies that arise in the further 
course…and so acts in some degree to lower the net efficiency of the industrial 
system which it pervades”. 
 
McCloskey (2010:20 – 21) provides an insightful example of collective action, stifling 
innovation and growth, in action: 
“A railroad was proposed in the early 1840s from Paris to Madrid. The city of 
Bordeaux, at a third of the distance, demanded that the railroad break there, on the 
argument that the break would “create jobs” for porters and hotels and 
cabs…according to “job-creating” logic every town along the route should see its 
opportunity and take it…Every few kilometres, at every country village, the railroad 
on the way to Madrid would end at a Gare du Nord to be resumed at a Gare du 
Sud…Jobs would be “created”. 
A further activity of the special-interest group is to limit entry into a market or profession. 
Such barriers lead to distortions in the market, making the economy less efficient. 
Additionally, barriers to entry reduce the rate of economic growth in the economy (Olson, 
1983) which Hicks (1983) rigorously proved reduce the rate of economic growth. 
Productivity increases in any industry raises income levels. Resource allocations which 
ensure economic efficiency are prevented or delayed by barriers to entry, resulting in lower 
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levels of economic growth. This logic only holds when the special-interest is small. Enhanced 
economic efficiency, or an increase in the rate of growth, can occur if the group is 
encompassing enough so that a considerable proportion of the population is represented e.g. 
Sweden (Olson, 1990). However, as has been discussed, the chances of a super-encompassing 
group forming are considerably less than small groups.  
 
Again, the size of the group becomes important in Olson’s understanding of the logic. It 
holds that individual group members in a small group, which successfully engages in 
collective action, receive a larger share of the gains of their action than members of a larger 
encompassing group, who receive a smaller percentage gain. However, the greater the size of 
the larger group the greater the dispersion of social and economic costs resulting from 
inefficient policy decision-making. It follows that as the size of the large group grows, the 
smaller the social cost becomes to each individual from collective action (Olson 1983; 1989; 
1990). In stable, democratic societies, the government assumes the role of the super-
encompassing interest group as it represents all citizens of the state. Logically, the 
government then has an incentive to engage in economic activities that are the most efficient 
for society. This would be true if the government was not influenced by lobbies and narrow 
special-interest groups. The success of collective action by the latter is determined by the 
relative strength of the government when facing up to less encompassing special-interest 
groups (Olson 1982 & 1983). The rate of economic growth can be improved if the 
government becomes stronger (greater majority) or by making the narrow special interest 
groups weaker.  
 
While super-encompassing groups do reduce the cost to each individual of inefficient 
decision-making from collective action, larger groups do not result in faster economic 
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growth. Olson (1983) claims because a group is large does not mean the action it seeks to 
pursue is growth enhancing. Furthermore, very large groups, which make up the vast 
proportion of a population, can lead to dictatorships and totalitarian rule, with minorities 
oppressed. Whether or not this style of government is growth-promoting or growth-retarding 
is discussed in Chapter 4 when the impact of democracy on the rate of economic growth is 
considered. Nonetheless, it is probable rather than certain, encompassing groups which make 
up a larger proportion of the population will attempt to engage in more socially beneficial 
collective than smaller, narrower groups, which have little incentive to engage in collective 
action that results in socially desirable outcomes.  The analysis in LCA did not mean that the 
free rider issue was necessarily a problem for society.  Olson was simply interested in 
explaining the logic.  He wanted to know what explained collective action.  As Oates, 
Oppenheimer & Schelling (2000:799) suggest: 
“Olson was not pro-union or anti-union, just interested in why unions had a hard time 
organising”  
 
3.2.1.2 Third-order Implications 
To recap, Olson (1965) explanation for the logic of collective action implies that through 
time individuals living in stable, democratic societies gather collectively into groups which, 
more probably than not, will be small in size. These small special-interest groups engage in 
collective action because the benefits from succeeding are confined to the group and the cost 
dispersed throughout society, of which the group makes up only a tiny fraction. Narrow 
special-interest groups do not fade away through time, but on the contrary, become more 
entrenched resulting in slower growth rates and lower levels of income as innovation and 
change are stifled or prevented entirely. While large groups, in some cases groups that are 
super-encompassing, are more likely to engage in collective action which is more socially 
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efficient, they may still slow down the rate of economic growth by pursuing inefficient 
objectives. Following this logic Olson (1983:25) argues: 
“Countries whose special-interest groups have been emasculated or abolished by  
totalitarian government and foreign occupation should grow relatively quick after a 
free and stable legal order is established. This helps to explain the marked 
underestimation of the growth that the war-torn economies would achieve after World 
War II, especially in the case of Germany and Japan”. 
 
The third-order implication assumes democratic states, immune from revolution or invasion, 
will be inundated with special-interest groups and will consequently suffer slower growth 
rates. Olson (1982) called this institutional sclerosis.  This implication helps explain the 
economic performance of France and the United Kingdom, two victorious countries, in the 
wake of World War II. This issue is investigated in detail in Section 3.2.2. Before the effect 
of collective action on the growth rate of countries is considered, one must explain another 
third-order implication. While differences in worker productivity have in the past been 
incorrectly attributed to one set of people being innately efficient or industrious and another 
group naturally lazy, real differences in productivity come down to incentives. Varying 
incentives result in differences in the efficiency of one workforce over another. These 
incentives are heavily influenced by the extent to which small special-interest groups are able 
to protect their members from what Olson (1983) describes as the “Darwinian process” of the 
economy. It was no surprise to Olson that absenteeism in Britain during the second half of the 
twentieth century was higher than it had ever been and coincided with Britain’s below 
average rate of growth. It was at this stage Olson became concerned with the consequences of 
collective action.  His next major contribution is testament to this. 
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3.2.2 The Rise & Decline of Nations  
The Rise and Decline of Nations (hereafter RADON) is the application of Olson’s logic of 
collective action to a set of developed countries. It is the most widely cited of Olson’s works, 
with over 1800 citations listed in the Social Science Citation Index (Heckelman, 2007).  A 
crucial difference between LCA and RADON is that in LCA Olson was concerned with the 
implications of group size in terms of actual numbers, whereas in RADON his attention 
turned to the size of the group relative to society as a whole.  For Olson the size of the group 
relative to society as a whole determined the manner in which that group would behave.  The 
reciprocal rule applies here
6
. A decision-making group encompassing all of society will select 
the optimal amount of public goods and tax accordingly.  There will be no rent-seeking 
redistribution.  By contrast, a decision-making group comprising 1% of society will only 
invest in public goods that generate a 100-fold increase in society’s product and will impose 
distribution taxes that maximise their tax take. While there are clearly incentives for groups 
of rent-seekers to form in their efforts to redistribute income, rent-seeking group activity must 
be subject to the same logic Olson applies to all groups in LCA.  Its members also have the 
incentive to free-ride.  Olson (1982) argues the passage of time in stable societies allows rent-
seeking groups to form, and once formed they are likely to seek the continuance of the status-
quo and oppose innovations that might undermine their privileged position. Many countries 
are used to illustrate this logic. The most frequently used by Olson and others to illustrate this 
is now considered – Great Britain. 
 
3.2.2.1 Great Britain and the Disease of Institutional Sclerosis. 
The name of Olson’s 1982 book The Rise and Decline of Nations gives an indication as to 
how he believes the economic performance of each country maps out through time. Olson 
                                                          
6
 This reasoning is implicit in Olson (1982).  An explicit form of this reasoning is presented in Olson (1993). 
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attributed the ‘rise’ to the benefits associated with collective action of the many or 
encompassing interests, for example the transition from dictatorship to democracy. The 
decline subsequently set in as the encompassing group broke into smaller pieces and other 
smaller groups assembled through time (Considine & Butler, 2010). Great Britain is used as 
the predominant exemplar of modern economic growth. North, Wallis & Weingast (2009) 
argue Great Britain is the first country to become an ‘open-access order’, while Black (1966) 
suggests Britain is the first to pass through all four stages of state development; with 
Economic and Social Transformation (EST) suggested to have commenced in 1832 following 
the first Reform Act and ending in 1945. Following this logic Great Britain becomes the 
cornerstone for explaining Olson’s theory. 
 
As the birthplace of parliamentary democracy and the location of the Industrial Revolution, 
Great Britain is the first example of a state experiencing modern economic growth (Considine 
& Butler, 2010). This enabled Great Britain to become the first state to exhibit control on a 
global scale with countries such as the South Africa, India, Australia and New Zealand all 
falling under the influence of British rule. In the absence of foreign invasion or political 
upheaval, Britain accumulated a growing number of small special-interest groups, which 
remained active due to the prolonged stability of the state since 1688. Following Olson’s 
logic, discussed in Section 3.2.1, the absence of disruption in Great Britain resulted in a ‘rise’ 
and ‘decline’. Olson (1982:78) states that the 
“Explanations of Britain’s relatively slow postwar growth, unlike many other 
explanations, is consistent with the fact that for nearly a century, from just after the 
middle of the eighteenth century until nearly the middle of the nineteenth, Britain was 
evidently the country with the fastest rate of economic growth. Indeed, during their 
Industrial Revolution the British invented modern economic growth. This means that 
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no explanation of Britain’s relatively slow growth in recent times that revolves around 
some supposedly inherent or permanent feature of British character or society can 
possibly be correct, because it is contradicted by Britain’s long period with the fastest 
economic growth. Any valid explanation of Britain’s relatively slow growth now must 
also take into account the gradual emergence of the “British disease”.     
 
This quotation asserts the ‘rise’ of Britain following the onset of the Industrial Revolution 
and the subsequent decline due to the ossification of institutions, compelling Olson to coin 
the term institutional sclerosis.  Institutional sclerosis or “British disease” led to the economic 
‘decline’ of a state. For Olson (1982:77) it is best explained by the fact that 
“Countries that have democratic freedom of organisation without upheaval or 
invasion the longest will suffer the most from growth-repressing organisations and 
combinations. This helps explain why Great Britain, the major nation with the longest 
immunity from dictatorship, invasion, and revolution, has had in this century a lower 
rate of growth than other large, developed democracies”. 
 
A number of interesting points can be extracted from these Olson’s quotations. Firstly, 
countries that overcome despotic rule, in the case of Great Britain when the absolute rule of 
the King was finally removed following the Glorious Revolution in 1688, the period of 
stability that follows promotes economic growth. Secondly, the slowdown in growth 
following long periods of stability cannot be attributed to innate characteristics of the 
population because the very same people successfully harnessed the resources of the state in 
an earlier period. Olson (1989) dedicates a section to explaining this point and vehemently 
refutes the suggestion growth rates declined due to the fact that “the British are inclined to 
take it inherently easy” Olson (1989:27). Thirdly, it is of note, while Olson believes 
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democracy is growth-promoting to begin with, states that have “democratic freedom” over 
the long-term tend to suffer as institutional sclerosis sets in, ossifying once flexible and 
efficient institutional structures.  
 
Olson is not the only person to recognise this disease. Hodgson (1996) demonstrates that 
many others were aware of the sclerotic nature of British institutions before the RADON was 
published. Anderson (1964) suggests that Great Britain was “a sclerosed, archaic society, 
trapped by the burden of past success”. Hodsbawn (1969), Dore (1973) and Phelps-Brown 
(1977) all suggest that Britain’s relatively poor economic performance during the twentieth 
century was due to the successful and prevailing institutions from the past, which had become 
long outdated and surpassed by more flexible institutional arrangements in the other 
countries. After the RADON was published Elbaum and Lazonick (1986) argued that the 
relative decline of Great Britain during the twentieth century was due to a lack of institutional 
flexibility as the prevailing institutional arrangements were developed during the nineteenth 
century. These rigidities, they argue, prevented all attempts to regenerate once flexibility 
institutions.          
 
The conclusion from this examination of Great Britain is that economic growth appears to 
have followed an inverted U-shaped curve, or as Olson would suggest, a rise followed by 
decline. The rise corresponds to major internal conflict and the removal of narrow special-
interest groups, allowing the rate of economic growth to accelerate. The decline is directly 
linked to stability, the passage of time and the incidence of democracy which permits groups 
to form. The impact of democracy on economic growth is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
4 while the empirical tests in Chapter 6 include three measures of institutional flexibility as 
independent variables. A theoretical explanation of the measure of institutional flexibility is 
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discussed in Sections 3.4 and 5.2.10 while the variable is modelled in Section 5.5.2 and 
empirically tested in Chapter 6.  
  
3.2.2.2 Eurosclerosis - The Disease Spreads 
While Great Britain is the first country to experience Olson’s ‘rise and decline’ and is 
subsequently labelled as having “British disease”, this infection is not inherently British. 
Britain just happened to suffer first due to its enduring stability. Murrell (1983) finds 51% of 
organizations existing in the United Kingdom in 1971 were more than thirty years old. This 
compares to just 37% in France, 24% in West Germany and 19% in Japan, all three of whom 
had experienced the occupation or external removal of governments during World War II. 
Additionally, Great Britain had a much larger number of organisations than France, Germany 
or Japan. Between 1947 and 1972 Japan experienced an average annual percentage growth 
rate of 8.2%, Germany an average annual rate of 5.7%, France 4% and the United Kingdom 
just 2.4% per annum (Maddison, 1982). The only plausible explanation for Olson (1982:87) 
is 
“Of two societies that were in other respects equal, the one with the longer history of 
stability, security, and freedom of association would have more institutions that limit 
entry and innovation, that these institutions would encourage more social interaction 
and homogeneity among their member, and that what is said and done by these 
institutions would have at least some influence on what people in that society find 
customary and fitting”. 
 
Of the four countries listed, Great Britain experienced the longest period of stability and 
security, resulting in the onset of institutional sclerosis earlier than the other three. Britain 
was paying the penalty for its relative early development, a point identified by Thorstein 
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Veblen in 1915, long before Olson’s RADON. Veblen (1915) suggests Great Britain was in a 
period of decline during the early twentieth century not because the British people were 
adverse to economic prosperity but because it was first country to experience modern 
economic growth. Veblen (1915:53) argues Great Britain’s slowing rate of growth 
“Does not mean that the British have sinned against the canons of technology. It is 
only that they are paying the penalty for having been thrown into the lead and so 
having shown the way. At the same time it is not to be imagined that this lead has 
brought nothing but pains and penalties. The shortcomings of this British industrial 
situation are visible chiefly by contrast with what the British might be doing if it were 
not for the restraining dead hand of their past achievement, and by further contrast, 
latterly, with what the newcome German people are doing by use of the English 
technological lore”. 
 
Veblen’s summation of the British should have acted as a warning for those coming next e.g. 
Germany, France and Italy. Support for the ‘rise and decline’ hypothesis is provided by the 
same countries that were eclipsing Britain’s economic performance during the early post 
World War II era. As expected, the large differences in average annual growth between the 
defeated and war-torn countries and the victorious allied states began to evaporate once 
stability emerged. Maddison (2006) shows between 1972 and 1995, Japan grew at an average 
annual rate of 2.6%, West Germany at 2% and France 1.6%. Over the same period the United 
Kingdom grew by 1.8%. From 1995 to 2004 Japan experienced an average annual growth 
rate of just 1.8%, Germany 1.2%, France 1.7% and the United Kingdom and impressive 
2.5%. The sclerotic effects of the passage of time and stability has caused the once rising 
states, defeated or destroyed after World War II, to suffer relative economic decline and 
stagnation. By the commencement of the twenty-first century France, Germany and Japan 
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were reporting slower rates of economic growth than the United Kingdom. Table 3.2.1 
presents post-war data for seven major economies directly involved in World War II. 
Strikingly, the defeated axis countries experience the fastest growth rates directly after the 
war, and the allied victors the slowest. As predicted under Olsonian logic, these differences 
disappear over time, as institutional sclerosis sets in among the faster growing states.  
 
Table 3.2.1: Average Annual Percentage Change in Output 1948 to 2004 
Country 1947 - 1972 1972 - 1995  1995 - 2004 
Canada 2.9 1.8 2.4 
France 4.3 1.6 1.7 
Germany 5.7* 2.0* 1.2 
Italy 4.9 2.3 1.5 
Japan 8.2 2.6 1.2 
United Kingdom 2.4 1.8 2.5 
United States 2.2 1.5 2.2 
*Applies to West Germany only.   
Source: Maddison (2006) 
 
It is important to note the not just war facilitates rapid economic growth under Olson’s logic. 
In The Varieties of Eurosclerosis (hereafter VOE) Olson (1996b) suggests that rapid 
economic growth can ensue following ‘jurisdictional integration’. Olson remarks that some of 
the best examples of rapid economic growth pre-1900 occurred when counties, regions or 
states merged to form a larger institutional arrangement. Germany grew fastest during the 
nineteenth century following the establishment of a customs union in 1834 and unification in 
1871. Japan had a similar experience following the Meiji Restoration of 1867–8. The 
Netherlands, France, the United States of America and the United Kingdom all report similar 
experiences on the back of the establishment of a new jurisdictional agreement or the 
integration of one jurisdiction with another of similar economic standing. Olson (1982) 
suggests this is the RADON and reiterates it in VOE. Given the destructed power or war not 
to mention the loss of life, overcoming institutional sclerosis in this way is highly inefficient 
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and costly. The only satisfactory means of counteracting ‘British Disease’ is through non-
violent means – jurisdictional integration (Considine & Butler, 2010).  
 
While this section does not deal with Olson’s final conclusion – economic understanding 
could minimise and overcome institutional sclerosis – he does allude to a possible role for 
this in the RADON. Olson (1982:237) states that 
“May we not reasonably expect, if special interests are (as I have claimed) harmful to 
economic growth, full employment, coherent government, equal opportunity, and 
social mobility, that students of the matter will become increasing aware of this as 
time goes on? And that the awareness will eventually spread to larger and larger 
proportions of the population? And that this wider awareness will greatly limit the 
losses from special interests? That is what I expect at least when I am searching for a 
happy ending”.  
Furthermore, in the VOE Olson (1996b:80 & 92) suggests 
“It is possible that the countries that suffered the most (or suffered in the least opaque 
ways) from special-interest cartelization and lobbying would be more susceptible to 
analyses of the problem, and come to have a bit more of an appreciation of it, than 
societies that had suffered less (or in ways that were harder to understand)…no 
historical process that is understood is inevitable”    
The presence of institutional sclerosis, as Olson suggests in the final quotation is not 
inevitable, yet it persists throughout stable, democratic societies. To understand why, a brief 
description is provided on the concept of rational ignorance. Rational ignorance among the 
population, to the formation of destructive special-interest groups seeking to alter the 
collective gains made by society in their favour, is one of the fundamental reasons 
institutional sclerosis persists.   
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3.2.3 Rational Ignorance  
The RADON briefly touches on the idea of rational ignorance. However, in 1989 Olson 
published How Ideas Affect Society: Is Britain The Wave Of The Future and devoted a full 
section of the paper to the concept of rational ignorance. By 1989 Olson was concerned 
“British Disease” posed a threat to all developed countries and that Great Britain’s slow 
growth rate was simply the forerunner for all others to follow. Despite the fact the Olson 
(1989 & 1990) recognises Britain had no shortage of intelligent economic debate and had a 
higher number of economists per capita than most developed countries, the country was still 
unable to escape the ossifying disease of institutional sclerosis. Olson (1989) puts this down 
to what he calls “the single most important factor limiting the diffusion and political potency 
of better ideas: rational ignorance” (Olson, 1989:33). 
 
To explain how rational ignorance allows institutional sclerosis to manifest itself in even the 
most economically aware countries, Olson uses the example of a single voter in a democratic 
state. The election of a national government is a point in case. When a citizen is given a set of 
candidates to choose from at election time, each must consider how much time to allocate to 
finding out about the policies and beliefs of each candidate standing for election in order to 
make an informed decision. However, should an individual do this, they will receive only a 
tiny fraction of the gains, if their research results in the election of candidates with effective 
policies. Therefore, each citizen has little incentive to spend time researching the candidates 
standing for election. Society would be far better off if every enfranchised citizen spent time 
researching policies and the potential effectiveness of each candidate standing for election. 
Olson (1989:34) clarifies this point by stating that: 
“The gain to a voter from studying issues and candidates until it is clear what vote is 
truly in his or her interest is given by the difference in the value to the individual of 
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the ‘right’ election outcome, multiplied by the probability that a change in the 
individual vote will alter the outcome of the election. Since the probability that a 
typical voter will change the outcome of the election is vanishingly small, the typical 
citizen, whether he is a physician or a taxi driver, is usually rationally ignorant about 
public affairs”. 
 
Olson (1989) alludes to Downs (1957), with the latter arguing that the rational ignorance of 
the average citizen allows ideologies to play a massive role in the public domain. Since it is 
not rational for people to acquire accurate information when deciding whom to vote for, 
many citizens allow ideologies to influence the decision as to which way they should vote. 
Herein lies the problem. Citizens often come to the same logical conclusion when faced with 
narrow special-interest groups. No single person is willing to tackle the group as the costs are 
borne by that individual and the benefits, if successfully, are dispersed among the entire 
population (outside of the special-interest group). Over time as states accumulate more and 
more special-interest groups the rational ignorance of the individual becomes more damaging 
and the rate of economic growth declines.  
 
3.2.4. Opponent of the “Rise and Decline” Hypothesis – Criticism of Mancur Olson  
The general popularity of Olson’s ‘rise and decline’ hypothesis ‘is mainly due to its 
parsimonious nature, which is intellectually challenging, aesthetically pleasing  and can be 
applied to a wide variety of historical events (Unger & van Waarden, 1999). However, 
despite the widespread acceptance of Olson’s work, there have been opponents to both his 
theoretical and conceptual ideas since the publication of the RADON in 1982. It is important 
to present these alternative explanations so that a holistic view on the development of states 
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over the past one-hundred and thirty years is afforded to readers. This sub-section attempts to 
do just that.   
 
Convergence hypothesis theorists present the most obvious alternative to Olson’s 
explanations for the performance of developed countries during the twentieth century. Solow 
(1956), Swan (1956), Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) all present extensive evidence to 
suggest the rapid economic development experienced by Germany, Italy and Japan post-1945 
can be explained by catch-up growth. The extensive destruction of physical capital in these 
countries, particularly from 1943 to 1945, resulted in the need for enormous rebuilding 
programmes after World War II. Solow (1956) and others suggest the surge in economic 
growth of the developed world from 1945 to 1973 has nothing to do with an undercutting of 
vested interest groups and can simply be attributed to the replenishment of the stock of 
physical capital destroyed by war.  This criticism of Olson’s hypothesis is quite general and is 
simply an alternative perspective, of which there are many, of the causes of economic 
growth. However, others have directly questioned Olson’s theories of economic growth and 
state development. Such criticism includes Weede (1986), Cameron (1988), Maddison (1995) 
Unger & van Waarden (1999) and Hóijer (2004). This section will take each of Olson’s three 
key books in turn and provide a brief review of criticism. The books are addressed as follows; 
The Logic of Collective Action (LCA), The Rise and Decline of Nations (RADON) and 
Olson’s last work, published posthumously in 2000, Power and Prosperity (PAP).  
 
Concerning the LCA, Cameron (1988) argues Olson’s theory rests on a number of 
implausible assumptions. The author claims the view that groups are the fundamental 
constituent of society is outdated or even obsolete and suggests Olson’s focus is primarily on 
the growth-retarding aspects of group formation. Groups could be growth-promoting under 
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the right conditions. Olson (1990) does address this issue using the case of Sweden 
(discussed in sub-section 3.2.1.1). Furthermore, Cameron (1988) suggests the theoretical and 
conceptual framework presented by Olson makes no allowance for the possibility individuals 
in society pursue interests extending beyond the interest of their narrow group.  Cameron 
takes issue with Olson’s conclusion that the objectives and success of the group rests entirely 
upon the “internal attributes” of the group such as size (Cameron, 1988:565). The author 
argues that size is less important than the relationship group members have with one another 
or the incentive structures in place within the group. Finally, Cameron (1988) suggests 
governments may act outside the influence or control of special interest groups despite their 
number or apparent size. 
 
Unger and van Waarden (1999) present a critique of Olson’s RADON and suggest Olson’s 
framework is in need of revision. Like Cameron (1988), the authors commend Olson on the 
parsimonious nature of his hypothesis but find fault with many of the assumptions underlying 
his explanations for the rise and decline of states during the twentieth century. Unger and van 
Waarden (1999) suggest three points, which undermine Olson’s hypothesis. Firstly, based on 
data the authors collect for Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, they find the number of trade associations and trade unions began to decline 
after World War II. Secondly, data collected for Austria, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and West Germany indicates that the 
number of associations in the defeated Axis countries, and the average age of these 
associations, was greater than associations in the victorious state. This would appear to 
contradict Olson’s view that revolutions, occupations and internal upheaval destroyed vested 
interest groups. Finally, Unger and van Waarden (1999) suggest interest associations and 
lobby groups are not detrimental to economic performance and can in fact make a positive 
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contribution to growth. The authors, like Cameron (1988), suggest Olson only views the 
negative when considering vested interests and as such makes the assumption that they are 
solely interested in a redistribution of the societal gains towards themselves, and have no 
interest in production. However, Unger and van Waarden (1999) counter this view and argue 
many Western European interest groups assist in the production process by correcting market 
failures.  
 
Lastly, Hoijer (2004) provides a critique of Olson’s final work PAP. Olson (2000) argues 
that state development begins to occur once a bandit becomes stationary and has an 
incentive to provide public goods to subjects living under their control. Such conditions are 
not automatic and are sometimes down to sheer luck. Section 4.4.3 addresses this 
perspective of state development. Hóijer (2004) argues Olson’s ideas in PAP, whilst 
providing some useful insights, do not constitute an acceptable theory of state-development. 
Hóijer (2004) suggests two main problems with Olson’s framework. Firstly, if two 
equilibriums can exist, one with competitive theft (roving bandits) and the other where theft 
is monopolised (stationary bandit) how can state development occur if competitive theft is 
ubiquitous. No incentive exists for a competing bandit to break from the group and attempt 
to monopolise theft (Hóijer, 2004). Additionally, if a bandit manages to monopolise theft in 
a geographic region Hóijer (2004) assumes this also means the bandit has a monopoly on 
violence. Such an assumption “appears circular, since a ‘monopoly on violence’ seems to 
constitute both ‘cause’ and ‘effect’” (Hóijer, 2004:36).   
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3.3 MODELLING INSTITUTIONAL FLEXIBILITY 
This section provides a brief discussion for what follows in Chapters 5 and 6 regarding 
institutional flexibility and the fusing of Black’s conceptual model of state development 
with North, Wallis & Weingast ’s stages of state development and Olson’s theories of 
collective action and institutional sclerosis into a logical ‘rise and decline’ hypothesis so 
that empirical tests can be conducted. Chapter 5 outlines the methods used to apply these 
three to the empirical results presented in Chapter 6. While attempts have been made, most 
notably by Choi (1983) and Hodgson (1989), to fuse the Black and Olson, this work builds 
on these earlier attempts using a new methodological approach. This approach is now 
discussed. 
 
3.3.1 Institutional Flexibility  
As outlined in the opening chapter, institutions are essential for economic growth. Among 
others, Barro (1991), Knack & Philip (1995), Rodrik (2007) and Acemoglu & Robinson 
(2012) have rigorously proved this line of reasoning. When considering institutional 
explanations for economic growth, much of the research in the area has focused on the 
impact of meta-institutional arrangement on economic growth or institutional efficiency. 
Very little attention has been diverted to the determinants and effect of institutional 
flexibility. Olson’s hypothesis attempts to redress this imbalance and emphasises the rise 
and decline of states. This is in effect the same as an increase and decrease in the productive 
capacity of institutions of the state. In the absence of disruptive events and interruptions, 
which encourage the establishment of new institutions and practices, it is logical to believe 
institutions display growth-retarding characteristics over time. Institutional flexibility is 
used to determine the extent to which the institutional structures of the state promote or 
retard economic growth. This theory is grounded in Olsonion logic. Under this logic 
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following internal upheaval (end of World War II in Germany) or jurisdictional integration 
(enlargement of the European Union during the 1970s following British, Irish and Danish 
accession) institutional flexibility in countries experiencing either will subsequently 
increase. This surge in flexibility, of the machinery of the state, is a consequence of an 
undercutting of the wider institutional sclerosis existing under previous governments. 
However following a period of stability, institutional flexibility peaks and begins to decline. 
The reasons for this are Olsonion in nature and are discussed at length in Section 3.2.        
 
History provides many examples illustrating the profound importance of institutional 
flexibility in determining economic growth. Milgrom, North & Weingast (1990), North 
(1991) and Grief (1994) all note the importance of institutional flexibility in allowing 
institutional innovations in the judiciary, foreign trade, measurement and accounting 
practices and insurance contracts. De Soto (2000:106) argues greater institutional flexibility 
in the United States of America historically allowed for more “dynamic property rights”. 
Furthermore, historical accounts by Olson (1982), Gimond (2002) and Kuran (2004) 
demonstrate how a lack of institutional flexibility can delay or prevent economic growth. As 
discussed, Olson (1982) uses the case of 1970s Great Britain to illustrate this point. Gimond 
(2002) argues institutional inflexibility in Japan during the 1990s resulted in a paralysis of 
the political process and the Japanese parliament, leading to prolonged stagnation. Kuran 
(2004) takes a more long-term view and claims inheritance and contract law in Islamic 
countries during the late Middle Ages did not support commercial enterprises. Not only did 
this result in a dearth of private companies but “…turned into handicaps by perpetuating 
themselves (Islamic countries) during the long period when the West developed the 
institutions of the modern economy” (Kuran, 2004:72).  
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3.3.2 Fusing Black, Choi, North, Hodgson & Olson 
The availability of reliable and consistent data means that it is virtually impossible to fuse 
the earlier years selected by Black (1966) for the Challenge of Modernity (COM) and 
Consolidation of Modern Leadership (CML) with Olson’s logic of collective action. 
Furthermore, the absence of democracy during these two periods, which North, Wallis & 
Weingast ’s (2009) describe as phases of the autocratic state, devoid of democracy, ensures 
mass collective action did not persist. Instead, the fusing of all three concepts is 
concentrated around Black’s staring years of Economic and Social Transformation (EST). 
The starting EST year is selected as all ending years are within the period 1880 to 2008; the 
same timeframe examined in the empirical tests in Chapter 6. Furthermore, mass 
democracy, a key determinant of collective action came to all countries in the sample during 
the years of EST. For this reason, it is possible to apply a new approach to determine an 
appropriate year for the peak of institutional flexibility and the subsequent onset of 
institutional sclerosis. 
 
The most notable previous attempts to fuse Black and Olson have been attempted by Olson’s 
student Kwang Choi. Choi (1983) uses a rising logistic curve to reflect the ‘sclerosis’ that 
occurs due to stability, the passage of time and the selected interests of small groups. Choi 
selects the CLM years proposed by Black (1966) in the formulation of this logistic curve. The 
approach assumes the states begin with no sclerosis and no interest group interference. 
Hodgson (1989) attempts to extend Choi’s analysis and disputes the assumption of no prior 
sclerosis. Hodgson suggests the curve which could estimate the importance of institutional 
flexibility through time is more likely to be an inverted U-shape. Like Choi (1983) Hodgson 
(1989) uses Black’s years, selecting the start year of EST as the high point of institutional 
flexibility for each country, with institutional sclerosis setting in thereafter. The zenith of this 
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curve represents the year institutions have the greater level of malleability and capacity, 
promoting and organising new ideas and routines. In addition, following the peak of the 
inverted U-shaped curve, institutional flexibility begins to decline as institutions, routines and 
habits become older and less receptive to change. In the absence of disruptive events, which 
could undermine the status quo and create newer institutions and routines, flexibility declines, 
inertia sets in and the ossification of the system is the result.  
 
The problem with this approach is the Black year for the commencement of EST used by 
Hodgson (1989) marks the starting point in a phase of state development. These EST starting 
years include events such as national independence, integration into a large jurisdiction or the 
end of a period of major conflict (See Table 2.4.2). Under Olsonian logic, such events destroy 
vested interests and greatly reduce the level of institutional sclerosis.  New institutional 
structures are created in the wake of these events which, as passed evidence has shown, lead 
to higher levels of economic growth. Assuming this logic is correct, the inverted U-shaped 
curve should not peak at the start year of EST. Instead this year of EST should correspond to 
the commencement of the rising portion of the institutional flexibility curve. This leads to a 
further problem; in what year does the curve reach its zenith? This the same as asking in what 
year does institutional sclerosis become so rampant that the rate of economic growth declines 
year on year.  
 
In order to establish a peak year, this research applies a rising logistic curve to democracy 
data collated from both Flora (1983) and the International Institute of Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (2012). To elaborate briefly on this, a logistic curve is applied to 
democracy data for each country from 1880 to 2008. Democracy is measured as the 
percentage of the population above the legal voting age with voting rights. Once the logistic 
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curve has been applied, the year democracy is increasing at the fastest rate, is chosen as the 
peak in the inverted U-shaped curve. This year is assumed to be the year in which collective 
action becomes accessible to the mass of the population. Thereafter, increases in the rate of 
enfranchisement of the percentage of the population above the legal voting age, begin to 
slow. However by this point of development, collective action is achievable to the majority of 
the population and institutional sclerosis sets in causing the rate of economic growth to 
decline. This is reflected in the downward sloping of the inverted U-shaped curve. Figure 
3.3.1 illustrates the difference between the inverted U-shape used by Hodgson (1989) to 
model institutional flexibility and this approach used in this thesis. 
 
Figure 3.3.1: Measure of Institutional Flexibilty Through Time 
 
Figure 3.3.1 illustrates the difference between the approach taken by Hodgson (1989) and this 
work when attempting to integrate Black’s years to Olson’s theory concerning the patterns of 
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cross-country economic growth. The key difference between the two is the replacement of the 
Black EST year as the high point of institutional flexibility with a logistic curve based on the 
spread of democracy. This approach is deemed to be more appropriate as the Black EST year 
is more likely to result in an increase in institutional flexibility, as the special-interest groups 
Olson claims are so damaging to economic progress, are destroyed with the commencement 
of EST. Further explanation of the illustration above is discussed in Chapter 5. The empirical 
results of this approach are discussed in Chapter 6.  
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3.4 CONCLUSION  
This chapter attempts to achieve a number of goals. Firstly, the chapter seeks to provide the 
reader with an overview of the key contributions of Mancur Olson. Attention focusses on 
Olson’s earlier work, in particular his interpretation of the logic of collective and second-
order and third-order implications of this logic. Olson’s most cited work, The Rise and 
Decline of Nations is examined in detail to provide the reader with an overview of how 
Olsonion logic is applicable to the economic performance of countries across time. This is 
essential as it remains the single most important application of Olson’s theory to cross-
country data.  The importance of the British experience over the past three hundred year 
stands out as the Olsonion exemplar. The British experience is captured by Figure 3.3.1, as a 
period of rapid economic growth due to the creation of a new institutional framework, which 
facilitated the industrial revolution, followed by a subsequent decline as stability, the passage 
of time and the spread of democracy permitted the onset on institutional sclerosis. The 
decline of Great Britain is so pronounced Olson coined the term British Disease. The disease 
is in no way innately British and as Table 3.2.1 demonstrates, institutional sclerosis spread to 
other major world economies. This chapter attempts to explain why this persisted despite the 
fact that institutional sclerosis is understood and highlighted the role of rational ignorance. 
The logic behind rational ignorance provides an explanation as to why the population at large 
does nothing, when faced with slowing economic growth. The voting metaphor is used to 
explain why rational ignorance persists and captures the incentives facing the average citizen 
when asked to elect candidates to a local or national assembly.  
 
Finally, the chapter addresses what institutional flexibility is and how this research will fuse 
the concept of institutional flexibility into the ideas of Black (1966), Olson (1982) and North, 
Wallis & Weingast  (2009) and in doing so build on earlier investigations by Choi (1983) and 
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Hodgson (1989). A measure of institutional flexibility is presented and assumed to follow an 
inverted U-shape. The rising side of the curve represents a period of increasing institutional 
flexibility, facilitated by the development of the state, and results in rapid economic growth. 
After a peak year of institutional flexibility a subsequent decline sets in as institutional 
sclerosis ossifies once flexible institutions, leading to slower economic growth.  The logic 
behind this approach is discussed further in Chapter 5 and empirical tests of the hypothesis 
are presented and discussed in Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 4 – DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The interplay between economic growth and democracy has been an area of interest across 
the social sciences for many years. In recent times, a vast array of literature has been 
produced investigating the relationship between the two variables. Two fundamental 
questions are posed by most researchers in the area. What way does causation between the 
two variables run and, once causation is established, what impact does one have on the 
other. Economists have concentrated their attention on the impact of democracy on 
economic growth, while political scientists have examined the influence of economic 
growth on democracy (Naryan, Naryan and Smyth, 2011). The results are so far 
inconclusive and offer a challenge to those seeking to understand the complex and often 
perplexing relationship between the two.  
 
While neither modern economic growth, nor mass democracy started to emerge until the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, an interest in the relationship between the two 
materialised long before. One of the first investigations into this relationship can be traced 
back to the mid sixteen-hundreds with the publication of English philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes’ book Leviathan. Kurzman, Werum and Burkhart (2002) cite this work as the first 
attempt to promote the idea that the level of democracy and the rate of economic growth 
were linked with the latter dependent on regime type. A conflicting hypothesis is provided 
by Lipset (1959). The Lipset Hypothesis
 7
 suggests the level of democracy is dependent 
                                                          
7
 Lipset (1959:75) stated that “From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy 
society in which relatively few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the 
population could intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid 
succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues”. 
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upon the rate of economic growth. An investigation into the likely direction of causation 
between democracy and economic growth follows in this chapter. 
 
The second question posed by researchers in the area is, once the nature of the relationship 
between economic growth and democracy is established, what impact does one have on the 
other? The much cited work of Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) proposes three explanations. The 
first is that democracy and economic growth have a positive relationship, confirming what 
is known as the “compatibility hypothesis”. The second is that the two are opposing forces, 
with one having a negative impact on the other, otherwise known as the “conflict 
hypothesis”. The third explanation is known as the “sceptical hypothesis” and claims no 
relationship exists between the two. All three are examined in this chapter.  
 
Investigations into the economic growth and democracy relationship have examined 
samples of developed and developing countries, together and separately. The vast majority 
of research conducted runs from post-World War II due to a lack of data prior to 1945. 
Different researchers have produced conflicting evidence as to the nature of the relationship. 
Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) investigate thirteen studies and find that four support the 
“compatibility” hypothesis, four the “conflict” hypothesis and the remaining six the 
“sceptical hypothesis”. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) review eighteen empirical papers 
and find the results are almost equally divided between democracy promoting growth and 
preventing growth. Of the eighteen, eight find that democracy promotes growth; eight find 
democracy slows growth when compared to an authoritarian regime, while two find that no 
relationship exists. Borner, Brunetti & Weder (1995) survey sixteen studies and find three 
studies suggest a positive relationship exists between democracy and growth, three a 
negative relationship, with ten suggesting no relationship. From an examination of 
103 
 
seventeen previous studies, Brunetti (1997) concludes nine confirm the “sceptical” 
hypothesis, four the “conflict” hypothesis and the remaining four the “compatibility” 
hypothesis. Finally, a more recent meta-analysis by Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu (2008) on 
eighty-four democracy-growth publications find 27% of the results are statistically 
significant and confirm the “compatibility hypothesis” while 15% are statistically 
significant but confirm the “conflict hypothesis”. The remaining 58% are split between the 
two hypotheses but the results are not statistically significant.  
 
From the outset, it is important to note while the definition of democracy is open to 
interpretation, sometimes being equated simply with the entitlement to vote (Cheung, 1998), 
the definition by Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (2002:135) is generally accepted as best 
capturing the concept. The authors define democracy as the extent to which “a country has 
checks and balances on executive powers, constitutional processes and guarantees, freedom 
of the press and the absence of censorship, clear and effective judicial and legal structures, 
incumbent term limits and transparency, openness and citizen input in policymaking”. The 
remainder of this chapter is presented as follows: Section 4.2 examines the nature of 
causation between the two variables. Section 4.3 discusses measures of democracy used in 
previous empirical investigations while Section 4.4 discusses the findings of these previous 
investigations. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.  
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4.2 THE RELATIONSHIP BEWTEEN DEMOCRACY & ECONOMIC GROWTH  
One of the central problems researchers in this area have had to overcome is endogeneity in 
the relationship between economic growth and democracy. If democracy is able to enhance 
economic growth, does economic growth then lead to increased levels of democracy, a 
relationship known as the Lipset Hypothesis? In order to examine the question of endogenity 
the relationship between the two must be viewed from a historical perspective. A serious 
shortcoming of much work in this area is the failure to recognise that the origins of 
democracy can be traced back more than two-hundred years, with the roots of Western 
democratization to be found in France and Great Britain. Attempting to interpret the 
relationship between the two variables in the mid to late twentieth century, often results in a 
failure to understand how democracy emerged in the first instance.    
 
Acemoglu & Robinson (2000) offer an excellent insight on the debate of causation. It is the 
view of Acemoglu & Robinson that the origins of Western democracy are not a result of 
economic growth. It is from this standpoint the remainder of this chapter and subsequent 
chapters take inspiration. The authors offer various explanations for the extension of 
franchise among the people of Western Europe during the nineteenth century. Acemoglu 
&Robinson (2000) suggest the extension of voting rights, to the majority of the adult 
population, was not driven by economic growth but more likely the threat of revolution, the 
Enlightenment, political party competition and a middle class drive to recognise the lower 
classes. Furthermore, developed democracies were not conceived in a short period of time but 
instead have profound roots, stretching back centuries in some cases and the consequence of 
cultural, economic, political and social conditions (Collier, 1999; Hite and Cesarini, 2004; 
Gerring, Bond, Barndt & Moreno, 2005; Persson & Tabellini, 2006). Finally, Gerring, 
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Kingston, Lange and Sinha (2011) suggest the most important driver of democracy is not 
economic growth but simply gaining independence.   
 
The first of these explanations, the threat of revolution, is probably the most likely cause for 
the spread of democracy in Western Europe. Milestones in the extension of democracy in 
Great Britain occurred in 1832, 1867, 1884, 1918 and 1928. When the first reform to 
electoral practices was in the process of passing through the British parliament, the then 
Prime Minister, Earl Grey, publically acknowledged his dissent to the act but insisted the 
reforms were implemented in order 'to preserve, not to overthrow” the current establishment 
(Evans, 1983:266). Darvall (1934), Briggs (1959) and Lee (1994) agree with this assessment, 
insisting that the extension of democratic freedoms across Britain during the 1800s were 
used, to prevent the spread of civil unrest and possible revolution. Stevenson (1979) and 
Acemoglu & Robinson (2000) indicate the years preceding the 1832 Reform Act in Britain 
were epitomised by an unparalleled level of civil unrest. This unrest manifested itself in 
events such as the Luddite Riots, the Spa Field Riots and the Swing Riots (Stevenson, 1979; 
Nasar, 2011). The impact that the spread of democracy would have on economic growth was 
a point of much debate. Collini, Winch & Borrow (1983) and Przeworski and Limongi (1993) 
both cite Scottish philosopher James Mackintosh, who in 1818 predicted that, an extension of 
franchise to the working class would result in a permanent struggle between the masses and 
those owning property. Whig politician, Thomas Macaulay, went even further and in 1900 
declared that the spread of democracy would result in the end of private property ownership.  
 
Further extensions in democracy were granted during the mid-nineteenth century in order to 
avert the restoration of political extremism in Britain (Lee, 1994). The second Reform Act of 
1867 was not caused by economic growth but the opposite, a severe recession, which again 
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threatened to result in civil unrest (Trevelyan, 1937; Harrison, 1965; Searle, 1993; Lee, 
1994). The treat of revolution in 1867 led to an extension of the franchise from 1.4 million 
people to 2.52 million, with working-class voters becoming the largest bloc of voters in all 
metropolitan constituencies (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2000). Female suffrage, eventually 
granted in Britain in 1928, was the result of an organised, antagonistic movement. A leader in 
the movement, Emmeline Pankhurst declared that “Parliament never grants (democratic) 
reform unless it is terrorised” (Jorgensen-Earp, 1997:48). 
 
Increases in democratic rights due to the fear of revolution were not confined to Britain. 
Continental Europe experienced the same phenomenon as voting numbers increased, due to 
the prevalence of civil unrest, which threaten the establishment. In France, the 1848 
revolution led to the founding of the Second Republic which granted universal male suffrage 
(Collier, 1999). Germany had a similar experience. The 1848 revolution in Germany resulted 
in a significant enlargement in the number of people eligible to vote across almost every 
German state, for fear of further revolution (Blackbourn, 1998). The spread of democracy in 
Sweden is delineated by two major milestones; the reforms of 1909 and 1918 (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2000). The 1909 reform was preceded by a series of strikes and public 
demonstrations. The 1918 reforms, extending suffrage to all male adults, occurred in the 
shadow of worker protests. These were as a result of a harsh economic downturn and reached 
the point where the threat of revolution was recognised by the incumbent Swedish 
government as a serious possibility (Tilton, 1974; Collier, 1999). 
 
The threat of revolution is not the only hypothesis forwarded by Acemoglu & Robinson 
(2000) to explain the spread of democracy across Western Europe. A change in social values 
due to the Enlightenment is another possible explanation, as the rights of the lower classes 
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and women began to be recognised. The timing of democratic reforms in Western Europe, 
many not arriving until the early to mid-twentieth century, suggests this explanation is not as 
likely as the first. Acemoglu & Robinson (2000) claim revolution rather than enlightenment, 
is the most likely explanation for the spread of democracy as it was forced upon the 
establishment rather than being a course plotted.  
 
Himmelfarb (1966) and Collier (1999) both suggest the reasons behind the increasing level of 
democracy in Britain was a result of political party competition. The inspiration for this is 
drawn from the fierce competition between William Gladstone and Benjamin Disraeli in the 
House of Commons during the 1860s and 1870s. An extension of the franchise during these 
decades could be viewed as a means of capturing newly enfranchised voters, appreciative of 
the rights bestowed upon them by the reforming government. Acemoglu & Robinson (2000) 
argue this hypothesis is again not as plausible as the ‘threat of revolution’, because 
democratic reforms did not result in winning general elections. It is more plausible that 
mounting social pressures forced both Gladstone and Disraeli into an extension of democratic 
rights across Britain.  
 
Political competition can also result in ‘lucky circumstances’ which cause an extension of 
democratic to occur. As discussed in Chapter 3, Olson (1993) addresses the stages a country 
goes through in moving from an autocracy to a democracy. Olson (1993) suggests, after a 
successful revolution and the removal of the incumbent, the period of instability that follows 
will result in either another dictator taking power or the emergence of a fledgling democracy. 
The latter will only occur if political competition is structured in such a way that no single 
person or group of people has enough support to seize power. The conditions necessary for 
this to arise are often down to chance, but if such circumstances do arise, power must be 
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shared, forcing those seeking power to establish a democratic system. Acemoglu & Robinson 
(2000) point out such conditions were met following the 1870 Paris Commune. No one group 
was in a position to seize and remain in power, forcing all factions to come together.  
 
The final hypothesis suggested by Acemoglu & Robinson (2000) for the spread of democracy 
in Western Europe was due to a middle class drive to shift the balance of power in its favour. 
The inclusion of the lower classes in the democratic process had consequences for taxation 
and political control. The middle classes saw this as a means of increasing their influence in 
rapidly modernising Britain. Again, Cowling (1967) Smith (1976) and Acemoglu & 
Robinson (2000) suggest this is not highly plausible due to the reluctance of both the middle 
and upper classes to hand power to the trade unions and the “rule of numbers” by extending 
suffrage to the poor. Smith (1967:27-28) quotes a leading Conservative at the time, Viscount 
Cranborne, who declared reform of democratic procedures and entitlements was “a battle not 
of parties, but of classes…[and] a portion of the great political struggle of our century – the 
struggle between property…and mere numbers”. An analysis of changes to voting rights from 
1820 to 1975, in the eleven European countries examined in the empirical investigations 
following in Chapter 6, is provided in Appendix 3.1 
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4.3 MEASUREMENTS OF DEMOCRACY 
Since empirical studies into democracy started, various methods have been used to measure 
the variable. Among the measures used to quantify democracy some of the more 
popularised attempts have been the Index of Democratization*, the Industrialization and 
Political Democracy Dataset** and the Democracy Index***. Table 3.3.1 below outlines 
existing datasets on democracy and is based upon the table produced by Munck & Verkuilen 
(2002).  
Table 4.3.1 Existing Datasets on Democracy 
Dataset & Latest Year Published No. of Countries  Year(s) Covered 
Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi & Przeworksi (1996) 141 1950 - 1990 
Arat* (1991) 152 1948 - 1982 
Bollen** (1993) 153 1980 
Coppedge & Polyarchy (1991) 170 1985 
Economist Intelligence Unit*** (2012) 167 2006 - 2012 
Freedom House Gastil Index (2010) 195 1972 - 2010 
Gasiorowski Political Regime Change (1996) 97 1992 
Hadenius (1992) 132 1988 
Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers (2010) (Polity IV) 161 1800 - 2010 
Vanhanen (2000) 187 1810 - 1998 
 
Despite various measures, a survey of literature from the past forty years indicates the two 
most popular measures of democracy are the Freedom House Gastil Index and the Polity IV 
database. An explanation of each of these is now provided. Munck & Verkuilen (2002) 
provide a detailed examination of the challenges and shortcomings associated with the 
construction and interpretation of democracy indices.  
 
4.3.1 Freedom House Gastil Index 
The Gastil Index, named after its creator Raymond Gastil, began in 1973. It is produced 
annually and measures democracy or political freedom in countries across the world. The 
level of civil rights and political freedom for each country is gauged on a seven-point scale. 
Each country is then classified as “free” (score between 1 and 2.5), “partly free” (score 
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between 2.51 and 5.5) or “not free” (score above 5.51). Countries that are classified as 
“free” display the characteristics of both “electoral” and “liberal democracies”. Electoral 
democracies are competitive, multi-party systems with regularly contested, secret ballot 
elections and universal suffrage for all citizens above the legal voting age. Campaigning by 
political parties is open and accessible to the media and public. Elections are free from voter 
fraud or corruption. Liberal democracies possess a substantial array of civil liberties such as 
freedom of religion, the right to privacy and the right to a fair trial. All “free” countries in 
the Gastil Index are both electoral and liberal democracies.  
 
4.3.2Polity IV 
The Polity IV project is a database used to measure the effectiveness of institutions in 
sustaining and promoting economic growth. The Polity IV dataset covers a total of one 
hundred and sixty-four countries from 1800 to 2010. The original Polity I dataset was 
constructed by Ted Robert Gurr and informed by foundational and collaborative work Gurr 
conducted with Harry Eckstein. The database is widely used to quantify democracy in 
different countries as it examines the connection between the quality of democracy and 
institutions of the state. Three general categories are observed; autocracies, hybrid regimes 
and democracies. A ‘Polity score’ is used to distinguish the degree to which a country 
displays the characteristics of an autocracy, democracy or mixture between the two. With 
three notable exceptions, the Polity score is measure on 21 point scale from -10 (hereditary 
monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). A score of -10 to -6 indicates the existence of 
an autocracy. Countries rated -5 to +5 are considered hybrid regimes, while a score of +6 to 
+10 implies a country is fully democratic. Three special values of -66, -77 and -88 are used 
during specific periods of unrest, war or constitutional crisis. The Polity IV dataset also 
measures the quality of two other institutional indicators used in the empirical test that 
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follow in Chapter 6; regime durability and political competition. A detailed explanation of 
both of these is presented in Section 5.2.9. 
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4.4 PREVIOUS STUDIES ON DEMOCRACY & ECONOMIC GROWTH  
Previous investigations into the relationship have been many. To date, no encompassing or 
satisfactory conclusions have been reached regarding the impact of democracy on economic 
growth. Three separate strands can be identified in the research; those that find democracy 
has a positive impact on growth; those that find democracy has a negative impact on growth 
and those that find no relationship between the two. This can be attributed to differences in 
definitions, timeframes and sample sizes. Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) sum the problem up by 
claiming despite the attention devoted to examining this relationship the big questions 
remain unanswered. Ambiguity and conflicting results muddy the understanding of the 
impact of democracy on economic growth, with definitions, measurement and modelling 
disparities all contributing to a lack of clarity.      
 
While Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu (2008) correctly point out the relationship between 
economic growth and democracy has been at the centre of debate since the end of the World 
War II, the initial interest in the interaction between the two can be traced as far back to 
Hobbes (1651). Hobbes identifies the importance of government power, in promoting 
economic growth and argues societies are most likely to experience economic growth under 
an absolute dictator, as the despot cannot promote their own interest unless, first 
establishing a system protecting public interests and providing public goods, an argument 
echoed by Olson (2000). In the same decade Harrington (1656) notes the importance of 
establishing a democratic system in order to stimulate economic growth as a ruling 
government is as much likely to ‘take as to make’. This subsection now examines the 
existing literature relating to the impact of democracy on economic growth. It is broken into 
three parts; those that find a positive relationship (compatibility hypothesis), those that find 
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an negative relationship (conflict hypothesis) and those that find no relationship (sceptical 
hypothesis). 
 
4.4.1 Compatibility Hypothesis – Democracy is Growth-Promoting 
This hypothesis is one of three suggested by Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) and Naryan, Naryan 
and Smyth (2011) as potentially answering the democracy and economic growth dilemma. 
A primary function of democracy is the establishment of a complex, heterogenetic system, 
preventing rent-seeking behaviour by a would-be dictator (Olson, 2000). North (1990) 
argues countries that live under democratic rule incentive citizens to save and invest where 
they see fit. Democracies allow the allocation of scarce resources to areas the market deems 
they are best suited. Information and ideas flow freely throughout the system and are 
supported by secure property rights. These property rights ensure that indiscriminate 
pillaging, a common phenomenon in autocratic systems, does not occur. States with 
extensive democratic histories are predicted to adopt sounder policies allowing them to 
outperform authoritarian regimes or transitional democracies in the long run (Gerring, 
Bond, Barndt & Moreno, 2005; Rodrik, 2007).  
 
The absence of a central planner or individuals seeking to create a monopoly on the right to 
govern indefinitely without recourse, ensures this system is more flexible to changing 
conditions and demands by citizens (Rodrik, 1998; Baum & Lake, 2003; Doucouliagos & 
Ulubasoglu, 2008). Furthermore, Bhagwati (1995) maintains democracies seldom engage in 
military conflict with one another, promoting global peace. McCord (1965), Goodin (1979), 
King (1981), Godell and Powelson (1982) and Kohli (1986) all claim democratic rule, 
which enables the existence of basic civil liberties and constitutional rights, promote 
conditions necessary for economic development. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, Olson (1993 & 2000) develops a theoretical basis for 
the transition of a country to democracy. This interpretation of the evolution of a state, from 
rule by physical force to democratically elected government, is based on the premise of 
encompassing interests. The broader the interests of the elected government, the more 
encompassing that government will be, resulting in the development of public goods and 
sustainable economic development. The corollary of this is economic prosperity, as narrow 
special-interests are ignored. The efficiency of established democracies in resolving the 
dilemma of leadership succession, without civil upheaval or revolution, ensures economic 
growth can continue uninterrupted following a crisis of governance. While this might seem 
a trivial point to those living in developed democracies, it is a problem that plagues 
countries under authoritarian rule. The processes safeguarding a peaceful transition of 
power from one group to the next must be institutionalised in the political system, which by 
definition is enduring, thus guaranteeing stability in democracies (Gerring, Bond, Barndt & 
Moreno, 2005).     
 
Empirical evidence of the growth-promoting nature of democracy is provided by Rodrik & 
Wacizarg (2005). Using the Polity 4 database for twenty-four developing countries, the 
authors find democratization has a positive impact on growth. Significantly, Rodrik & 
Wacizarg (2005) find those moving from low absolute levels of democracy to higher levels 
experienced much faster economic growth, as opposed to long established democracies, with 
higher absolute levels of enfranchisement among the population. An earlier study by Barro 
(1998) reports similar results, suggesting at low absolute levels of democracy more 
democracy raises economic growth for more than one hundred countries from 1960 to 1994. 
Gerring, Bond, Barndt & Moreno (2005) examine the impact of democracy on economic 
growth from 1950 to 2000 and conclude democracy does have a positive effect of economic 
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growth. Interestingly, the authors find that the stock of democracy or the cumulative effects 
of being a democratic country over many years, rather than simply the level of democracy at 
a point in time, significantly impacts upon economic growth. According to Gerring, Bond, 
Barndt & Moreno (2005), the passage of time and the degree of democracy “matter when 
considering the effect of democracy on growth”. A later study by Gerring, Kingstone, Lange 
and Sinha (2011) reports older democracies grow faster than newer ones, ceteris paribus, 
contradicting the findings of Barro (1998) and Rodrik & Wacizarg (2005).  A similar 
investigation by Minier (1998) examining changes in democracy and growth, finds countries 
that democratised earlier grew fasters than those failing to embrace democracy. Butiewicz & 
Yanikkaya (2006) report a positive relationship between democracy and economic growth, 
however these results are significantly affected by the sample size, classification used and 
estimation technique.   
 
Additional investigations by Dick (1974), Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Pourgerami (1988 
& 1991), Scully (1988 & 1992), Barro (1989), Grier and Tullock (1989) and Remmer (1990) 
all find democracy has a positive impact on economic growth. Dick (1974) examines fifty-
nine developing countries from 1959 to 1968 and finds slightly faster growth rates in those 
that are democratic. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) examine forty-seven countries from 1950 
to the second oil crisis in 1977 and find democracy is growth-promoting. Pourgerami (1988), 
Scully (1988 & 1992), Barro (1989), Grier and Tullock (1989) all examine sixty countries or 
more from the early 1960s to the mid-1980s and find democracy to be growth-promoting. 
Finally, Remmer (1990) examines eleven Latin American countries, for seven years, from 
1982 to 1988. The author finds democracy has a positive relationship with economic growth 
but the results are not statistically significant. An analysis of all investigations is presented in 
Table 4.5.1. 
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A common tread connecting the growth-promoting hypothesis is the passage of time. 
Empirical research supporting this hypothesis is often confined to newly democratised 
countries or those moving from relatively low levels of democracy to higher levels. There 
would appear to be a threshold level of democracy, and once reached, enfranchising more of 
the population does not result in quicker growth. This explanation could be due to the 
development of new institutions, necessary to ensure the success of early democratisation, are 
already in place when enfranchisement is extended further and hence have no marginal 
positive impact on the economy. Since modern democracy can by definition, never go 
beyond one hundred per cent of the population, diminishing returns must set in at some point. 
Extending democratic rights further in an attempted to increase the rate of economic growth 
therefore must be futile. As discussed in Chapter 3, a further possible explanation is provided 
by Olson (1982). Once democracy reaches a certain point the sclerotic effects of narrow 
special-interest groups slows economic progress.  
 
Before alternative hypothesises are discussed, it is important to note while some 
investigations have found no positive relationship between democracy and economic growth, 
positive indirect effects have been found. Sah (1991) and Rodrik (2007) find democratic 
states experience more predictable long run growth patterns as they are less susceptible to 
unpredictability in the short run, given the encompassing nature of decision-making. 
Consequently, this produces greater short-term stability, better management of economic 
shocks, resulting in improved distributional outcomes. Rodrik (2007) argues given this 
evidence, it can be reasonably suggested, democracies deliver higher-quality growth and do 
so mainly because of the institution building in participatory political regimes. Furthermore, 
both De Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1997) and Dethier, Ghanem and Zoli (1997) find that in the 
wake of the communist collapse in Eastern Europe, democracy was seen to have a positive 
117 
 
and significant effect of economic liberalisation. The authors consider this to be growth-
promoting and an indirect consequence of the spread of democracy. Fidrmuc (2003) confirms 
the indirect, growth-promoting aspects of democracy.   
 
Using democracy data from the Freedom House Gastil Index, Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) 
examine a sample of sixty-five countries from 1970 to 1989 using five year averages. The 
authors find capital accumulation and education both have a positive impact on economic 
growth and are directly influenced by the level of democracy, with higher levels equating to 
greater capital accumulation and education provision. Perotti (1996) finds democracies 
indirectly affect growth through the redistribution of incomes. The less democratic a country, 
the more uneven income is distributed, which in turn stifles economic growth. Helliwell 
(1994) finds indirect and positive effects with levels of investment and education both higher 
in democracies. Baum and Lake (2003) report democracy has an indirect effect on the rate of 
economic growth, positively influencing levels of human capital accumulation. Doucouliagos 
& Ulubasoglu (2008) endorse this view and find democracy only affects growth indirectly by 
positively impacting upon the accumulation of human capital. Doucouliagos & Ulubasoglu 
(2008) also find democracies promote economic growth by ensuring lower inflation rates and 
greater levels of price stability.  
 
Future evidence of the indirect effects of democracy is presented by Feng (1997) who 
investigates ninety-six countries from 1960 to 1992 and finds democracy has a positive 
indirect effect upon growth by impacting upon the probabilities of regime change and 
constitutional government change from one ruling party to another. Finally, Barro (1998) 
examines a sample of over one hundred countries from 1965 to 1994 and finds that 
democracy has a positive and significant impact on life expectancy, the incidence of female 
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education numbers, enrolment numbers in primary school education across genders and 
reduces infant mortality rates, all of which help foster economic growth. These findings are 
consistent with Rodrik (2007) who also suggests an increase in democracy assists the 
establishment of economic freedoms. 
 
4.4.2 Conflict Hypothesis – Democracy is Growth-Retarding 
The second hypothesis suggested by Sirowy and Inkeles’ (1990) as answering the 
democracy and economic growth conundrum, is that the two are in “conflict”. Sirowy and 
Inkeles (1990) maintain democracy is regarded as an impediment to growth because rapid 
economic growth requires an autocratic ruler, with the power to subjugate the interests of 
the population, in order to forward a national agenda of economic development. 
Democracies by their very nature, act only to enhance special-interest groups and selective 
incentives, thereby eliminating the capacity of governments to act swiftly and effectively 
(Krueger, 1974; Olson, 1982; Sirowy and Inkeles, 1990).   
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Olson (1982) outlines this argument and suggests the relatively 
slow twentieth century growth rates of many developed democracies are a result of the 
cumulative effects of decades of democratic rule (see Table 3.2.1). Olson (1982) makes 
special reference to the growth performance of the United Kingdom during the last hundred 
years and argues the slower growth rate of the United Kingdom, when compared to its 
European counterparts, is a consequence of the stability of British society. This stability, 
coupled with the passage of time, is a fertile environment for the established of narrow 
special-interest groups with selective incentives, seeking to redistribute societal gains in 
their favour, often at the behest of economic progress. Kruegar (1974) and Bhagwati (1982) 
119 
 
both support this view, suggesting that democracies are pressured by rent-seeking activity 
into redistributing income to unproductive areas of the economy.     
 
Extending this line of argument, democracies are seen to undermine investment. The shorter 
life span of democratic governments puts pressure on immediate consumption. De 
Schweintiz (1959) and Huntington (1968) are among the first to suggest democracies have 
fragile and precarious political institutions which are susceptible to immediate demands at 
the detriment of long term progress. The view is supported by the World Bank (1991) and 
Barro (1996). The conflict of interest, between the political and economic business cycles, 
results in unwise decision-making as politically popular decisions, aimed at getting 
politicians elected, often leads to ill-thought investment (Comeau, 2003; Doucouliagos & 
Ulubasoglu, 2008).  An excellent appraisal of this standpoint is provided by Przeworski & 
Limongi (1993). As a starting point Przeworski & Limongi (1993) argue because the poor 
have a higher marginal propensity to consume and wish to consume immediately, the spread 
of democracy confers rights upon the poor enabling them to organise. Successful 
organisation can drive wages upwards and pressurises governments to redistribute income 
towards less wealthy members of society (Olson, 1982). The latter reduces the 
government’s ability to spend, while the former reduces business profits, both of which 
combined to reduce investment. Assuming this logic is correct, democracy reduces 
investment thereby slowing the rate of economic growth.  
 
Many empirical investigations support the “conflict” hypothesis”. Helliwell (1994) 
examines the impact of democracy on economic growth for ninety-eight countries from 
1960 to 1985. Helliwell (1994) finds democracy and economic growth are in directly 
conflict with one another however the reported results are not statistically significant. 
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Fidrmuc (2003) tests the performance of the post-communist countries of the former USSR 
and finds while some indirect effects are present, democracy alone has had a negative effect 
on economic growth. The two explanations for this forwarded by Fidrmuc (2003) are 
political uncertainty associated with newly formed democratic governments and the 
pressures of immediate consumption, as governments seek to maximise voter support and 
constrain the spending power of future, opposition governments, should they not win re-
election.  
 
Weingast (2005), Hodgson (2006b) and Butiewicz & Yanikkaya (2006) all argue 
democracies undermine investment and allow coalitions with selective interests to take root. 
Hodgson (2006b) finds democracy has had a negative effect on economic growth in the 
former Soviet Bloc since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The reason for this may be due to the 
fact democracy has allowed redistributive coalitions to form, hindering economic growth at 
the behest of society. Coupled with this, it appears as if the former Soviet countries exhibit 
Weingast’s (2005) asymmetric equilibrium where the government tends to look after their 
own supporters and neglect the rest of society. Older investigations, confirming the results 
of Helliwell (1994), Fidrmuc (2003), Weingast (2005), Hodgson (2006b) and Butiewicz & 
Yanikkaya (2006),  have been conducted by Przeworski (1966), Adelman & Morris (1967), 
Huntington and Dominguez (1975), Marsh (1979), Weede (1983), Landau (1986), Sloan 
and Tedin (1987) and Helliwell (1992).  Przeworski (1966) investigates fifty-seven 
countries from 1949 to 1963 while Adelman & Morris (1967) examine an almost identical 
timeframe (1950 to 1964) for developing and communist countries. Huntington and 
Dominguez (1975) inspect thirty-five developing countries during the 1950s. Both Marsh 
(1979) and Weede (1983) test ninty-eight and one hundred and twenty-four countries 
respectively, with the latter’s investigation from 1960 to 1974 and the former from 1955 to 
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1970. Helliwell (1992) examines ninety countries from 1960 to 1985; Landau (1986) 
observes sixty-five countries from 1970 to 1980, while Sloan and Tedin (1987) investigate 
the same period, minus one year (1970 – 1979). All research confirms the conflict 
hypothesis. Again, an analysis of all investigations is presented in Table 4.5.1. 
 
4.4.3 Democracy has No Impact on Economic Growth 
The final hypothesis suggested by Sirowy and Inkeles’ (1990) is that democracy and 
economic growth have no relationship. This is known as the “sceptical” hypothesis. This 
idea is grounded in the belief that the level of democracy is not important. What is 
important is the stability of the government and its ability to adopt effective policies 
(Comeau, 2003).  Sirowy and Inkeles’ (1990) argue institutional structures determine the 
rate of economic growth. The nature of these institutional structures, for example the 
number of political parties, methods used to elect representatives or the prevalence of 
government intervention in economy, are far more important than the level of democracy. 
Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson (1996) find rapid economic growth can occur under both 
democracies and dictatorships. The time horizon is the important factor, not the government 
style, with dictators capable of rapid economic growth should they comply with Olson’s 
(2000) ‘stationary bandit’ and democracies capable of rapid growth should they secure 
property rights. Olson’s stationary bandit has a monopoly on crime and is the only person 
who can tax or steal within a geographic area. The encompassing interest of this bandit 
makes them behave very differently than a ‘roving bandit’ as they have a super-
encompassing interest in society. This gives the stationary bandit an incentive to provide 
public goods, spend recourses on productivity-enhancing activities and protect their domain. 
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A meta-analysis by Przeworski and Limongi (1993) confirms the “sceptical” hypothesis. 
The authors find no significant relationship between democracy and economic growth and 
conclude the relationship is spurious. This view is supported by investigations carried out 
before Przeworski and Limongi (1993) such as Kohli (1986), Marsh (1988) and Levine & 
Renelt (1992). Kohli (1986), using a sample of ten developing countries from 1960 to 1982, 
finds no difference in the growth performance of countries under democratic government or 
authoritarian rule. Marsh (1988) supports these findings from an examination of forty-seven 
countries from 1965 until 1984. Levine & Renelt (1992) find no robust relationship between 
the two, confirming the “sceptical” hypothesis.  
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4.5 DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The difficulty when attempting to establish a common theme in the mass of empirical results 
is the lack of comparability of countries examined, sample size and timeframes considered. A 
major shortcoming of many empirical papers is the limited number of years the effect of 
democracy on economic growth is considered for and the treatment of developing and 
developed countries as one in the same. For these reasons it is not surprising the democracy 
and economic growth debate has produced many conflicting results. Table 4.5.1 attempts to 
overcome the problem of comparing results from different studies discussed in Section 4.4. 
The table lists a total of thirty-three empirical studies and illustrates the timeframe examined, 
the total number of years covered, the number of countries considered, the type of country 
considered
8
, the method used to measure democracy and the hypothesis confirmed by the 
results. Of the thirty-three studies, nineteen consider a mix of both developing and developed 
countries with the remaining fourteen considering developing countries only. The earliest 
year considered in any study is 1950 with the latest 2005. Gerring, Bond, Barndt & Moreno 
(2005) examine the longest timeframe, a total of fifty-one years, from 1950 to 2000 and 
consider the most countries, with a total sample size of one hundred and eight-seven 
countries. A detailed examination of Table 4.5.1 illustrates some interesting findings. 
 
4.5.1 Developed and Developing 
Eight of the fourteen studies considering developing countries only, confirm the compatibility 
hypothesis. A further four confirm the conflict hypothesis, with the remaining two sceptical. 
Of the nineteen investigations that consider both developed and developing countries 
together, thirteen support the compatibility hypothesis, three the conflict hypothesis with a 
                                                          
8
 The type of country is simply a binary choice; developing or developed. No empirical study looks at just 
developed countries. The term mixed in Table 4.5.1 refers to a sample of both developing and developed 
countries.  
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further three the sceptical hypothesis. These findings appear to suggest that, in general, 
democracy has growth-promoting qualities for both developed and developing countries.  
 
4.5.2 Measurement of Democracy 
The results become more interesting when one considers the index or method used to 
quantify democracy. The Freedom House Gastil Index is by far the most prevalent democracy 
measure used and is applied to more than half of the studies (seventeen of thirty-three). 
Thirteen empirical studies using the Gastil Index confirm the compatibility hypothesis. Three 
studies find no relationship between democracy and growth. Only one investigation, 
Helliwell (1994,) uses the Gastil Index and finds the conflict hypothesis holds. It must be 
noted Helliwell (1994) applies both the Gastil Index and the Bollen Index together. 
Furthermore, while the conflict hypothesis is found to hold the results produced are not 
statistically significant.  
 
The Polity score is the second most popular measurement of democracy. Like the Gastil 
Index, investigations using the Polity score confirm the compatibility hypothesis in five out 
of six investigations. Only Hodsgon (2006b) finds support for the conflict hypothesis using 
the Polity score. It is significant that, like Gastil and Polity, other measurements of 
democracy produce consistent findings. Bollen’s Index is used on four occasions and 
confirms either the conflict or sceptical hypothesis. Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient is 
applied to two studies both of which confirm the compatibility hypothesis. A simply one-zero 
dummy variable approach, employed by Landau (1986), confirms the sceptical hypothesis. 
These conclusions suggest the impact of democracy on economic growth has less to do with 
the level of development in a country and more to do with the method used to quantify 
democracy.  
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4.5.3 Length of Time Considered 
A further important issue raised is the length of time examined in each empirical 
investigation. This interesting idiosyncrasy is raised due to the findings of Hodgson (2006b) 
when using the Polity score. The shorter timeframe examined by Hodgson (2006b produced 
results that conflicted with all other Polity based results. All other investigations using the 
Polity score in Table 4.5.1 consider thirty or more years. An examination of the number of 
years considered in each empirical investigation (See Table 4.5.1) indicates ten studies 
consider twenty-five years or more. Of these ten, seven produce results which support the 
compatibility hypothesis. Only one, Helliwell, (1994) finds a conflicting relationship between 
economic growth and democracy and this could be due to the use of the Bollen Index which 
confirms the conflict and sceptical hypothesis in the two other studies considered in Table 
4.5.1. This appears to suggest the longer the timeframe considered, the more like democracy 
is to have a positive effect on economic growth.  
126 
 
Table 4.5.1 Empirical Investigations Between Democracy and Economic Growth 
Author(s) & Year From - To Years Sample Size Country Type Democracy Measure Hypothesis 
Adelman & Morris (1967) 1950 - 1964 15 74 Developing Only ISD Index Conflict  
Barro (1989) 1960 - 1985 26 72 Mixed Gastil Index Compatibility 
Barro (1996) 1960 - 1990 31 100 Mixed Gastil Index Sceptical 
Barro (1997) 1972 - 1994 23 105 Mixed Gastil Index Compatibility 
Baum & Lake (2003) 1967 - 1997 31 128 Mixed Polity Index Compatibility (I)  
Butiewicz & Yanikkaya (2006) 1970 - 1999 30 114 Mixed Gastil Index & Polity IV Compatibility 
De Melo, Denizer & Gelb (1997)  1989 - 1994 6 27 Developing Only Pearson Correlation Coefficient Compatibility (I)  
Dethier, Ghanem &Zoli (1997)  1992 - 1997 6 25 Developing Only Pearson Correlation Coefficient Compatibility (I)  
Dick (1974) 1959 - 1968 10 72 Developing Only Gastil Index Compatibility 
Feng (1997)  1960 - 1992 33 40 Developing Only Polity Index Compatibility (I)  
Fidrmuc (2003)  1990 - 2000 11 25 Developing Only Gastil Index Compatability 
Gerring, Bond, Barndt & Moreno (2005) 1950 - 2000 51 187 Mixed Polity Index Compatibility 
Grier & Tullock (1989)  1961 - 1980 30 113 Mixed Gastil Index Compatibility 
Helliwell (1994)  1960 - 1985 26 98 Mixed Gastil Index & Bollen Index Conflict 
Hodgson (2006)  1989 - 2005 17 27 Developing Only Polity Index Conflict 
Huntington & Dominguez (1975) 1950 - 1959 10 35 Developing Only   Conflict 
Kohli (1986) 1960 - 1980 21 10 Developing Only Bollen Index of Democracy Sceptical 
Kormendi & Meguire (1985) 1950 - 1977 18 47 Mixed Gastil Index Compatability 
Landau (1986) 1960 - 1980 21 65 Mixed 0 - 1 Dummy Variable Conflict 
Marsh (1979) 1955 - 1970 16 98 Mixed Bollen Index of Democracy Conflict 
Marsh (1988)  1965 - 1984 20 55 Mixed Gastil Index Sceptical 
Minier (1998)  1960 - 1989 30 148 Mixed Gastil Index Compatibility 
Naryan, Naryan & Smyth (2011)  1972 - 2001 30 30 Developing Only Gastil Index Sceptical 
Perotti (1996)  1960 - 1985 26 28 Mixed Gastil Index Compatibility (I)  
Pourgerami (1988) 1965 - 1984 20 92 Mixed Political Repression Index Compatability 
Pourgerami (1991) 1986 - 1986 1 106 Developing Only Gastil Index Compatability 
Remmer (1990)  1982 - 1988 7 11 Developing Only Date since start of Democracy  Compatability 
127 
 
Author(s) & Year From - To Years Sample Size Country Type Democracy Measure Hypothesis 
Rodrik & Wacizarg (2005) 1964 - 2001 37 24 Developing Only Polity Index Compatability 
Scully (1988) 1960 - 1980 21 115 Mixed Gastil Index Compatability 
Scully (1992) 1960 - 1980 21 115 Mixed Gastil Index Compatability 
Sloan & Tedin (1987)  1960 - 1979 20 20 Developing Only   Conflict 
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001)  1970 - 1989 20 65 Mixed Gastil Index Compatibility (I)  
Weede (1983) 1960 - 1974 15 74 Mixed Bollen Index of Democracy Sceptical 
 
Compatability (I) = Positive Indirect Impact on Economic Growth 
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4.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter seeks to provide an overview into the relationship between democracy and 
economic growth by answering three key questions. Firstly, what direction does the causation 
run? Secondly, if democracy does impact upon economic growth, what impact does it have? 
And thirdly, is there evidence to suggest that the timeframe examined, the total number of 
years covered, the number of countries considered, the type of country considered and the 
method used to measure democracy, impact upon empirical investigations. The emergence of 
modern democracy has its origins in the French Revolution and the parliamentary Reform 
Acts passed in the United Kingdom during the nineteenth century. The extension of 
democratic freedoms was not a direct result of economic growth but the fear of revolution 
which incumbent governments and elites viewed as a threat to their economic prosperity and 
social standing. The spread of democracy was as much an attempt by the ruling classes to 
preserve the status quo as it was by the rest of the population to undermine it. Other 
explanations for the spread of democracy in Western Europe include the Enlightenment, 
political party competition and a middle class drive to recognise the lower classes. While 
each of these could have played a part, none is as likely as the threat of revolution.  
 
Despite the many attempts to address the question of democracy’s impact on growth no 
satisfactory conclusion has been reached. Instead four separate strands have emerged, with 
positive direct effects, positive indirect effects, negative effects and no effects, all found to 
exist in different samples, at different times. Of the studies considered in this chapter, the 
majority of previous investigations support the view democracy is compatible with economic 
growth, either directly or indirectly. Democratisation of a country, in general, appears to 
promote economic growth. Furthermore, the extension of democracy appears to have a 
greater impact on economic growth when moving from lower relative levels to higher levels. 
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That said some investigations do report a negative relationship between the two variables or 
no relationship at all. An examination of previous empirical investigations appears to suggest 
the results are sensitive to sample size, timeframe considered and the measurement of 
democracy employed in the regression analysis. Both the Freedom House Gastil Index and 
Polity IV database, the two most popular measures of democracy, confirm the compatibility 
hypothesis in all but two cases. In contrast, Bollen’s Index of democracy fails to find any 
growth-promoting aspects to democracy. The length of time examined appears to influence 
results with longer investigations more likely to confirm the growth-promoting properties of 
democracy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 130 
 
CHAPTER 5 – SOURCES OF DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The principal research hypothesis asserts the transition to a modern capitalist economy 
depends largely on state development, state capacity and the integration and modernisation 
of institutions which support the state. In order to tackle a question like this, a long-term or 
evolutionary approach based on an extended data series is required. Mitchell (2007a) states 
although data for some countries is available back to the Middle Ages, it is all too often 
gathered and presented in an inadequate manner. While it would be worthwhile examining 
as far back in time as possible, it is often neither possible nor appropriate to go back beyond 
certain points in time when collecting data for many countries. It was not until the Industrial 
Revolution, its origins dated at the very earliest to the middle of the eighteenth century that 
countries began to record the output of various economic and social statistics in any sort of 
reliable manner.    
 
Prior to a discussion of the data collection techniques employed, it is necessary to highlight 
some problems associated with using cross-country data over extended time horizons. 
According to Mitchell (2007a) the greatest of these is a lack of complete data for many 
countries, prior to World War Two. Similar but more discreet problems when using the 
data, are the presence of cross-country recordings which ‘appear’ to be reporting the same 
information but in fact are not. This problem is often one of definition, where one country 
reports a statistic in a different manner to another. For example, general government 
revenue as a percentage of national output may be reported as a percentage of gross 
domestic product in one country and gross national product in another. This research 
attempts to minimise these inconsistencies. Sometimes however, due to data constraints, 
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this has been impossible to avoid. Where this does happen, readers are made aware of any 
issues regarding the uniformity of the data.  
 
It is important to note some additional issues that must be considered when using historical 
data. This first is that of the unknown competence of the collectors and publisher of past 
data. Due to the historic nature of all recorded observations it is often impossible to check 
the credibility of data and therefore, it must be accepted at face value as being correct. The 
second problem when using historical data is of greater concern; Mitchell (2007a) argues 
the most important methodological development of the twentieth century [was] the 
introduction of measurement in varying degrees in virtually every one of the social sciences. 
It is only since the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that data and statistical 
publications have been collected and produced for their own sake. Many series produced 
before the late nineteenth century should be viewed with a large degree of scepticism, a 
consequence of the incentives of misreporting or failing to report data. Examples of this 
include incorrect date of birth data in censuses in order to avoid, or partake, in wartime 
campaigns or incorrect reporting of imported or exported commodities to avoid duties and 
other taxes. Furthermore, countries often inflated statistics on population size or industrial 
output as a means of sabre-rattling in the age of imperialism (Mitchell, 2007a).  
  
Due to a lack of reliable data, or in many cases the lack of any data, the empirical 
estimations in Chapter 6 are applied from 1880 to 2008. A sample of fifteen countries are 
considered, consisting of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the 
Unites States of America. These countries are selected as they provided the longest and 
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most consistent time-series data, stretching back into the nineteenth century. Eight separate 
hypotheses, discussed later, are proposed as potentially answering the research question. 
 
Data is obtained from a variety of sources, each of which is discussed in turn below. Given 
the length of time under examination, a primary objective of the collection and estimation of 
the data is to ensure it is consistent across individual countries for the duration of the time 
period examined. There are instances (which are documented later in the chapter), when 
data is unavailable, where interpolation, extrapolation or adjoining years are used to account 
for missing data. For the purposes of the empirical tests, the years 1914 to 1918 and 1939 to 
1945 are omitted from the sample. Data is widely unavailable for many variables for these 
years. Given the disruption in all countries in the sample during both periods, interpolation 
of the data, used for other missing observations, was deemed inappropriate. The remainder 
of this chapter is presented as follows: Section 5.2 provides a detailed account of how the 
variables used in the empirical tests are sourced and constructed. Section 5.3 outlines the 
empirical models used in the regression analysis in Chapter 6. Section 5.4 presents newly 
created data and is one of the main contributions of this work. Section 5.5 concludes the 
chapter.  
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5.2 CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES  
Data has been obtained from the following sources: The Australian Government (2012), 
Black (1966), The Economic History Association (2012), Engerman & Sokoloff (2005), The 
European Commission (2012) Flora (1983), Hodgson (1996), International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2012), Maddisson (2006), Mitchell (2007a, 2007b & 
2007c), Mackie (1982), Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers (2012), The Princeton Encyclopaedia of 
American Political History (2010),  The Reserve Bank of Australia (2012), The United States 
Government Revenue History (2012) and The World Bank (2012). Each of these sources is 
now discussed.  
 
5.2.1 Real GDP per Capita 
The Development Centre Studies World Economy Historical Statistics is a joint project 
between the Angus Maddison Foundation and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). Maddison (2006) provides data on real GDP and real GDP per 
capita from 1AD to 2030 (estimations) for over 190 countries.  Real GDP per capita is 
expressed in Geary-Khamis Dollars for all countries. This measure is sometimes referred to 
as the international dollar and is a hypothetical currency that exists only for cross-country 
comparison purposes. It is used to make comparisons between countries over time. The 
Geary-Khamis Dollar is based on the joint concepts of purchasing power parities and the 
international average price of products and services. The data uses 1990 as the base year 
with the purchasing power of all currencies converted to US dollars in that year. Making 
comparisons between GDP per capita in various countries in international dollars is an 
improved comparison tool rather than simply relying on nominal exchange rates. For the 
purposes of this research, data for real GDP per capita is collected from 1880 to 2008 for 
the fifteen countries in the sample. The rate of GDP per capita growth is calculated, for five 
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years intervals, from real GDP per capita data for the years 1880 to 2008. Data is available 
for all countries and for all years. No data for the dependent variable is interpolated or 
extrapolated.  
 
5.2.2 Nominal National Output 
Mitchell (2007a, 2007b, 2007c) provides data for a number of economic and institutional 
variables from 1750 to 2005 for countries across the world in International Historical 
Statistics 1750 -2005. Interest in a country’s wealth and the income generated within its 
borders can be traced back centuries, however, it was not until the interwar period of the 
twentieth century that serious attempts were made to record national output correctly. The 
length and persistence of data is country-specific. Two countries, Sweden and the UK, have 
recorded time-series data stretching back to the eighteenth century. For other countries, such 
as Austria and Belgium, data becomes available from this source in the late nineteenth or 
early twentieth century. The fifteen countries in the sample are very different with regards to 
area, population and national output. For this reason, it is necessary to consider government 
revenue, expenditure and the volume of exports and imports as a percentage of national 
output. As all revenue, expenditure and trade data collected in Mitchell (2007a, 2007b, 
2007c) is presented in nominal currency; it is not possible to use national income statistics 
from the Development Centre Studies World Economy Historical Statistics to calculate each 
as a percentage of national output. Instead, nominal national output data from The Economic 
History Association (2012) and Mitchell (2007a, 2007b, 2007c) are used.  
 
The first method used to measure national output is Net National Product (NNP) or National 
Income (NI). After the Second World War, Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) become more prevalent, especially in Western Europe. Mitchell 
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(2007a) states neither NNP, GNP nor GDP are intrinsically better than each other at 
measuring national output and while this scenario is not ideal, no measure can be considered 
incorrect. It is important to note different measures of national output are used at different 
times in the Mitchell statistics (See Appendix 5.4 for individual country accounts).  
 
5.2.3 Nominal General Government Expenditure & Revenue 
The management of public finances has been a fundamental statistic for all governments from 
a state’s inception. It is surprising data on government revenue and expenditure, despite its 
importance historical, is only readily available for even the most developed countries from 
the middle of the nineteen century onwards (Mitchell, 2007a). With the exception of Britain 
and the Habsburg monarchy, almost no record of public finances is available for developed 
countries. Mitchell (2007a) suggests full information regarding the expenditure and revenue 
of most states only becomes widely available when democratically elected governments are 
present, wielding control over the taxation system. Furthermore, it must be recognised that in 
some instances countries failed to report expenditure and receipts for state secrecy reasons, 
military ambitions or reasons related to the repayment of national debt.  
 
For the purposes of empirical tests in Chapter 6, data is collected for general government 
revenue only. Due to the balanced-budget approach adopted by many states prior to the Great 
Depression (Nasar, 2011), including both general government revenue and expenditure would 
lead to multicollinearity problems in the empirical tests presented in Chapter 6. Where 
possible general government statistics are used as opposed to central government figures. The 
latter includes central, regional and local levels but excludes federal levels which are included 
in ‘general’ government statistics (Flora, 1983). Due to a lack of data at general government 
level, in some instances central government figure are used between the years 1880 and 1919. 
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Fortunately, divergences between central and general government accounts only appear after 
1945. The rationale for using general government revenue when measuring public finances, 
as opposed to general government expenditure, is simply down to the availability of data. 
Mitchell (2007a, 2007b, 2007c) provides all government figures revenue while Flora (1983), 
the European Commission (2012), the Australian Government, the Reserve Bank of Australia 
and US Government Revenue (2012) are used to construct an index of general government 
revenue for all fifteen countries. Due to the unexplained absence of data on government 
revenue in Mitchell (2007a) from 1994 onwards, data for the years 1994 to 2008 is sourced 
from the World Bank Databank.  
 
5.2.4 Volume of Exports and Imports 
Unlike nominal national output and public finances figures, data regarding external trade is 
more readily available for developed countries and dates back several centuries in many 
instances. This can be attributed to the importance of international trade as a source of 
government revenue, requiring all trade to be reported and recorded in national statistics. 
Historically, most European countries have reported the volume of exports and imports in 
two forms; the first is ‘general trade’; the second ‘special’ trade. General trade refers to all 
commodities that enter or leave the borders of the state. Special trade describes only 
commodities that are imported for internal use or products that are produced in a state and 
then exported. The subtle difference is that general trade includes commodities that are 
imported and then used in the production of exports; special trade does not include these 
commodities. Trade data used in the empirical tests is reported in the form of ‘special’ trade.  
 
Historical trade data is more credible than figures for the public finances, especially given the 
time period under examination. Smuggling, a problem rife in most developed countries due to 
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duties and taxes levied on exports and imports, only began to be eliminated in the mid-
nineteenth century. Two decades of free trade in the middle of the nineteenth century 
rendered much smuggling activity redundant. The return to trade protectionism and tariffs on 
imported goods did return in the latter part of the nineteenth century, however at this stage 
monitoring at seaports and boarders was far more advanced, hence the incidence of 
smuggling collapsed (Mitchell, 2007a). It can be reasonably assumed trade data for today’s 
developed states is accurate from the middle part of the nineteenth century onwards. For this 
purposes of this research nominal export data as a percentage of national output is calculated 
using Mitchell (2007a, 2007b, 2007c). Linear interpolation is used on a limited number of 
occasions to fill in missing data points between years. A discussion of the particulars for each 
country is outlined in Appendix 5.4. 
 
5.2.5 Educational Enrolment Numbers at Primary School Level 
According to Mitchell (2007a) of all the statistics reported for countries over the past two 
hundred and fifty years, from national output and industrial indices to crime levels, none 
presents less uniformity in reporting, both over time and across countries, than education. For 
this reason, comparisons in the importance of education, across countries are problematic. 
The reason for these inconsistencies relates to the arbitrary nature and definition of what 
comprises primary and secondary education. Large scale reorganisation of schooling systems 
across developed countries throughout the twentieth century make comparisons even more 
difficult.  The statistics reported in Mitchell (2007a, 2007b, 2007c) face a further problem 
regarding the consistency of what is reported. The number of children reported in primary 
education can consist of any of the following; all those registered as attending school, all 
those that regularly attend school, all those present on a particular day when a register is 
taken or all those present on a particular day when an inspector visits. Despite these 
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drawbacks, estimates of child primary school participation rates are calculated as a 
percentage of the population aged between five and twelve years of age in education. 
Population data is obtained from Mitchell (2007a, 2007b, 2007c). A discussion of the 
particulars for each country and the number of times census figures are reported is outlined in 
Appendix 5.4. 
 
5.2.6 Freight Traffic on Railway Lines 
States, and by extension government, have for many years been involved in the development, 
provision and maintenance of transport and communication. Data on freight traffic is readily 
available for a large sample of developed countries dating to the early nineteenth century. 
Railway lines were a traditional source of military strength and for this reason governments 
have been keen to record and monitor all aspects of their use. With the exception of Germany 
and Japan, whose time series commence in the mid-1880s, freight traffic in million metric 
tons is recorded for all countries, from 1880 onwards. Freight traffic in million metric tons is 
now divided by population to establish the value of freight traffic per capita for each country.  
A discussion of the particulars for each country are reported is outlined in Appendix 5.4. 
 
5.2.7 Democracy Index 
The extent of democracy in a country is considered to be an important determinant of 
economic growth and institutional flexibility. Previous investigations into the relationship 
between economic growth and democracy have been discussed at length in Chapter 4. Table 
4.3.1 presents various measurements used to quantify democracy. Measurement techniques 
ranging from simply binary choice (country is democratic or not) to more sophisticated 
measurement of democracy such as the Polity IV Database and the Freedom House Index. 
This research has chosen an alternative method to measure the extent of democracy by 
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collecting cross-country data on all those in the population above the legal voting age with a 
legal right to vote. Flora’s (1983) State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe provides 
most of the earlier data (1880 to 1975), with International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (2012) database providing the later data from 1975 to 2008. Engermand 
& Sokoloff (2005) and The Princeton Encyclopaedia of American Political History (2010) 
are used to fill in missing data for New World countries between the years 1880 and 1948 
which are not recorded in Flora (1983). All data from 1880 to 1980 is triangulated using 
Mackie (1983). The construction of the democracy measure from these three sources is now 
discussed. 
 
The prevalence of voting rights among the population is used as a determinant of economic 
development (see Barro, 1998 and Rodrik, 2007) and institutional flexibility. As countries 
develop along a path to modernisation, voting rights have tended to become more apparent 
among the population. While voting rights today are almost universal in every developed 
country, this was not always the case. Restrictions on suffrage have historically been 
experienced by groups of the population such as females, younger citizens of the state, ethnic 
or religious minorities and those in lower social classifications. Restrictions have been 
imposed in the manner votes are cast, with plural voting often granted to those holding 
privileged positions within states. Universal voting rights have been further tarnished by 
violation of secret ballot and gerrymandering (the deliberate rigging of constituencies 
boundaries so as to fix an electoral outcome). 
  
Data for the democracy index is collected from three sources mentioned above. Flora (1983) 
and Engermand & Sokoloff (2005) are used to construct the earlier part of the index. Both 
sources provide a variety of electoral data from 1820 to 1975 for the fifteen countries.  Before 
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female suffrage in specific countries, the percentage of population above the voting age with 
a legal entitlement to vote consisted only of male members of the population above twenty 
years of age. While today voting rights are extended to those as young as sixteen in some 
cases, as late as 1968 no country in the sample extended franchise rights to persons below 
twenty years of age. In 1969 Sweden and the United Kingdom granted voting rights to 
nineteen year olds and above. These countries where subsequently followed by all others in 
reducing the legal voting age.  
 
The latter part of the index is constructed using the International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (IIDEA) database. IIDEA is an intergovernmental organization, 
established in the early 1960s, with the purpose of supporting sustainable democracy 
worldwide. The organisation provides comparative knowledge to fledgling democracies, 
from experience of how others countries have become stable democracies. It assists these 
countries by encouraging and facilitating democratic reform by shaping policies and politics, 
enabling democracy to take root and become sustainable in newly democratic states. IIDEA 
provides data on voter turnout across over one hundred and fifty countries. This data contains 
additional information such as the year of each election, the number of votes cast, the 
percentage voter turnout, the number of registered people on the electorate list and the 
number of people in the population over eighteen years of age. Using the number of 
registered to vote and dividing it by the number of those in the population over eighteen, an 
estimate of the percentage of the population over eighteen with voting rights is calculated 
from all fifteen countries from 1975 to 2008. The estimates in Flora (1983) are cross checked 
with the IIDEA database from 1945 to 1975 and it can be confirmed that the estimates are 
almost identical. These are additionally cross referenced with the electoral turnout data in 
Mackie (1981) and further supported by this source. The fraction of the population above the 
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voting age which are legally entitled to vote is observed a minimum of twenty-nine times for 
all countries between 1880 and 2010.  A discussion of the particulars for each country is 
outlined in Appendix 5.4. 
  
5.2.8 Independence, Revolutions & Occupations 
Chapter 3 explains Olson’s (1982, 1989, 1996a & 1996b) argument regarding the importance 
of disruptions and stability on the progress of economic development across countries. 
Olson’s work is grounded in what he regarded as the peculiar pattern of economic growth 
during the twentieth century, with the economic stagnation of the victorious countries starkly 
contrasted to the booming post-war economies of the defeated states, such as Germany and 
Japan. Olson (1965) discusses the damaging effects that group formation could have on a 
society and proposed four conditions necessary for group formation to occur; small numbers, 
common interests, stability and the passage of time. This logic is applied to countries to 
explain their performance over the twentieth century. Olson (1989) is convinced that the 
United Kingdom’s relative poor economic performance during the twentieth century was a 
consequence of the destructive role of groups in British society or ‘British disease’. Olson is 
not the first person to recognise this. Veblen (1915:132) suggests Britain is  
“Paying the penalty for having been thrown into the lead and so having shown the 
way”.  
 
Long before Veblen, Smith (1776:116) remarks  
“China seems to have long been stationary, and had, probably long ago acquired that 
full complement of riches which is consistent with the nature of its laws and 
institutions”. 
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A series of disruption variables are included in the model to capture the affect disruption and 
institutional change has on the rate of economic growth over the period 1880 to 2008. The 
inspiration for this approach comes from Hodgson (1989 & 1996). A similar approach is 
taken, with the inclusion of three disruption variables used to capture national unification 
(DISNAT), foreign occupation (DISOCC) and revolution or civil war (DISREV). The same 
criteria used by Hodgson (1996) to define a disruption are used for these empirical tests. A 
period of disruption is only considered to be such if it obeys three criteria. Firstly, there must 
be an extensive foreign occupation, revolution or civil war, a year of the declaration of 
national independence or unification of the state, which leads to significant and noticeable 
social change. Secondly, there must be at least a decade from any other period of major 
disruption. Finally, it must occur in the ‘modern era’. This is defined as the start of the period 
outlined by Black (1966) as marking the beginning of the period of “consolidation of 
modernising leadership” (CML) (See Tables 5.2.1 and 5.2.2). The inclusions of the second 
and third criteria are to prevent a bias by over-weighting disruptions that occur in close 
proximity to one another, with one possibly correlated to the other. Furthermore, this ensures 
disruptions that occurred before the modernisation of the state, which are too early to affect 
modern institutions, are not included. 
 
Consolidation of modern leadership (CLM) is a transfer of power away from the traditional, 
hereditary base established by the ruling elite to that of modernising leaders who emerged 
from the educated middle classes. The creation of a state, a shift away from a predominantly 
agrarian way of life and a politically organised society with stable institutions are 
predominant features of countries that have consolidated modern leadership. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, CML marks the transition from a basic to mature autocratic state. Black (1966) 
argues CLM occurs when the state has a direct relationship with every citizen. This 
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relationship exists when centralised tax collection occurs and government expenditure 
extends to satisfy the needs of a country’s education system. This is consistent with North, 
Wallis & Weingast ’s (2009) description of the “mature nature state”. Table 5.2.1 lists the 
years Black (1966) estimates as the beginning of CML in each country and the years when 
major disruptions ended. Table 5.2.2 presents a list of events that may have triggered the start 
of CLM in each country, providing a rationale for each of Black’s commencement years for 
CLM.  The dummy variables used to capture national independence (DISNAT), revolutions 
(DISREV) and foreign occupations (DISOCC) are illustrated in Appendices 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.  
 
Table 5.2.1: Years of CLM and Major Disruption  
Country CML Periods of Major Disruption 
 Australia 1801 1901 
     Austria 1848 1848 1918 1945 
   Belgium 1795 1813 1830 1848 1918 1945 
 Canada 1791 1867 
     Denmark 1807 1945 
     France 1789 1789 1814 1830 1848 1871 1945 
Germany 1803 1805 1848 1870 1918 1933 1945 
Italy 1805 1805 1848 1860 1922 1945 
 Japan 1868 1868 1945 
    Netherlands 1795 1795 1810 1945 
   Norway 1809 1905 1945 
    Sweden 1809 
      Switzerland 1798 1803 1847 
    United Kingdom 1649 1688 
     United States 1776 1783 1865 
    Source: Black (1966) and Hodgson (1996) 
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Table 5.2.2: Event Triggering the Start of the CLM Period. 
Country CML Event Triggering CML 
Australia 1801 Unknown 
Austria 1848 Hungary proclaims its independence from Austria. 
Belgium 1795 Belgium becomes a part of France. 
Canada 1791 Provinces Quebec and Ontario are formed each with an assembly. 
Denmark 1807 The Second Battle or Bombardment of Copenhagen. 
France 1789 The French Revolution. 
Germany 1803 Territorial reform of German States. 
Italy 1805 Napoleon declares himself the emperor of Italy. 
Japan 1868 Restoration of imperial rule. 
Netherlands 1795 The Velvet Revolution and establishment of the Batavian Republic. 
Norway 1809 End of Dano-Swedish War 
Sweden 1809 Sweden declares independence; Constitutional monarchy begins. 
Switzerland 1798 Revolution in Switzerland 
United Kingdom 1649 Cromwell's reign begins. 
United States 1776 Declaration of Independence. 
Source: Timelines (2012) 
 
5.2.9 Polity IV  
The Polity IV project provides further institutional indicators. This database is used 
throughout the literature, most recently by Besley and Persson (2011), in an attempt to 
measure the effectiveness of institutions in sustaining and promoting economic growth. The 
Polity IV dataset covers a total of one hundred and sixty-four countries from the year 1800 to 
2010. In order to be included in Polity IV, states must have a population of over 500,000 
people in the year 2010. This database is unique as it examines concomitant qualities of 
democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions, rather than discreet and 
mutually exclusive forms of governance (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2012). This advantage 
allows the variables in the database to be considered across countries and through time in the 
empirical tests presented in Chapter 6. Polity IV encompasses six component measures. Each 
measure records ‘executive recruitment’, ‘constraints on executive authority’ and ‘political 
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competition’ across one hundred and sixty-four countries. Furthermore, the database 
considers and records changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authorities.  
 
According to Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers (2012:1) one drawback of using this data is that it 
only includes  
“…information on the institutions of the central government and on political groups 
acting, or reacting, within the scope of that authority. It does not include consideration 
of groups and territories that are actively removed from that authority or segments of 
the population that are not yet effectively politicized in relation to central state 
politics”. 
For the purposes of the empirical tests, this research considers two Polity IV variables; 
regime durability and political competition. Data is available for all countries in the sample 
from 1880 to 2010.  
 
5.2.9.1 Regime Durability  
Regime durability is measured as the number of years since the most recent regime change or 
the cessation of a transitional period, where standard institutions used to ensure the proper 
functioning of the state are not in place. Polity IV calculates the durable variable as the first 
year in which a new regime change occurs is given a baseline value of zero, with each 
subsequent year after this adding one to the initial value. Examples of events which are 
deemed to have reset the durability score to zero are the Liberal victory in the 1880 UK 
election, the German annexation of Austria in 1938 and the resignation of President Charles 
de Gaulle in 1969.  
 
 
 146 
 
5.2.9.2 Political Competition 
Political competition is measured by constructing an index based around two additional 
metrics of political competition. These are Regulation of Participation (PARREG) and 
Competitiveness of Participation (PARCOMP). PARREG measures the extent to which there 
are enforceable and compulsory rules on when, where and how political opinions and beliefs 
are articulated. A five point scale is constructed to categorise different levels of PARREG. 
The categories are Unregulated (1), Multiple Identity (2), Sectarian (3), Restricted (4) and 
Regulated (5). PARCOMP measures the extent to which alternative policies and leaderships 
can be pursued within a state. PARCOMP is also categorised on a five point scale. The 
categories are Repressed (1), Suppressed (2), Factional (3), Transitional (4) and Competitive 
(5). POLCOMP is constructed by combining both PARREG and PARCOMP and is presented 
in Table 5.2.3.  
 
Table 5.2.3: Translation of Polity IV Political Competition Concept 
  Polity IV Concept Polity IV Component Variables  
  POLCOMP PARREG PARCOMP 
1 Suppressed Restricted (4) Repressed (1) 
2 Restricted Restricted (4) Suppressed (2) 
3 
Imposed Transition: Loosening or 
Tightening restrictions Sectarian (3) Suppressed (2) 
4 Uninstituionalised Unregulated (1) N/A 
5 
Gradual Transition from 
Uninstituionalised Multiple Identity (2) N/A 
6 Factional/Restricted Sectarian (3) Factional (3) 
7 Factional Multiple Identity (2) Factional (3) 
8 
Electoral Transition: Persistent 
Conflict/Coercion Sectarian (3) Transitional (4) 
9 
Electoral Transition: Limited 
Conflict/Coercion Multiple Identity (2) Transitional (4) 
10 Institutionalised Electoral Regulated (5) Competitive (5) 
Source: Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers (2012) 
 
To illustrate the ten point scale, Austria was at Point 6 from 1880 to 1920. From 1920 to 1932 
it moves to Point 7, however in 1933 this declines to Point 1. Since the Second World War it 
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has remained at Point 10. Italy is at Point 6 in 1880 and remains there until 1928 when the 
establishment of the Mussolini regime coincides with a collapse of the POLCOMP to point 1. 
From 1948 to 2010 Italy is reports a POLCOMP score of 10.     
 
5.2.10 Institutional Flexibility 
The significance of disruption or stability in promoting or preventing economic growth leads 
to the inclusion of an institutional flexibility measure. In the absence of bifurcations and 
interruptions, which encourage the establishment of new institutions and practices, it is 
logical to believe that institutions display growth-retarding characteristics over time. Such 
growth-retarding characteristics are grounded in the Olsonian logic of institutional sclerosis. 
This logic is discussed in Chapter 3, however attempting to measure institutional change is 
more problematic. Previous attempts have been made notably by Choi (1983) who uses a 
rising logistic curve to reflect the ‘sclerosis’ that occurs due to stability, the passage of time 
and the selected interests of small groups. Choi (1983) uses the CLM date, proposed by Black 
(1966) in the formulation of the curve. This approach assumes that the societies begin with no 
sclerosis and no interest group interference.  
 
As discussed in Section 3.4, Hodgson (1989) disputes the assumption of no prior sclerosis 
and suggests the curve which most closely resembles the form of institutional flexibility 
through time is more likely to be an inverted U-shape. The zenith of this curve represents the 
year institutions have the greater level of malleability and capacity, promoting and organising 
new ideas and routines (See Figure 3.3.1). Hodgson (1989) uses Black’s years, selecting the 
starting years of EST as the high point in institutional flexibility for each country with 
institutional sclerosis setting in thereafter. Table 5.2.4 presents the year in which the fifteen 
countries commence EST and the event that may have triggered the initiation of this phase. In 
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addition, following the peak of the inverted U-shaped curve, institutional flexibility begins to 
decline as institutions, routines and habits become older and less receptive to change. In the 
absence of disruptive events, undermining the status quo and creating new institutions and 
routines, flexibility declines and the ossification of the system is the result.  
 
Table 5.2.4: Years of Economic and Social Transformation (EST) 
Country EST Event Triggering EST 
Australia 1901 Australian independence declared 
Austria 1918 Austria is declared a republic 
Belgium 1848 Unknown 
Canada 1867 Foundation of Canada 
Denmark 1866 Unknown 
France 1848 Foundation of the Second Republic 
Germany 1871 German unification 
Italy 1871 Italian unification 
Japan 1945 End of World War Two 
Netherlands 1848 Parliamentary democracy established 
Norway 1905 Norway becomes an independent kingdom 
Sweden 1905 Union of Norway and Sweden dissolved 
Switzerland 1848 Adoption of the Swiss federal constitution  
United Kingdom 1832 Reform Act  
United States 1865 End of civil war 
Source: Black (1966) and Hodgson (1996) 
 
The approach taken to measure institutional flexibility in the empirical estimations in Chapter 
6 builds on that of Choi (1983) and Hodgson (1989). Three approaches are used to measure 
institutional flexibility. The three are as follows: 
1. Despite reservations (previously outlined) with the use of Black’s EST year as the 
high point of institutional flexibility, the tests still consider the possibility this is 
correct. This approach is an extension of Hodgson (1989) and uses an inverted U-
shape to capture the rise and decline of institutional flexibility in each country, with 
the peak of the curve corresponding to Black’s year of EST. This measure is now 
referred to as FLX (See Figure 6.2.1). 
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2. A second approach is a new methodological approach to modelling institutional 
flexibility. A rising logistic curve, similar to that used by Choi (1983), is applied to 
the new democracy data collected and discussed in Chapter 5. From this application it 
is possible to identify the inflection point and corresponding year for each country. 
This year is assumed to correspond with a peak in EST where new ideas, the 
dissemination of new information and the absorbing new concepts and routines 
occurred most frequently. This year replaces that of Black (1966) in the inverted U-
shape institutional flexibility curve and is known as DEMFLX. This is deemed a more 
appropriate approach as Black’s date of EST is more likely to occur at the beginning 
of Hodgson’s inverted U-shaped curve. EST is likely to trigger the start of a period of 
rapid institutional flexibility, leading to higher levels of economic growth, as narrow 
special-interest groups are destroyed during the transition from CML to EST (See 
Figure 6.2.2). 
3. Thirdly, the first difference of each rising logistic curve is calculated and used as a 
measure of institutional flexibility. This transformation moves the measure of 
institutional flexibility away from the inverted U-shape for each county to varying 
degrees of rise and decline, depending upon the number of years it took for 
democracy to transition from low absolute levels to higher absolute levels. Countries 
that experienced rapid democratisation display a sharp rise and decline in institutional 
flexibility; countries which experienced slower transitions to full democracy display a 
more gradual rise and subsequent decline in institutional flexibility. This measure is 
now referred to as LOGCUR (See Figure 6.2.3). 
 
Further explanation of these three approaches is provided in Section 5.3 of this chapter. 
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5.2.11 Global Era Dummies 
Hodgson (1996) incorporates a number of dummy variables to test the hypothesis that 
different eras in the global economy affected individual countries in unique ways. Four 
periods are chosen to represent these dummies. These are 1880 to 1913 (pre First World 
War), 1919 to 1938 (Interwar period), 1946 to 1973 (post Second World War to the end of 
Bretton-Woods) and 1974 to 2008 (post Bretton-Woods).  
 
5.2.12 Relative Productivity – Diffusion Hypothesis 
Finally, a relative productivity measure is added to the model to capture Gomulka’s (1971) 
“diffusion hypothesis”.  Gomulka (1971 & 1979) argues that the overriding factor which 
determines the rate of economic growth is the extent to which “diffusion of innovations” 
from the most technologically advanced countries in the world passes to less developed 
states. Like Gomulka (1971 & 1979) and Hodgson (1989) the rate of GDP per capita growth 
is used as a proxy for technological advancement. The effect ‘diffusion’ has on a country is 
dependent on the “absorptive capacity” of that state to embrace new technologies and 
routines (Hodgson, 1989) and is directly influenced by the level of education, institutional 
framework and a “variety of social, cultural, institutional and political factors” (Gomulka, 
1979:186). This variable is included in the model and is simply the relative productivity 
levels between the United States of America (lead country) and each other country 
(RELPRO) from 1880 to 2008. This proxy captures the ‘technology gap’ between each 
country and the United States of America, which is deemed to be the most technologically 
advanced, measured by real GDP per capita. Data is obtained, as before, from The 
Development Centre Studies World Economy Historical Statistics. Real GDP per capita for 
each country is converted into a percentage of the United States level to give the variable 
RELPRO.  
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Having addressed the various empirical models employed in Chapter 6, Appendix 5.4 
discusses the various idiosyncrasies associated with data availability and the construction of 
the independent variables, for the individual fifteen countries. Relative productivity with the 
US is available for all countries from 1880 to 2008.  
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5.3 EMPIRICAL MODELS 
Three independent models of institutional flexibility are used in the empirical tests that 
follow in Chapter 6. To establish a measure of institutional flexibility, discussed in Section 
5.2.10, a rising logistic curve is applied to the democracy data addressed in Section 5.2.7. An 
explanation of the logistic curve is now provided, followed by an explanation for the 
measurement of institutional flexibility. Finally, a description of the panel regressions run on 
all data discussed in Section 5.2 is presented. This section addresses specification tests to be 
used in Chapter 6 to confirm the model is correctly specified.    
 
5.3.1. Logistic Curve 
The logistic curve is a common sigmoid function used to obtain a smoothed-curve 
representation of a time-series. The functional form of the logistic curve used in the 
estimations presented in the Chapter 6 is presented in Equation 5.3.1. 
 
1
















c
b
x
a
y
  (Equation 5.3.1) 
The use of this curve is most prevalent when attempting to explain the diffusion of an 
innovation through time. The conditions which led to the spread of democracy during the 
nineteenth century have been discussed in Chapter 4. From this discussion it should be clear 
the spread of democracy was very much the diffusion of a new idea which culminated in the 
bestowment of voting rights on the mass of the adult population across each state. The 
logistic curve is applied to each state from the earliest available democracy data point until 
2008. This curve then allows a year of inflection to be identified. This year replaces Black’s 
EST year as the high point of institutional flexibility in each country (See Equation 5.3.3). A 
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graphical illustration of the logistic curve, applied to democracy data for the United 
Kingdom, is presented in Figure 5.3.1. The year of inflection is identified as 1908. 
 
Figure 5.3.1: Democracy Logistic Curve for United Kingdom 1831 – 2008 
 
5.3.2. Three Measures of Institutional Flexibility  
Section 5.2.10 introduces the three approaches used to measure institutional flexibility. As 
discussed in Section 5.2.10, two of the models assume institutional flexibility through time is 
shaped like an inverted U-shape. The peak of this curve representing the year institutions are 
assumed to have the greatest level of malleability and capacity, promoting and organising 
new ideas and routines. Following the peak, institutional flexibility starts to decline as 
institutions, routines and habits become older and less receptive to change. In the absence of 
disruptive events, which could undermine the status quo and create new institutions, 
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flexibility declines, inertia sets in and the ossification of the system is the result. The third 
approach moves away from the uniform inverted U-shape, allowing each country to display 
varying levels of rise and decline, depending on country specific conditions related to the 
spread of democracy in each. This section now discusses the functional form of three 
approaches considered below 
1. FLX Years. 
2. DEMFLX Years. 
3. LOGCUR Years 
 
The first approach is linked to approach number two which in turn is linked to approach 
number three. There is no direct relationship between approaches 1 and 3. This is a step 
forward in understanding the impact of institutional flexibility on economic growth. The use 
of the logistic curve to identify years that coincide with the peak of institutional flexibility is 
an innovative and logical step forward, breaking with the arbitrariness of other approaches, 
such as Black (1966), allowing for the identification of an inflection point and thus providing 
a rigorous approach to the identification of peak institutional flexibility years (DEMFLX 
Years).   
 
5.3.2.1 FLX Years  
This measure of institutional flexibility is discussed in section 5.2.10, and is calculated from 
1880 to 2008 using the same model as Hodgson (1989). The Black (1966) EST years are used 
as the high point of institutional flexibility. The functional form used to model institutional 
flexibility is taken from Hodgson (1989) (See Equation 5.3.2):  
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     (Equation 5.3.2) 
Where: FLX measures institutional flexibility, 
 t  is the year, 
 EST is Black’s year of economic and social transformation 
 
5.3.2.2 DEMFLX Years 
The second measure of institutional flexibility is generated by identifying the year of 
inflection in each countries logistic curve, discussed in Section 5.3.1. The same functional 
form used by Hodgson (1989) is employed with the EST year replaced by the year of 
inflection or DEMFLX dates (Equation 5.5.3):  
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   (Equation 5.3.3) 
Where: DEMFLX measures institutional flexibility, 
 t  is the year, 
DEMFLX is year the inflection point on the rising logistic curve. 
 
5.3.2.3 LOGCUR 
The third approach uses the first difference of each country’s logistic curve (Equation 5.3.1). 
This approach moves away from the uniform hat shape used in approaches 1 and 2 but is 
related to the DEMFLX approach as institutional flexibility is measured by calculating the 
rate of change in the logistic curve in each year when applied to the democracy data. This 
allows the function to capture differences in countries experiencing rapid democratisation 
(steep curve) as opposed to those that experienced a much slower spread of democracy 
(flatter curve). The functional form capturing this approach is shown in Equation 5.3.4 
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  )()( 1 tt LogestLogesttLOGCUR    (Equation 5.3.4) 
Where: LOGCUR measures institutional flexibility, 
 t  is the year, 
 Logestt is the logistic curve value of democracy in a given year t 
 
5.3.3 Panel Regression Models  
Chapter 6 presents regression results for the data discussed in Section 5.2 and the three 
separate approaches taken to model institutional flexibility in Section 5.3.2. Seven statements 
are presented in Section 6.3. Each seeks to explain if state development and institutional 
flexibility have a significant impact on long run growth. As this is a panel of data, both a 
fixed effects regression and random effects generalised least squares (GLS) regression are 
run. This section now discusses the difference in the fixed effects and random effects 
regressions, ensuring such an approach is appropriate, and explains the tests used to identify 
whether the fixed or random effects model is correct. 
 
5.3.3.1 Fixed Effects Model 
The Fixed Effects Model takes into account the individuality of each cross-sectional unit by 
allowing the intercept in each unit to vary but assumes a constant slope.  This model is known 
as the Fixed Effects model because although the intercepts differ across different countries in 
the sample this difference is time invariant, or in other words, it is fixed through time as the 
slope coefficients are not allowed to vary. The Fixed Effects Model is presented as follows:  
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titiiti uXy ,,1,      (Equation 5.3.5) 
Where: yit is the dependent variable observed for individual country i at time t,  
αi is the time-invariant regressor 
Xit is the time-variant regressor 
uit is the error term 
 
5.3.3.2 Random Effects Model 
The Random Effects Model differs from the Fixed Effects Model as it allows the country 
effects to vary. The Random Effects Model is used when it is believed some omitted 
variables are constant over time but differ between countries or may be constant between 
countries but variable over time. The model achieves this through the error term. Starting 
with the model presented in Equation 5.3.5, the intercept is assumed to be a random variable 
and can be expressed for each individual country as  
1 i      (Equation 5.3.6) 
Where: 1 is a random error term with zero mean and constant variance.  
 
This approach assumes all the countries in the sample under investigation have a common 
mean value of the intercept   and the individual differences in the intercepts for each 
country are reflected in the error term 1 . Substituting this into the original model (Equation 
5.3.5) gives the following:  
tiititi uXy ,,1,     (Equation 5.3.7) 
titiX ,,1      
   
(Equation 5.3.8) 
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Where: ti, is the composite error terms consisting of two components, 1  which is the cross-
section or individual specific error components and uit which is the combined time-series and 
cross-section error component. This transformation now allows random effects to be 
estimated as the intercept is no longer time-invariant.  
 
5.3.3.4 Variance Inflation Factors 
The tests presented in Chapter 6 use the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test to estimate how 
much the presence of multicollinearity has increased the variance of the estimated 
coefficients. The VIF test is captured by equation Equation 5.3.9 below: 
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(Equation 5.3.9) 
Where: 
2
kR  is the coefficient of determination from the original regression run in Chapter 6 
which includes all independent variables. 
 
The higher the VIF becomes the more severe the multicollinearity is considered to be.  As a 
general rule, a VIF of greater than five assumes the presence of chronic multicollinearity.   
 
5.3.3.4 Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test 
Once the empirical tests are conducted in Chapter 6, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier Test is conducted to eliminate the possibility of incorrect estimators being used.  
The test is appropriate as it establishes whether a Random Effects GLS regression should be 
used over the simpler Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. The null hypothesis in the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test test assumes the variance across countries is zero. 
In other words, panel effects do not exist. Should the null be rejected, it can be assumed 
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significant differences exist across countries in the sample and therefore an OLS regression is 
not appropriate. 
 
5.3.3.5 Hausman Test 
A Hausman Test is used to consider whether a fixed or random effects model is the most 
appropriate to use. The test is used to discover whether differences exist between the random 
and fixed effects models. The null hypothesis assumes the difference in coefficients is not 
systematic. Therefore, should one be unable to reject the null hypothesis, it is assumed no 
systematic difference exists between the fixed affects and random effects model. In this case, 
the random effects model should be used.  
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5.4 NEWLY CREATED DATASETS 
A primary contribution of this chapter is not only to set the scene for the empirical tests that 
follow in Chapter 6 but also to illustrate the newly created datasets this research has put 
together. In total six new datasets have been created from manipulating and synthesising the 
data discussed in Section 5.2. It is hoped these datasets will be of use to others carrying out 
empirical investigations in the future. The six new datasets cover all fifteen countries in the 
sample from the years 1880 to 2008 in five year intervals (with expectation of years around 
both World Wars).  The six new datasets are listed as follows: 
1. Rate of GDP per Capita Growth. 
2. General Government Revenue as Percentage of National Output. 
3. Exports as Percentage of National Output. 
4. Percentage of the Population above the Legal Voting Age with Voting Rights. 
5. Traffic on State Railways in Metric Tons per Capita. 
6. Relative Productivity with the United States of America. 
 
These datasets are presented in Table 5.4.1 to 5.4.6 and graphically illustrated for each 
country in Appendix 5.5 to Appendix 5.10. Graphical representations of the application of the 
rising logistic curve to the democracy data are presented for each country in Appendix 5.11. 
With reference to the datasets the countries are coded as follows: AS = Australia, AU = 
Austria, BE = Belgium, CA = Canada, DE = Denmark,  FR = France, GE = Germany, IT = 
Italy,      JA = Japan, NE = Netherlands, NO = Norway, SW = Sweden, SZ = Switzerland,                 
UK = United Kingdom and USA = United States of America.  
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Table 5.4.1 Rate of GDP per Capita Growth  
 
 
 %ΔGDP AS AU BE CA DE FR GE IT JA NE NO SW SZ UK USA 
1875-1880 0.70 1.05 1.39 0.36 0.65 -0.91 -1.17 0.40 1.29 1.13 -0.44 0.90 -1.52 0.25 4.15 
1880-1885 0.63 1.28 0.47 2.68 0.84 0.81 2.16 0.04 -0.08 2.00 0.35 1.96 3.11 0.55 0.53 
1885-1890 0.73 1.88 2.11 3.47 1.95 1.52 2.36 0.37 2.51 -0.38 2.62 1.53 1.86 2.73 0.73 
1890-1985 -7.02 1.76 0.84 -0.39 2.04 1.38 2.89 -0.91 4.11 0.84 0.73 1.69 3.95 0.88 1.25 
1895-1900 2.16 1.63 1.24 6.20 1.56 1.73 2.17 2.35 2.92 1.98 1.22 1.88 2.04 1.40 3.94 
1900-1905 2.77 1.92 1.07 3.56 1.89 0.59 1.97 1.23 -1.05 1.11 -0.13 1.29 1.11 0.39 0.98 
1905-1913 1.94 1.25 1.07 2.09 2.02 2.44 2.11 3.30 0.96 1.42 3.21 2.73 0.20 0.87 0.61 
1919-1925 2.76 6.88 5.47 1.29 2.12 6.78 5.33 0.44 0.52 3.38 1.61 2.53 4.83 0.92 1.69 
1925-1930 -4.13 1.24 1.00 1.70 3.82 1.62 2.46 -0.07 -0.28 1.12 5.85 4.05 2.65 2.46 -1.51 
1930-1938 4.40 1.14 -0.08 1.83 1.04 0.76 4.57 2.05 4.19 0.18 3.62 3.41 1.04 2.88 1.06 
1946-1950 2.96 17.32 4.54 1.27 4.71 7.69 15.03 8.77 7.39 7.70 5.79 3.09 2.60 0.71 0.98 
1950-1955 1.69 6.29 2.24 2.15 1.61 3.22 8.35 5.75 6.85 4.98 2.67 1.74 2.92 2.52 1.88 
1955-1960 2.04 3.85 1.60 0.23 3.45 2.78 4.52 4.02 6.22 2.02 1.84 2.68 1.72 1.75 0.75 
1960-1965 4.07 2.53 3.37 3.47 3.30 3.50 2.93 3.58 6.04 3.62 2.73 3.64 2.06 1.94 3.31 
1965-1970 4.09 3.74 3.87 1.94 2.60 3.64 2.92 4.12 8.35 3.79 2.31 2.90 2.79 1.72 1.24 
1970-1975 1.74 2.69 2.55 2.65 1.04 1.81 1.68 1.77 2.47 1.66 3.22 1.96 -0.18 1.60 1.25 
1975-1980 1.54 2.43 1.97 1.65 1.03 1.86 2.16 2.92 2.85 1.15 3.12 0.26 1.81 1.31 1.82 
1980-1985 1.63 1.46 0.96 1.31 2.86 0.91 1.36 1.32 2.19 1.02 2.69 1.48 0.66 2.13 1.90 
1985-1990 2.17 2.30 2.51 1.11 0.51 2.19 0.59 2.39 3.68 2.02 0.64 1.58 1.66 2.19 1.79 
1990-1995 2.87 0.86 0.92 1.04 1.77 0.66 0.77 0.81 0.64 1.11 2.65 0.18 -0.42 1.68 1.49 
1995-2000 2.77 2.28 2.30 3.09 2.00 2.03 1.69 1.56 0.12 3.14 2.01 3.05 1.71 2.49 2.44 
2000-2005 1.88 1.24 1.39 1.60 0.78 0.81 0.27 0.37 1.17 0.44 1.46 1.93 0.58 1.81 1.42 
2005-2008 1.92 2.67 1.68 0.59 -0.12 0.69 1.88 0.28 0.88 2.32 1.07 1.03 2.31 1.37 0.28 
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Table 5.4.2 General Government Revenue as Percentage of National Output 
GGR%GDP AS AU BE CA DE FR GE IT JA NE NO SW SZ UK USA 
1875-1880 1.70 8.25 6.60 4.90 5.83 11.64         4.72 4.82 2.74 6.32   
1880-1885 1.85 9.20 6.77   7.70 11.39 4.00 18.70   6.40 5.58 6.46 2.84 8.50   
1885-1890 2.12 9.82 7.58 4.79 8.50 11.61     10.98 6.30 6.31 8.60 3.20 7.40   
1890-1985 2.44 13.39 7.71     11.98 4.90 20.45 13.56 6.50 6.50   3.20 7.80 7.00 
1895-1900 2.80 18.33 8.82 5.14 8.60 11.55   20.10 18.01 7.50 6.91 8.20 3.16 7.90   
1900-1905 3.29 18.76 7.75   7.40 11.25 4.28   17.26 8.30 7.74   2.31 9.60   
1905-1913 2.85 20.62 8.65 5.52 7.75 10.37 4.20 18.20 37.00 7.90 8.20 8.65 6.50 8.80   
1919-1925 4.55 18.00 25.94 7.88 11.90 16.70 20.70 16.00 4.00 17.00 11.50 12.15   22.55 8.40 
1925-1930 4.43 19.07 19.47 7.36 13.75 20.00 24.40 14.80 31.89 16.00 16.40 10.80 13.80 21.80 19.10 
1930-1938 5.57   18.35 9.03 15.10 20.30 32.73 21.93 27.74 15.60 18.50 13.95 12.60 21.95 20.30 
1946-1950 29.74   21.64 19.36 23.10   29.30 21.90 41.61   32.30 20.67 15.95 42.35   
1950-1955 26.17   21.35 17.78 24.50 26.70 32.84 20.76 42.67 32.80 34.62 27.98 16.84 36.54 30.20 
1955-1960 23.50 26.12 22.95 16.01 29.88 27.62 29.50 22.90 31.26 27.63 34.35 32.00 17.38 34.30   
1960-1965 24.02 28.40 26.50 15.49 33.94 31.58 30.30 24.32 28.20 27.90 35.58 36.52 19.40 32.62   
1965-1970 20.60 31.36 32.68 35.67 42.48 42.05 31.87 24.80 22.50 33.08 35.54 40.84 25.54 41.22 30.65 
1970-1975 20.63 32.60 40.16 37.14 46.03 52.86 41.96 30.60 21.34 45.27 32.84 41.38 48.90 42.05 30.96 
1975-1980 22.49 46.76 45.41 37.14 47.60 44.41 44.49 33.68   50.28       41.36 31.31 
1980-1985 24.08 49.48 47.51 39.81 51.77 47.60 43.84 36.72 30.11 52.93       44.08 32.00 
1985-1990 25.02 49.59 46.47 41.26 56.04 47.61 42.82 39.37 32.22 51.34 55.51   30.19 40.69 32.83 
1990-1995 22.47 50.93 46.83 43.56 55.42 48.25 44.83 44.41 31.74 50.79 53.98 59.56 31.70 38.15 33.61 
1995-2000 24.43 51.11 49.03 44.30 56.36 50.49 45.94 45.84 30.99 46.44 54.60 59.17 33.81 39.17 34.93 
2000-2005 25.46 49.58 49.63 41.29 55.89 49.83 43.97 44.06 31.00 44.40 56.46 55.01 34.59 39.71 32.51 
2005-2008 25.22 47.80 48.58 40.49 55.68 50.13 43.81 45.67 34.52 46.07 58.18 54.46 34.34 41.82 33.58 
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Table 5.4.3 Exports as Percentage of National Output  
EXPRT%GDP AS AU BE CA DE FR GE IT JA NE NO SW SZ UK USA 
1875-1880 39.25 18.26 32.68 30.56 45.89 33.46 33.94 20.46 9.48 145.75 36.11 39.39 40.32 48.88 14.56 
1880-1885 40.38 18.79 33.82 29.08 46.15 29.81 34.44 23.18 9.95 153.17 37.40 41.02 40.64 50.18 13.20 
1885-1890 31.48 19.71 35.79 26.62 46.10 28.93 31.54 21.78 12.90 166.31 39.50 45.35 41.18 48.38 12.25 
1890-1985 40.14 20.67 37.89 28.79 50.20 26.15 29.62 19.25 15.22 180.57 42.33 43.14 41.73 45.92 12.88 
1895-1900 47.02 21.68 40.10 34.04 52.58 25.67 30.31 22.10 19.62 196.33 44.56 40.67 42.28 44.31 12.57 
1900-1905 40.82 22.74 42.45 35.72 54.07 27.41 32.09 24.41 23.31 214.72 44.43 40.27 42.84 44.52 11.08 
1905-1913 41.00 24.21 41.46 35.88 57.93 30.78 36.00 28.55 25.78 235.76 48.37 38.64 48.49 51.97 10.43 
1919-1925 33.27 34.26 57.85 46.24 56.64 36.42 34.12 29.64 29.59 70.27 45.92 33.93 61.18 46.72 11.21 
1925-1930 31.38 44.08 101.79 41.55 56.35 30.95 31.60 25.81 31.06 71.89 40.56 35.16 49.21 44.95 9.27 
1930-1938 26.59 24.96 70.05 29.38 43.11 19.33 15.59 14.14 33.89 44.66 33.43 30.41 31.24 28.43 6.08 
1946-1950 37.20 22.19 49.99 36.21 37.57 20.66 21.68 20.38 7.56 59.91 43.74 31.72 43.90 34.34 7.49 
1950-1955 39.54 34.20 58.88 33.44 52.21 20.48 23.78 20.68 19.58 74.65 47.71 39.24 44.84 42.77 7.19 
1955-1960 28.18 39.44 64.19 31.07 55.08 19.44 33.99 21.75 19.79 76.36 51.39 38.27 47.32 36.03 7.12 
1960-1965 27.06 38.30 71.50 29.72 52.23 20.78 31.17 24.71 17.94 75.24 50.44 37.45 49.19 32.58 6.79 
1965-1970 27.13 39.83 81.06 34.18 50.22 22.71 32.73 27.97 18.07 72.76 52.97 38.09 51.17 37.63 7.56 
1970-1975 26.71 45.02 94.89 38.46 56.94 30.31 37.15 32.88 20.59 81.89 56.37 45.53 51.30 43.10 10.83 
1975-1980 27.68 50.59 102.82 43.90 59.92 34.80 44.87 38.85 22.06 83.77 59.06 49.85 57.81 50.07 15.26 
1980-1985 28.30 54.83 131.09 45.63 63.25 38.26 53.84 38.95 23.98 98.06 58.92 55.84 59.34 49.76 14.92 
1985-1990 27.64 54.02 123.50 44.79 50.52 35.88 51.47 32.44 16.53 88.59 54.66 51.84 58.55 48.10 15.38 
1990-1995 27.44 52.35 115.27 53.94 51.18 34.83 44.14 33.03 14.91 85.73 54.00 48.39 51.81 45.70 16.66 
1995-2000 29.40 61.01 136.03 54.08 54.91 40.33 47.70 38.40 16.45 96.74 52.33 59.98 56.54 42.06 19.17 
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Table 5.4.4 Percentage of the Population above Legal Voting Age with Voting Rights  
 
 
 
POPVOTE AS AU BE CA DE FR GE IT JA NE NO SW SZ UK USA 
1875-1880 9.80  10.40 3.90 12.90 26.70 41.60 36.20 3.80   5.40 8.30 10.70 38.35 16.40 18.30 
1880-1885   13.00 3.90 15.00 27.45 41.45 36.50 12.10   5.40 10.40 10.80 38.35 20.73 18.30 
1885-1890  10.20 12.95 3.90 15.00 28.85 41.80 37.35 14.65   7.73 11.80 10.30 38.20 28.90 18.30 
1890-1985   12.90 20.60 15.00 29.40 41.80 37.80 14.20 1.66 11.40 14.50 10.70 38.20 29.10 18.30 
1895-1900 44.38 13.80 37.70 15.00 30.00 42.00 37.80 12.00 1.66 20.90 25.70 11.15 38.10 28.50 18.40 
1900-1905 64.73 14.20 37.70 15.00 29.05 43.20 38.30 13.50 3.16 22.80 34.40 13.35 37.65 28.50   
1905-1913 81.31 37.95 38.20 16.55 29.88 43.55 38.50 28.50 4.74 26.65 51.30 26.93 36.93 28.65   
1919-1925 82.96 88.67 44.83 20.50 80.80 41.65 97.40 50.97 9.60 67.27 87.15 69.70 40.27 75.00 25.10 
1925-1930 82.96 91.25 45.35   81.30 40.00 98.20  0 35.77 82.10 89.00 88.50 40.70 95.50 25.10 
1930-1938 83.22 91.25 45.23 41.10 83.50 39.85 0  0   84.05 91.80 89.55 41.90 97.20 37.80 
1946-1950 86.93 89.10 76.13 94.10 87.60 88.60 95.60 96.50 94.15 89.60 93.60 96.30 43.70 96.30   
1950-1955 87.32 92.90 94.10 96.34 92.60 83.00 97.30 96.60 97.88 89.70 97.80 95.60 42.60 97.30   
1955-1960 86.13 94.65 93.90 92.02 93.15 88.05 97.50 98.70 95.91 90.90 97.30 95.40 40.80 97.50   
1960-1965 86.63 96.10 93.65 92.74 97.00 86.40 96.40 98.80 96.47 90.20 96.45 93.50 38.40 95.70   
1965-1970 89.53 97.55 92.80 90.33 98.46 85.85 93.80 98.90 99.68 93.60 99.00 96.40 38.20 97.65 67.06 
1970-1975 87.89 97.65 94.30 91.37 98.17 87.50 98.80 99.40 100 97.35 99.40 96.30 82.15 100.00 67.44 
1975-1980 88.91 91.72 93.55 91.61 98.06 88.51 92.40 100 100 98.03 95.51 96.14 84.48 98.77 67.62 
1980-1985 87.62 90.13 96.24 90.36 97.80 90.20 90.86 100 99.50 98.52 99.94 96.43 83.39 98.47 68.14 
1985-1990 87.89 90.77 92.62 90.77 97.53 88.47 91.49 100 100 97.70 98.02 96.19 84.04 99.66 66.88 
1990-1995 87.14 91.71 91.54 91.71 97.00 88.91 91.67 100 98.86 95.49 98.18 95.14 85.28 96.82 68.94 
1995-2000 86.00 87.24 91.80 87.24 96.72 88.08 91.63 100 99.20 95.76 98.01 95.48 80.86 97.10 71.64 
2000-2005 88.05 90.77 93.80 90.77 96.49 78.34 92.80 100 98.76 97.02 98.11 97.41 82.40 95.99 79.93 
2005-2008 86.93 89.97 99.48 89.97 96.08 72.40 91.27 98.24 100 95.38 97.87 97.97 82.41 92.84 86.75 
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Table 5.4.5 Freight Traffic on State Railways in Metric Tons per Capita 
FREIGHT AS AU BE CA DE FR GE IT JA NE NO SW SZ UK USA 
1875-1880 6.68 41.91 79.77 8.17 6.31 35.00  10.01 0.00 21.73 5.68 10.04 22.56 93.77 1.41 
1880-1885 12.66 267.28 112.38 57.91 5.58 372.04  78.66 0.00 15.43 5.35 45.46 26.60 712.40 150.54 
1885-1890  308.42 120.09 71.94 6.55 359.76  99.36 6.42 17.40 6.78 51.28 28.97 732.87 285.53 
1890-1985 23.72 346.93 127.10 82.48 8.09 386.77 883.93 109.39 34.23 21.82 7.78 66.33 31.71 795.49 348.40 
1895-1900 30.69 390.26 141.13 100.39 11.87 382.35 958.47 124.38 91.69 25.83 10.06 88.49 36.36 887.03 389.00 
1900-1905 38.97 420.27 155.87 124.81 15.33 298.49 1125.71 119.67 154.29 31.05 15.09 108.91 34.42 990.44 515.71 
1905-1913 45.49 450.36 188.92 168.06 19.47 355.99 1310.21 154.10 225.15 37.73 24.90 128.87 41.11 1110.17 1718.88 
1919-1925 65.46 80.71 188.79 263.29 26.36 411.61 1689.95 183.76 436.85 33.66 28.73 109.46 43.42 666.78 1936.09 
1925-1930 68.55 79.43 219.90 238.95 20.09 478.73 1178.74 210.81 554.13 39.22 31.13 102.15 41.16 563.22 1882.74 
1930-1938 58.04 72.19 172.18 179.88 13.90 364.12 1268.19 155.09 538.14 33.04 22.45 72.14 36.26 482.24 1396.00 
1946-1950 57.52 100.25 119.12 214.77 19.49 329.16 1051.26 150.57 843.77 33.02 22.70 70.01 27.66 404.71 1458.10 
1950-1955 59.50 91.95 112.81 207.20 12.34 303.81 1148.87 141.43 786.14 36.26 25.68 63.45 27.84 389.22 1246.54 
1955-1960 57.86 75.18 95.70 199.44 10.15 312.03 1038.55 119.56 645.88 32.73 24.91 57.48 29.79 318.56 1123.73 
1960-1965 63.32 61.74 80.87 163.96 8.63 282.66 921.01 92.57 495.61 31.91 26.77 53.57 33.43 257.61 998.01 
1965-1970 65.94 51.70 67.29 169.36 6.79 228.13 808.69 66.49 322.06 23.85 29.85 52.41 34.76 203.67 948.74 
1970-1975 73.51 45.20 59.07 168.16 6.64 195.10 620.83 52.11 204.10 16.85 26.23 45.98 32.80 160.71 866.38 
1975-1980 80.25 37.04 47.82 158.33 5.16 147.04 552.87 44.88 142.07 13.46 20.77 37.89 30.23 133.93 755.40 
1980-1985 91.82 37.10 46.33 143.57 4.53 112.68 482.74 37.84 85.85 13.01 14.36 31.58 27.70 97.06 633.78 
1985-1990 106.36 36.06 40.31 149.11 4.38 86.38 453.99 37.55 49.72 11.71 12.72 32.30 24.39 90.29 578.61 
1990-1995 112.25 35.45 34.09 146.97 4.55 72.04 327.30 40.75 41.84 9.82 9.77 32.08 24.36 67.65 592.60 
1995-2000  34.70 31.41 146.01 3.89 74.15 222.14 43.30 38.49 11.49 8.36 28.99 26.28 73.78 761.06 
2000-2005  42.68   3.25  211.60 43.74  12.55  26.30 27.60  770.92 
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Table 5.4.6 Relative Productivity with the United States of America  
RELPRO AS AU BE CA DE FR GE IT JA NE NO SW SZ UK USA 
1875-1880 100.00 65.29 96.26 57.03 68.51 66.60 62.55 49.65 27.12 95.65 47.65 47.74 76.94 100.00 100.00 
1880-1885 100.00 67.75 95.96 63.39 69.55 67.50 67.78 48.44 26.30 100.00 47.23 51.22 87.31 100.00 100.00 
1885-1890 100.00 72.04 100.00 70.12 74.39 70.05 71.58 49.16 29.83 97.97 50.40 52.15 93.80 100.00 100.00 
1890-1985 95.69 73.75 96.36 65.06 76.02 70.50 73.71 43.67 30.83 91.50 48.37 53.87 95.71 100.00 100.00 
1895-1900 98.11 70.45 91.21 71.17 73.74 70.30 72.96 43.64 28.83 83.69 45.88 54.00 93.70 100.00 100.00 
1900-1905 92.24 66.56 83.62 76.73 72.08 62.34 66.87 42.75 24.92 77.43 40.76 50.97 84.29 97.38 100.00 
1905-1913 97.28 65.38 79.60 83.89 73.80 65.74 68.82 48.36 26.16 76.38 46.16 57.97 80.48 92.83 100.00 
1919-1925 88.39 53.59 74.26 69.09 69.69 66.32 56.22 46.49 30.01 80.08 45.57 54.34 85.76 81.89 100.00 
1925-1930 75.78 57.72 80.14 77.43 85.97 72.94 63.96 46.96 29.78 90.18 58.38 69.31 100.00 87.58 100.00 
1930-1938 96.08 58.10 78.88 74.20 94.06 72.90 81.51 54.13 39.98 85.69 69.57 87.67 100.00 102.28 100.00 
1946-1950 77.52 38.76 57.13 76.26 72.62 54.24 40.59 36.63 20.09 62.71 56.79 70.80 94.80 72.58 100.00 
1950-1955 73.67 46.37 57.63 75.26 67.87 56.89 53.20 42.91 25.43 67.23 57.83 68.63 99.72 72.21 100.00 
1955-1960 77.60 57.54 61.37 77.26 77.78 65.30 68.02 52.22 35.19 73.15 63.59 77.61 100.00 76.31 100.00 
1960-1965 75.65 57.64 63.79 78.05 81.63 68.30 68.45 56.63 44.22 73.02 64.76 82.31 100.00 72.67 100.00 
1965-1970 80.00 64.85 70.60 80.18 84.40 75.92 72.12 64.66 64.63 79.62 66.72 86.57 100.00 71.64 100.00 
1970-1975 80.88 71.52 76.40 87.92 83.65 79.57 73.94 65.97 69.66 82.13 75.36 89.51 100.00 72.75 100.00 
1975-1980 77.58 74.06 77.88 87.07 81.97 79.48 75.97 70.78 72.28 79.15 81.15 80.83 100.00 69.61 100.00 
1980-1985 75.48 71.21 72.29 84.87 83.91 74.96 73.08 68.04 74.00 73.77 83.60 77.47 94.54 68.37 100.00 
1985-1990 74.02 72.82 74.12 81.34 79.53 76.06 68.66 70.31 80.99 74.40 79.59 76.64 92.62 70.82 100.00 
1990-1995 77.23 73.36 74.26 78.15 82.71 74.58 70.31 69.97 81.21 75.23 88.21 71.50 83.76 71.38 100.00 
1995-2000 76.34 72.69 72.56 79.00 80.71 71.74 66.55 65.95 72.85 77.85 88.18 72.75 78.95 71.50 100.00 
2000-2005 78.72 72.64 72.98 80.28 78.65 70.65 63.70 63.71 72.10 75.22 89.82 75.41 76.31 73.87 100.00 
2005-2008 81.15 77.40 75.87 81.04 78.97 71.28 66.72 63.86 73.18 79.21 91.41 78.29 80.52 76.15 100.00 
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5.5 CONCLUSION  
Chapter 5 attempts to address four central points. Firstly, what data has been sourced and 
how has it been shaped to use it in the empirical tests that follow. Secondly, what empirical 
models are to be used to test the data collected. Thirdly, what countries-specific conditions 
exist that determine the availability and usability of the collected data. And finally, what data 
has now been created so that it can be used by others in this area into the future.   
 
It should be clear that a large portion of the data that is used in Chapter 6 has been 
constructed by manipulating data already available and bringing together datasets covering 
different periods in time, in order to have an extended timeframe for examination. Data has 
been obtained from a variety of contemporary and historical sources such The Australian 
Government (2012), Black (1966), The Economic History Association (2012), Engerman & 
Sokoloff (2005), The European Commission (2012) Flora (1983), Hodgson (2006), 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2012), Maddisson (2006), 
Mitchell (2007), Mackie (1982), Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers (2012), The Princeton 
Encyclopaedia of American Political History (2010), The Reserve Bank of Australia (2012), 
US Government Revenue (2012), The United States Government Revenue History (2012) 
and The World Bank (2012).  
 
Each source has been used to create useable panels of data for the fifteen countries examined 
from 1880 to 2008 for the list of variables discussed in section 5.2. Section 5.3 is presented to 
allow the reader understand the foundation of econometric tests that follow in Chapter 6. A 
derivation of the logistic curve, applied to the level of democracy in each country, is 
explained. An explanation of the measures of institutional flexibility, central to Chapter 6, is 
provided in this section. The three different approaches followed are all tested in the Chapter 
168 
 
6 and are a step forward in understanding the relationship between institutional flexibility and 
economic growth. Due to the extended timeframe under examination it should not be 
surprising that in some instances data is missing or proxy data must be used. This is due to 
the very different circumstances each country endured from 1880 to 2008, which include two 
world wars, a great depression, two major oil crises not to mention internal revolutions, 
external occupations and in some cases nearly fifty democratic elections. These individual 
country-specific conditions are discussed in Appendix 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the newly 
created data. In total six new datasets are presented. Each of these is a step forward in 
understanding cross-country conditions since 1880 under various different institutional 
indicators.  
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CHAPTER 6 - EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The statistical tests presented in this chapter are applied to the fifteen countries discussed in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 5, using the data collected and created. The availability of historical data, 
which in most instances is available only for the countries considered in the regressions, 
prevented a larger sample of states being examined. This test attempts to build on the work 
started by Black (1966), Olson (1982), Choi (1983) and Hodgson (1989 & 1996) and by 
considering an extended period of time, allowing for institutional flexibility, institutional 
ossification, internal upheaval and the sclerotic effects of the passage of time in stable 
democratic societies to be taken into consideration. 
 
A major contribution of the work is the derivation of a measure of institutional flexibility 
which extends the analysis of both Choi (1983) and Hodgson (1989). As alluded to in 
Chapter 5, Choi (1983) argues the sclerotic effects, central to Olson’s rise and decline 
hypothesis, can be plotted using a rising logistic curve. The timing of each country’s logistic 
curve corresponds to the starting year of Black’s (1966) Consolidation of Model Leadership 
(CML) for each state. Hodgson (1989) suggests choosing Black’s (1966) date for Economic 
and Social Transformation (EST) is a better approximation of a countries economic, social 
and political transformation from which to measure institutional sclerosis. Furthermore, 
Hodgson (1989) believes a logistic curve is not the most appropriate shape to model Olson’s 
rise and decline hypothesis. Such a curve gives no credit to the period before institutional 
sclerosis sets in, when the ability for fostering new ideas, disseminating new information and 
absorbing new concepts and routines is at its highest. Once this period reaches its zenith, 
decline ensues, in line with Olson’s rise and decline hypothesis. This is due to inertia, an 
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ossification of the system and the reinforcement of existing routines and societal norms. The 
longer the passage of time in a stable, democratic society the more ossified the system 
becomes. In the absence of major conflict or upheaval, it is logical to assume a decline in 
institutional flexibility continues apace. Only in the face of major disruption, forcing 
institutional change and the creation of new routines and institutions, are cycles of decline 
disrupted. Assuming this logic is correct, Hodgson (1989) suggests Choi’s logistic curve 
would more accurately reflect Olson’s concept of institutional sclerosis if it were modelling 
as an inverted U, the peak of the curve corresponding to the year established by Black (1966) 
as marking the starting point for each country’s EST. Chapter 3 explains the problem of using 
Black’s EST year as marking the high point of institutional flexibility. This research offers 
three approaches for measuring institutional flexibility, discussed in Section 5.4. To refresh 
these are as follows: 
  
1. FLX – Black’s EST year is used as the high point of institutional flexibility. This 
approach is an extension of Hodgson (1989) and uses an inverted U-shape to capture 
the rise and decline of institutional flexibility in each country, with the peak of the 
curve corresponding to Black’s starting year of EST. 
2. DEMFLX – The application of a rising logistic curve to the new democracy data to 
identify the inflection point and corresponding year for each country. This year is 
assumed to correspond with a peak in EST and replaces Black’s (1966) year in the 
inverted U-shape institutional flexibility curve.  
3. LOGCUR – The first difference of each rising logistic curve is calculated and used as 
a measure of institutional flexibility.  
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This chapter continues are follows: Section 6.2 graphically compares the appropriateness of 
using Black’s EST date as the high point of institutional flexibility with the alternative 
logistic curve approaches. Section 6.3 presents the panel regressions run on the fifteen 
countries for all three measures of institutional flexibility. Section 6.4 provides a discussion 
of the findings of the empirical results. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.    
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6.2 THE PEAK OF INSTITUTIONAL FLEXIBILITY 
Due to the arbitrary nature of the EST years selected by Black (1966) a more robust and 
consistent approach is required to model institutional flexibility. Olson’s theoretical 
framework is central to this approach. As discussed in Chapter 3, Olson (1982) outlines the 
rise and decline of countries in accordance with his concept of institutional sclerosis. 
Following this logic, institutional flexibility should decline when narrow special-interest 
groups start to form in stable democratic societies. As Black’s years of EST represent the 
commencement of economic and social transformation, as opposed to marking the high point, 
they are therefore likely to lead to an improvement in institutional flexibility. Therefore, it is 
deemed inappropriate to use these years to mark the high point of institutional flexibility. 
Two alternative approaches to modelling institutional flexibility are forwarded as alternative 
and are discussed in Section 6.1.  
 
6.2.1 Comparing FLX, DEMFLX & LOGCUR  
Table 6.2.1 presents the fifteen countries used in the empirical tests and possible years when 
institutional flexibility peaked. The second column presents the original years suggested by 
Black’s (1966) for the commencement of EST while the fourth column lists the years when 
EST is assumed to have ended. The third column presents a new set of years reflecting the 
peak of institutional flexibility in each country. These years have been identified by applying 
the logistic curve to the democracy data discussed in Section 5.5.1 and are the DEMFLX 
Years. The benefit of this approach is twofold. Firstly, it provides a set of years that have 
been rigorously identified and consistently defined. Secondly, it establishes a list of years 
where the rate of economic and social transformation is deemed to have peaked; reflecting 
the high watermark of institutional flexibility in each country. Of further significance, is the 
divergence between the peak DEMFLX years and the arbitrary years selected by Black 
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(1966) for both the commencement and conclusion of EST. While many of the new peak 
years sit between Black’s start and end dates, notable exceptions standing out include 
Australia, Austria, Japan, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. It is likely the first five 
experienced economic and social transformation much earlier than Black (1966) suggests. 
Conversely, Switzerland’s economic and social transformation peak is likely to have occurred 
much later than suggested by Black.  
 
Table 6.2.1: Economic and Social Transformation & Logistic Curve Years 
 
Black (1966) 
Commencement of EST  
Logistic Curve 
Inflection Year 
Black (1966) 
End of EST 
Australia 1901 1900 1941  
Austria 1918 1910   
Belgium 1848 1927 1948 
Canada 1867 1927 1947   
Denmark 1866 1912 1945  
France 1848 1906 1945  
Germany 1873 1909 1933  
Italy 1871 1943   
Japan 1945 1933   
Netherlands 1848 1916 1948  
Norway 1905 1908 1945  
Sweden 1905 1905 1945  
Switzerland 1848 1933 1932  
UK 1832 1908 1945  
USA 1865 1907 1933   
Column 2 & 4 Source: Black (1966) 
 
From Table 6.2.1 it appears Black’s selected years for the commencement of EST, which 
Hodgson (1989) uses to reflect the high point of institutional flexibility, are in need to 
revision. The mean date to reflect the zenith of institutional flexibility suggested by Hodgson 
(1989) is 1876. The logistic curve approach used in this research suggests a much later year. 
Using the new approach, this research suggests the high point of economic and social 
transformation more likely occurred on average just after World War I. Having established a 
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set of new years for the zenith of institutional flexibility, this list of years (column 3 in Table 
6.2.1) now measures institutional flexibility and is referred to as DEMFLX. Graphical 
illustrations of Equations 5.2.2 and 5.2.3, applied separately to each of the fifteen countries, 
are presented in Figures 6.2.1 and 6.2.2.  
 
Figure 6.2.1 uses the original Black years (column 2 in Table 6.2.1) to plot each institutional 
flexibility curve (FLX). Five countries (Australia, Austria, Japan, Norway and Sweden) 
experience a peak in institutional flexibility during the period 1880 to 2008, with the 
remaining ten all peaking prior to 1880. While there appears to be only eleven countries 
plotted, the remaining four follow identical institutional flexibility curves and are hidden. For 
example, Norway does not appear on Figure 6.2.1 simply because it follows an identical 
pattern to Sweden, peaking in 1913. Similarly, France, Germany and the Netherlands are 
hidden behind Switzerland and follow an identical pattern, with each state’s peak occurring in 
1848, the year Black (1966) selects are the commencement of the phase of EST. Figure 6.2.2, 
uses the DEMFLX estimator of institutional flexibility. All fifteen countries experience a 
peak in institutional flexibility between the years 1880 and 2008. Similar to Figure 6.2.1, not 
all countries appear to have been plotted. This is the case again because Sweden and Norway 
follow an identical curve, as do Italy and Japan, and Belgium and France.  
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Figure 6.2.1: Cross-Country Institutional Flexibility FLX Years 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2.2: Cross-Country Institutional Flexibility DEMFLX Years 
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The third approach, (the first difference of each logistic curve) as a measure of institutional 
flexibility is illustrated in Figure 6.2.3. This differs from both the FLX and DEMFLX as the 
rate of rise on decline is dependent upon the number of years it takes for democracy to move 
from low absolute levels to higher absolute levels. The y-axis is a measure of institutional 
flexibility.  
 
Figure 6.2.3: Cross-Country Institutional Flexibility LOGCUR 
 
 
Figure 6.2.3 illustrates while some countries experienced a dramatic rise and decline in 
institutional flexibility, others experienced far less fluctuation. In order to establish if any of 
these measures of institutional flexibility are appropriate, a series of panel regressions are 
carried out. These regressions are now presented in Section 6.3. 
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6.3 RESEARCH STATEMENTS & PANEL REGRESSION RESULTS  
Using the data collected and created, it has been decided to test seven various statements in 
the empirical study from 1880 to 2008. The seven are now listed with the assumption each 
can explain the rate of GDP per capita growth across the fifteen countries under examination. 
1. The capacity of the state to raise revenue, engage in external trade, educate the child 
population and sustain commercial freight traffic on railways. 
2. The capacity of the state to extend enfranchisement among the adult population.  
3. The degree of institutional disruption captured by DISNAT, DISREV and DISOCC. 
4. The degree of institutional flexibility measured using three alternative approaches 
FLX, DEMFLX and LOGCUR. 
5. Political competition and regime durability as measured by the Polity IV dataset. 
6. Different global conditions in given eras, reflecting the influence of world effective 
demand, global financial markets and international conflicts.  
7. The technology gap between the United States and all other countries measured using 
RELPRO. 
 
A series of generalised least squares regressions are run for selected five intervals between 
1880 and 2008.
9
 The selected intervals are 1880 – 1885, 1885 – 1890, 1890 – 1895, 1895 – 
1900, 1900 – 1905, 1905 – 1913, 1919 – 1925, 1925 – 1930, 1930 – 1938, 1946 – 1950, 1950 
– 1955, 1955 – 1960, 1960 – 1965, 1965 – 1970, 1970 – 1975, 1975 – 1980, 1980 – 1985, 
1985 – 1990, 1990 – 1995, 1995 – 2000, 2000 – 2005 and 2005 – 2008. This produces an 
empirical analysis of fifteen countries over a total of one hundred and twenty-eight years with 
                                                          
9
 Please note due to World War I and World War II some periods are long than five year intervals due to 
international conflicts. These periods are 1906 to 1913 (eight years), 1919 to 1925 (seven years) and 1931 to 
1938 (8 years). The last period, 2005 to 2008 covers four years. 
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two hundred and fifty-two observations. The rate of GDP per capita growth, measured using 
Maddison’s OECD dataset, is the dependent variable and is subject to a series of regressions. 
 
For the purposes of these tests, sixteen independent variables and one of the three measures 
of institutional flexibility are run against the dependent variable, the rate of GDP per capita 
growth. General government revenue as a percentage of national output, the value of exports 
as a percentage of national output, the percentage of the population aged between five and 
twelve years of age enrolled in primary education, freight traffic in million metric tons per 
capita, the percentage of the population above the voting age with voting rights (POPVOTE) 
and the rate of change in POPVOTE are included to capture the role of the state in promoting 
and sustaining long term economic growth, the significance of which has been explained in 
Chapter 2. Additionally, national unification (DISNAT), foreign occupation (DISOCC), 
revolution or civil wars (DISREV), regime durability and political competition (POLCOMP) 
are included as independent variables. These consider if Olson’s disruption and stability 
hypothesis impact upon the rate of economic growth. A number of global era dummies for 
the periods 1880 to 1913 (pre First World War – ERA 1), 1919 to 1938 (Interwar period – 
ERA 2), 1946 to 1973 (post Second World War to First Oil Crisis – ERA 3) and 1974 to 
2008 (post Bretton-Woods – ERA 4) are included, as is a measure of relative productivity 
(RELPRO). The former tests if extended and defined periods of time can explain economic 
growth across countries, while the later tests the diffusion hypothesis (See Section 5.2.12). 
Finally, institutional flexibility, which is central to Olson’s “rise and decline” hypothesis, is 
measured in three ways, already discussed; FLX Years, DEMFLX Years and LOGCUR. 
 
The empirical tests are now presented in three sub sections; 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 for each of 
the institutional flexibility measures. In all three subsections both fixed and random effects 
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models are presented. All tests are corrected for heteroscedasticity, with robust standard 
errors produced and presented. Both the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test and 
Hausman Test are presented to confirm the correct model specification. In all three sets of 
sets of regressions the random effects model proves to be the correct model specification. 
 
6.3.1 Empirical Results – FLX Years of Institutional Flexibility  
The first set of estimations presented uses the FLX Years to correspondent with the zenith of 
institutional flexibility. Tables 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 presents both fixed and random effects 
regressions. Due to presence of multicollinearity, general government revenue as a 
percentage of national output, the value of exports as a percentage of national output, the 
percentage of the population aged between five and twelve years of age enrolled in primary 
education, political competition (POLCOMP), global era dummies for periods 1880 to 1913 
(ERA 1) and 1974 to 2008 (ERA 4) and the measure of relative productivity (RELPRO) are 
dropped from the tests. While it is often difficult to explain why some independent variables 
are dropped over others, the reason for dropping these seven is as follows. Statement 1 in 
Section 6.3 combines elements of state development such as the ability of the state to raise 
revenue, engage in external trade, educate the child population and sustain commercial 
freight traffic on railways. These four variables are correlated. Government revenue as a 
percentage of national output and the percentage of the population aged between five and 
twelve years of age in education are dropped due to the incidence of missing observations 
(See Table 5.4.2 for the former). Freight traffic on railways is chosen over export data as the 
latter accounts for only “special trade” as opposed to general trade (See section 5.2.4). 
POLCOMP is dropped as it is highly correlated with DURABLE, with the latter thought to 
capture the Olson’s theoretical framework more appropriately.  ERA 1 and RELPRO are 
correlated with POPVOTE; the latter is considered central to this thesis hence both ERA 1 
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and RELPRO are dropped from the regression analysis. ERA 4 is automatically dropped from 
the regressions as the control dummy variable.  
 
Removing these seven independent variables leaves ten remaining variables to be tested on 
the dependent variable. Furthermore, the variance inflation factor test for mulitcollinearity 
reports a VIF coefficient of 2.09. It can be assumed that no mulitcollinearity problems exist. 
A Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test is run and reports a coefficient of 0.067. The 
null hypothesis assumes that the individual effects are zero. The null is rejected, confirming 
the existence of random effects and use of the correct model. A Hausman Test is conducted, 
comparing the fixed effects and random effects models. The test reports a coefficient of 
0.9598. The null hypothesis assumes no difference between the two models and therefore the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected. It can be assumed there is no systematic difference 
between the random effects and fixed effects models.  The random effects GLS is assumed to 
be the most appropriate technique to use in this panel analysis and is selected as the best 
estimator. The full VIF, Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test and Hausman Test are 
presented in Appendices 6.3.1, 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. Tables 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 illustrate the results 
when the FLX measure of institutional flexibility is included in the model. Despite the fact 
the Hausman Test confirms the random effects model is the most appropriate model, the 
fixed effect regression is still presented. The discussion which now follows only considers the 
random effects GLS regression results (Table 6.3.2).  
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Table 6.3.1 Fixed Effects (within) Regression (FLX Years)    
 
Number of Observations = 252 
Group variable: Country      
Number of Groups = 15 
 
Adjusted R²  = 0.2195                                       
F (4, 264)  = 12.72 
Prob > F  = 0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
%CHGGDPCAP         Coefficient Standard Error  t-stat  P-value       [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 POPVOTE   0.6991     0.4721       1.48      0.140     -0.2311    1.6293 
 ERA 2   -0.6588    0.3439    -1.92      0.057*     -1.3364   -0.0188 
 ERA 3      1.7576    0.2404       7.31      0.000****      1.2838     2.2313 
 DURABLE    -0.0068    0.0039     -1.73      0.086*     -0.0145    0.0095 
 DISNAT      1.6103    0.5380       2.99      0.003***       0.5503     2.6703 
 DISOCC     0.3063    0.3173       0.97      0.335     -0.3188    0.9314 
 DISREV      0.5071    0.4609       1.10      0.272     -0.4012    1.4154 
 FREIGHT   0.0004    0.0008       0.05      0.962     -0.0154    0.0162 
 VOTECHG   1.0675    1.4098       0.76      0.450     -1.7104    3.8454 
 FLX       0.0070   0.0052       1.33      0.184       0.0033     0.0172 
 CONSTANT    0.2849    0.6025       0.47      0.637     -0.9022    1.4720 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Sigma_u | 0.0109 
 Sigma_e | 0.0129 
 rho       | 0.4176 (fraction of  variance due to u_i) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Levels of significance: **** 0.1%, *** 1%, **5%, *10%   
Where: POPVOTE  = Percentage of the population above the voting age with voting rights 
 ERA 2  = Dummy variable for period 1919 to 1938 
ERA 3  = Dummy variable for period 1945 to 1973 
DURABLE = Number of years since the most recent regime change 
 DISNAT = Dummy variable for national independence 
 DICOCC = Number of times country has been occupied 
DISREV = Number of times country has experienced a revolution 
FREIGHT = Traffic on state railways metric tons per capita 
VOTECHG = Rate of change in POPVOTE 
FLX  = Measure of institutional flexibility using Black (1966) EST Years 
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Table 6.3.2 Random Effects GLS Regression (FLX Years) 
             
Number of Observations = 252 
Group variable: Country      
Number of Groups = 15 
 
Adjusted R² = 0.3763                                       
Wald chi²  = 108.75 
Prob > chi²  = 0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
%CHGGDPCAP         Coefficient Standard Error  t-stat  P-value       [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 POPVOTE   1.0930     0.3855       2.84      0.005***     -0.5295    1.7773 
 ERA 2   -0.6732    0.3358    -2.00      0.045**     -1.5119   -0.1733 
 ERA 3      1.8160    0.2534       7.17      0.000****      1.2808     2.1670 
 DURABLE    -0.0055    0.0029     -1.91      0.056*     -0.0117    0.0034 
 DISNAT      0.2652    0.2568       1.03      0.302      -0.2359     2.5872 
 DISOCC     0.0143    0.1283       0.11      0.911     -0.2689    1.1101 
 DISREV      0.0225   0.0758       0.30      0.766     -0.1272    1.2786 
 FREIGHT   0.0068    0.0053       1.23      0.218     -0.0039    0.0156 
 VOTECHG   0.9540    1.4464       0.66      0.510     -1.9887    3.5010 
 FLX       0.0063   0.0055       1.13      0.258       0.0004     0.0160 
 CONSTANT    0.8540    0.3892       2.87      0.004***     -0.0048    1.7127 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sigma_u | 0.0034 
Sigma_e | 0.0129 
rho      | 0.0652 (fraction of  variance due to u_i) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Levels of significance: **** 0.1%, *** 1%, **5%, *10%   
Where: POPVOTE  = Percentage of the population above the voting age with voting rights 
 ERA 2  = Dummy variable for period 1919 to 1938 
ERA 3  = Dummy variable for period 1945 to 1973 
DURABLE = Number of years since the most recent regime change 
 DISNAT = Dummy variable for national independence 
 DICOCC = Number of times country has been occupied 
DISREV = Number of times country has experienced a revolution 
FREIGHT = Traffic on state railways metric tons per capita 
VOTECHG = Rate of change in POPVOTE 
FLX  = Measure of institutional flexibility using Black (1966) EST Years 
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The regression results presented in Table 6.3.2 indicated four of the ten independent variables 
are significant at the 10% level of better. POPVOTE is positively related to rate of GDP per 
capita growth. Democracy therefore, is found to be growth-promoting in the long run and 
highly significant. As expected, ERA 3, a golden era for economic development, reports a 
significant negative coefficient. On the other hand, ERA 2 not surprisingly reports a 
significant negative coefficient. This is to be expected given it covers the period of time 
during the Wall Street Crash and Great Depression. Olson’s hypothesis is supported by the 
significant negative coefficient reported for regime or government durability. However 
DISNAT, DISREV nor DISOCC are statistically significant. The same can be said for 
FREIGHT, VOTCHG and FLX. The latter result confirms the Black EST years are not an 
appropriate peak for modelling an inverted U-shaped institutional flexibility function, when 
attempting to explain rate of GDP per capita growth. An R² of .3763 is reported. Considering 
the extended timeframe under examination this is not a surprising result and is deemed 
acceptable. Further discussion of these finding is presented in Section 6.4.  
 
6.3.2 Empirical Results - DEMFLX Years of Institutional Flexibility  
An identical panel regression is run but the original measure of institutional flexibility (FLX 
Years) is replaced with that corresponding to DEMFLX Years. As before, the regressions are 
run on selected intervals between 1880 and 2008. The selected intervals are 1880 – 1885, 
1885 – 1890, 1890 – 1895, 1895 – 1900, 1900 – 1905, 1905 – 1913, 1919 – 1925, 1925 – 
1930, 1930 – 1938, 1946 – 1950, 1950 – 1955, 1955 – 1960, 1960 – 1965, 1965 – 1970, 1970 
– 1975, 1975 – 1980, 1980 – 1985, 1985 – 1990, 1990 – 1995, 1995 – 2000, 2000 – 2005 and 
2005 – 2008. This produces an empirical analysis of fifteen countries over a total of one 
hundred and twenty-eight years with two hundred and fifty-two observations. Tables 6.3.3 
and 6.3.4 present the results of these regressions for both fixed and random effects models. 
184 
 
Again, due to multicollinearity problems, general government revenue as a percentage of 
national output, the value of exports as a percentage of national output, the percentage of the 
population aged between five and twelve years of age enrolled in primary education, political 
competition (POLCOMP), global era dummies for periods the 1880 to 1913 (ERA 1) and 
1974 to 2008 (ERA 4) and the measure of relative productivity (RELPRO) are all dropped 
from the tests. The logical for dropping these variables has been outlined in Section 6.3.1. 
Removing these seven independent variables leaves the same remaining ten independent 
variables to be tested on the dependent variable. The variance inflation factor test for 
mulitcollinearity reports a VIF coefficient of 2.21. As before it can now be assumed that no 
mulitcollinearity exists.  
 
To ensure the correct estimator is employed, a Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test is 
run, reporting a coefficient of 0.016. The null hypothesis, that the individual effects are zero, 
is strongly rejected, confirming the existence of random effects. The Hausman Test reports a 
coefficient of 0.7769. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected and it can be assumed there is 
no systematic difference between the random effects and fixed effects models. The random 
effects GLS is again chosen as the most appropriate technique to use. The full VIF, Breusch-
Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test and Hausman Test are presented in Appendices 6.3.4, 6.3.5 
6.3.6. Tables 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 report the results when the DEMFLX Years are used to model 
institutional flexibility. Again, both the fixed effect and random effects regression are 
presented, with the discussion focusing only on the random effects results (Table 6.3.4).  
 
The regression results presented in Table 6.3.4 are similar to those presented in Table 6.3.2. 
The replacement of the FLX Years with the new DEMFLX Years is worthwhile as the latter 
is significant at the 5% level. The reported positive coefficient confirms that as institutional 
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flexibility increases, the rate of GDP per capita growth increases; as flexibility declines, the 
reasons of which have been discussed in Chapter 3, the rate of GDP per capita growth 
declines. Furthermore, in order to establish if the shape of the institutional flexibility 
suggested by Hodgson (1989) is appropriate, a range of different curves are tested. This 
research confirms the Hodgson (1989) approach (see Equation 5.5.3) is the most appropriate 
as it has the highest level of explanatory power. The DEMFLX years are a step forward in 
establishing the peak of institutional flexibility during this phase of economic and social 
transformation and are a significant contribution to the existing literature. The explanatory 
power of the GLS regression presented in Table 6.3.4, while not a massive improvement on 
the panel regression presented in Table 6.3.2, is still higher at 0.4039. Again, given the 
extended time under examination, the reported R² of is not unexpected and deemed 
satisfactory.  
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Table 6.3.3 Fixed Effects (within) Regression (DEMFLX Years)    
 
Number of Observations = 252 
Group variable: Country      
Number of Groups = 15 
 
Adjusted R² = 0.2392                                         
F (4, 264)  = 13.11 
Prob > F  = 0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
%CHGGDPCAP         Coefficient Standard Error  t-stat  P-value       [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 POPVOTE   0.8534     0.4689       1.82      0.070*     -0.0706    1.7773 
 ERA 2   -0.8278    0.3322    -2.49      0.013**     -1.4824   -0.1733 
 ERA 3      1.7065    0.2352       7.25      0.000****      1.2430     2.1670 
 DURABLE    -0.0051    0.0043     -1.19      0.235     -0.0137    0.0034 
 DISNAT      1.5048    0.5493       2.74      0.007***       0.4224     2.5872 
 DISOCC     0.4361    0.3421       1.27      0.204     -0.2380    1.1101 
 DISREV      0.3571    0.4677       0.76      0.446     -0.5644    1.2786 
 FREIGHT   0.0098    0.0074       0.13      0.894     -0.0136    0.0156 
 VOTECHG   0.8410    0.01350       0.62      0.534     -1.8187    3.5010 
 DEMFLX      0.0099   0.0042       2.35      0.020**       0.0002     0.0182 
 CONSTANT    0.0317    0.5849       0.05      0.957     -1.1208    1.1842 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sigma_u  | 0.0102 
 Sigma_e | 0.0128 
 rho       | 0.3890 (fraction of  variance due to u_i) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Levels of significance: **** 0.1%, *** 1%, **5%, *10%   
Where: POPVOTE  = Percentage of the population above the voting age with voting rights 
 ERA 2  = Dummy variable for period 1919 to 1938 
ERA 3  = Dummy variable for period 1945 to 1973 
DURABLE = Number of years since the most recent regime change 
 DISNAT = Dummy variable for national independence 
 DICOCC = Number of times country has been occupied 
DISREV = Number of times country has experienced a revolution 
FREIGHT = Traffic on state railways metric tons per capita 
VOTECHG = Rate of change in POPVOTE 
DEMFLX = Measure of institutional flexibility using logistic curve years 
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Table 6.3.4 Random Effects GLS Regression (DEMFLX Years) 
 
Number of Observations = 252 
Group variable: Country      
Number of Groups = 15 
 
Adjusted R² = 0.4039                                        
Wald chi²  = 111.40 
Prob > chi²  = 0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
%CHGGDPCAP         Coefficient Standard Error  t-stat  P-value      [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 POPVOTE   1.2964     0.3913       3.31      0.001****     -0.5295    1.7773 
 ERA 2   -0.8687    0.3282    -2.65      0.008***     -1.5119   -0.1733 
 ERA 3      1.7576    0.2433       7.22      0.000****      1.2808     2.1670 
 DURABLE    -0.0055    0.0032     -1.70      0.089*     -0.0117    0.0034 
 DISNAT      0.3123    0.2797       1.12      0.264      -0.2359     2.5872 
 DISOCC    -0.0043    0.1350      -0.03      0.974     -0.2689    1.1101 
 DISREV      0.0371   0.0838       0.44      0.658     -0.1272    1.2786 
 FREIGHT   0.0067    0.0054       1.24      0.217     -0.0039    0.0156 
 VOTECHG   0.6906    1.3670       0.51      0.6113     -1.9887    3.5010 
 DEMFLX      0.0082   0.0040       2.07      0.020**       0.0004     0.0160 
 CONSTANT    0.8540    0.4381       1.95      0.051*     -0.0048    1.7127 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sigma_u | 0.0040 
Sigma_e | 0.0128 
rho      | 0.0900 (fraction of  variance due to u_i) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Levels of significance: **** 0.1%, *** 1%, **5%, *10%   
Where: POPVOTE  = Percentage of the population above the voting age with voting rights 
 ERA 2  = Dummy variable for period 1919 to 1938 
ERA 3  = Dummy variable for period 1945 to 1973 
DURABLE = Number of years since the most recent regime change 
 DISNAT = Dummy variable for national independence 
 DICOCC = Number of times country has been occupied 
DISREV = Number of times country has experienced a revolution 
FREIGHT = Traffic on state railways metric tons per capita 
VOTECHG = Rate of change in POPVOTE 
DEMFLX = Measure of institutional flexibility using logistic curve years 
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6.3.3 Empirical Results – LOGCUR Institutional Flexibility  
The third set of regressions is run on the same panel of data. Institutional flexibility is 
measured using the first difference of each logistic curve. This transformation moves the 
measure of institutional flexibility away from the uniform inverted U-shape for each county 
(see Figure 6.2.3). Countries that experienced rapid democratisation display a sharp rise and 
decline in institutional flexibility. As before the regressions are run on selected intervals 
between 1880 and 2008. This produces an empirical analysis of fifteen countries over a total 
of one hundred and twenty-eight years, with two hundred and fifty-two observations. The 
results of both the fixed and random effects models are presented in Tables 6.3.5 and 6.3.6. 
As before, multicollinearity problems arise, resulting in the dropping of the same seven 
independent variables. The same logic for dropping the variables applies (See Section 6.3.1). 
 
The variance inflation factor test for mulitcollinearity now reports a VIF coefficient of 2.11. 
The same specification tests are conducted to ensure the correct estimator is employed. The 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test reports a coefficient of 0.028. The null hypothesis, 
that the individual effects are zero, is strongly rejected, confirming the existence of random 
effects. The Hausman Test reports a coefficient of 0.8870. The null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected and it can be assumed that there is no systematic difference between the random 
effects and fixed effects models, with the former chosen as the most appropriate technique. 
The VIF, Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test and Hausman Test are presented in 
Appendices 6.3.7, 6.3.8 and 6.3.9. Focusing on the random effects regression, the results 
appear similar to what has been found in the two previous approaches. The logistic curve 
measure of institutional flexibility is not statistically significant. The DEMFLX inverted U-
shaped function is deemed to have greater explanatory power when explaining the impact of 
institutional flexibility on the rate of GDP per capita growth.  
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Table 6.3.5 Fixed Effects (within) Regression (LOGCUR) 
Number of Observations = 252 
Group variable: Country      
Number of Groups = 15 
 
Adjusted R² = 0.2369                                         
F (4, 264)  = 12.74 
Prob > F  = 0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
%CHGGDPCAP         Coefficient Standard Error  t-stat  P-value       [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 POPVOTE   0.5251     0.4424       1.19      0.237     -0.3467    1.3969 
 ERA 2   -0.6966    0.3234    -2.15      0.032**     -1.3338   -0.0594 
 ERA 3      1.7196    0.2405       7.15      0.000****      1.2457     2.1936 
 DURABLE    -0.0084    0.0041     -2.05      0.042**     -0.0165   -0.0003 
 DISNAT      1.4019    0.5272       2.66      0.008***       0.3630     2.4408 
 DISOCC     0.1620    0.3201       0.51      0.613     -0.4688    0.7928 
 DISREV      0.4510   0.4525       1.00      0.320     -0.4406    1.3426 
 FREIGHT   0.0004    0.0080       0.01      0.995     -0.0158    0.0159 
 VOTECHG   1.3804    1.4424       0.96      0.340     -1.4617    4.2226 
 LOGCUR     -0.0832   0.1178      -0.71      0.481       0.3153     0.1490 
 CONSTANT    0.9199    0.5223       1.76      0.080*     -0.1093    1.9490 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sigma_u | 0.1000 
Sigma_e | 0.0129 
rho      | 0.3749 (fraction of  variance due to u_i) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Levels of significance: **** 0.1%, *** 1%, **5%, *10%   
Where: POPVOTE  = Percentage of the population above the voting age with voting rights 
 ERA 2  = Dummy variable for period 1919 to 1938 
ERA 3  = Dummy variable for period 1945 to 1973 
DURABLE = Number of years since the most recent regime change 
 DISNAT = Dummy variable for national independence 
 DICOCC = Number of times country has been occupied 
DISREV = Number of times country has experienced a revolution 
FREIGHT = Traffic on state railways metric tons per capita 
VOTECHG = Rate of change in POPVOTE 
LOGCUR = First difference of logistic curve  
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Table 6.3.6 Random Effects GLS Regression (LOGCUR) 
 
Number of Observations = 252 
Group variable: Country      
Number of Groups = 15 
 
Adjusted R² = 0.3708                                        
Wald chi²  = 108.82 
Prob > chi²  = 0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
%CHGGDPCAP         Coefficient Standard Error  t-stat  P-value       [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 POPVOTE   0.8422     0.3424       2.46      0.014**     -0.5295    1.7773 
 ERA 2   -0.6825    0.3131    -2.18      0.029**     -1.5119   -0.1733 
 ERA 3      1.7638    0.2464       7.16      0.000****      1.2808     2.1670 
 DURABLE    -0.0073    0.0032     -2.32      0.021**     -0.0117    0.0034 
 DISNAT      0.2562    0.2996       0.85      0.397      -0.2359     2.5872 
 DISOCC    -0.0488    0.1441      -0.34      0.735     -0.2689    1.1101 
 DISREV      0.0268   0.0894       0.30      0.765     -0.1272    1.2786 
 FREIGHT   0.0061    0.0059       1.04      0.298     -0.0039    0.0156 
 VOTECHG   1.3785    1.4737       0.94      0.350     -1.9887    3.5010 
 LOGCUR     -0.1273   0.1067      -1.19      0.233       0.0004     0.0160 
 CONSTANT    1.6265    0.3307       4.92      0.000****     -0.0048    1.7127 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sigma_u | 0.0046 
Sigma_e | 0.0129 
rho      | 0.1112 (fraction of  variance due to u_i) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Levels of significance: **** 0.1%, *** 1%, **5%, *10%   
Where: POPVOTE  = Percentage of the population above the voting age with voting rights 
 ERA 2  = Dummy variable for period 1919 to 1938 
ERA 3  = Dummy variable for period 1945 to 1973 
DURABLE = Number of years since the most recent regime change 
 DISNAT = Dummy variable for national independence 
 DICOCC = Number of times country has been occupied 
DISREV = Number of times country has experienced a revolution 
FREIGHT = Traffic on state railways metric tons per capita 
VOTECHG = Rate of change in POPVOTE 
LOGCUR = First difference of logistic curve 
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6.4 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
The main purpose of the regressions is to ascertain whether state development and 
institutional flexibility can explain changes in economic growth across the selected countries. 
Ten independent variables are run on the dependent variable (the rate of GDP per capita 
growth). POPVOTE, FREIGHT and VOTECHG capture the role of state development in 
promoting economic growth. DURABLE, FLX, DEMFLX and LOGCUR capture Olson’s 
theory of institutional sclerosis while ERA 2, ERA 3, DISNAT, DISOCC and DISREV 
capture the disruptive events, which Olson suggests should undermine vested interests and 
result in an acceleration of the rate of GDP per capita growth. Given similar results across the 
three models discussed in Section 6.3, with the exception of the institutional flexibility 
measure, this discussion will take each variable in turn and elaborate on why such a result is 
reported without making direct reference to Table 6.3.2, Table 6.3.4 or Table 6.3.6 directly. 
Table 6.4.1 presents a results summary for the three separate approaches taken to measure 
institutional flexibility. The original random effects GLS regressions, which include all 
sixteen independent variables and a measure of institutional flexibility, are presented in 
Appendices 6.10 to 6.12. 
 
Table 6.4.1 provides an overview of the results for the ten independent variables included in 
the regression analysis in Section 6.3 for the three institutional flexibility measures. Notably, 
the only difference across all three columns is the statistical significance of the DEMFLX 
institutional flexibility measure at the 5% level of significance. This confirms the 
appropriateness of Hodgson’s (1989) inverted U-shaped or hat-shaped institutional flexibility 
function. Furthermore, it confirms the application of the logistic curve to the democracy data 
for each country, identification of the inflection point, and correspondingly, the use of the 
year of inflection to coincide with the peak of institutional flexibility. This approach is now 
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deemed superior to both FLX and LOGCUR, building on the earlier work of Black (1966), 
Choi (1983) and Hodgson (1989).  
Table 6.4.1: Results Summary - Comparing Measures of Institutional Flexibility 
VARIABLE FLX YEARS DEMFLX YEARS LOGCUR 
CONSTANT  1% 10% 0.1% 
POPVOTE 1% 0.1% 5% 
ERA 2  5% 1% 5% 
ERA 3    0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
DURABLE   10% 10% 5% 
INST FLEX 
 
5% 
 DISNAT    
   DISOCC   
   DISREV    
   FREIGHT 
   VOTECHG 
   ADJUSTED R²  0.3763 0.4039 0.3708 
WALD CHI² 108.75 111.40 108.82 
PROB > CHI² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
VIF 2.09 2.21 2.11 
HAUSMAN 0.9598 0.7790 0.8870 
B-P LM 0.0669 0.0156 0.0282 
ADJUSTED R² (ALL 17 
VARIABLES) 0.4164 0.4203 0.4123 
  
The R² in all three cases are respectable, given the length of time in question and nature of the 
data collected. The overall significance of each of the three models, tested by the Wald chi² 
statistic, finds all three to be statistically significant. The correlation between the individual 
effects and the independent variables is assumed to be zero. The variance inflation factor 
tests, once the selected independent variables discussed in Section 6.3 are dropped, ranges 
between 2.09 and 2.21. This confirms the absence of mulitcollinearity and is deemed more 
than acceptable given the size of the panel of data in question. Finally, both the Hausman 
Test and Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test confirm the existence of random effects 
in the model and the appropriateness of using the random effects generalised least squares 
estimator.  
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6.4.1 Percentage of the population above the Voting Age with Voting Rights 
A considerable amount of this thesis is devoted to the impact of democracy on economic 
growth. Chapter 4 provides an extensive review of the current body of literature surrounding 
the impact of democracy on economic growth. The empirical results presented here all report 
a positive relationship between democracy (POPVOTE) and economic growth over the long 
run. This is a significant finding given the extended timeframe under examination and set of 
countries considered. Table 4.5.1 in Chapter 4 suggests the longer the timeframe considered 
the more like democracy is to have a positive effect on economic growth. This is supported 
by the empirical results here and confirms that over the long term democracy, as measured by 
the percentage of the population above the voting age with the right to vote, is growth-
promoting. This is not to say that democracy does not have damaging aspects, simply over 
the one hundred and twenty-seven year period considered, the variable has had a positive 
impact of the rate of economic growth. These results are in line with Dick (1974), Kormendi 
& Meguire (1985), Grier & Tullock (1989), Pourgerami (1988 & 1991), Scully (1988& 
1992), Remmer (1990) Barro (1998), Minier (1998), Fidrmuc (2003), Gerring, Bond, Barndt 
& Moreno (2005), Rodrik & Wacizarg (2005), Butiewicz & Yanikkaya (2006). 
 
Additionally, the set of countries examined, all of which are highly developed and among the 
richest in the world, has not been considered to date. Previous investigations regarding the 
relationship between democracy and economic growth have used samples containing 
developing countries only and a mixture of developed and developing countries together. 
These have produced mixed results. It seems likely that examining developed countries only 
will produce results supporting the compatibility hypothesis. This may be a resulted of the 
phased nature for the spread of democracy in developed countries. In almost all cases 
enfranchisement extended from men over thirty, to all men, to women of privilege and 
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eventually to all adults citizens. This process took decades to run its course. This is in 
contrast to the big bang approach of some developing countries which have moved from 
dictatorship to democracy in the space of weeks.  
 
6.4.2 Dummy Variable for the Period 1919 to 1938 & 1945 to 1973 
Of the four era dummy variables, ERA 2 (Interwar period) and ERA 3 (post-World War II to 
the end of Bretton Woods) prove to be statistically significant across all regressions. In all 
cases, ERA 3 proves highly significant. This is unsurprising given that this period is often 
referred to as the ‘Golden Age of the West’. France, Germany, Italy and Japan amongst 
others experienced rapid economic growth, a consequence of reconstruction following the 
devastation of World War II and the destruction of narrow special-interests in these countries. 
This allowed for greater institutional flexibility, fostering innovation and competition, and 
resulted in higher levels of economic growth. There is certainly support for the Olsonain 
hypothesis from these result however catch-up growth cannot be ruled out. ERA 2 (Interwar 
period) is significant in all regressions, displaying a negative relationship with economic 
growth. This era dummy is not as robust as ERA 3. The level of significance varies across 
differing measures of institutional flexibility. The negative coefficient is largely due to the 
Great Depression which occurred during this period.  
     
6.4.3 Regime Durability 
Regime durability is taken from the Polity IV dataset. Interestingly, it is not only statistically 
significant at least at the 10% level, but more importantly, displays a negative coefficient. 
This finding is supportive of Olson’s hypothesis. In stable societies, special-interest groups 
engage in collective action because the benefits from succeeding are confined to the group 
and the cost dispersed throughout society. Special-interest groups do not fade away through 
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time, resulting in slower growth rates and lower levels of income as innovation and change 
are stifled or prevented entirely. If follows, states with longer regime durability, will be 
inundated with special-interest groups and will consequently suffer with slower growth rates 
or display a greater degree of institutional sclerosis. Referring directly to Chapter 3, 
according to Olson (1982:77) institutional sclerosis will be more prevalent in 
“Countries that have democratic freedom of organisation without upheaval or 
invasion the longest will suffer the most from growth-repressing organisations and 
combinations. This helps explain why Great Britain, the major nation with the longest 
immunity from dictatorship, invasion, and revolution, has had in this century a lower 
rate of growth than other large, developed democracies” 
The reported regime durability coefficients in all three sets of regressions add empirical 
weight to Olson’s argument.  
 
6.4.4 Institutional Flexibility 
Institutional flexibility is central to all three sets of empirical results. Four interesting strands 
of enquiry can be deduced from the empirical results regarding institutional flexibility.  
1. FLX when used to mark the peak of institutional flexibility proves to have no 
statistically significance. As mentioned, Black’s (1966) years which are used in the 
construction of FLX, represent the commencement of the phase of EST and therefore 
are more likely to reflect a year when narrow special-interest were undermined or 
destroyed, leading to greater institutional flexibility rather than the high point of 
flexibility.  
2. The significance of the DEMFLX approach to modelling institutional flexibility 
confirms the approach taken in Equation 5.5.3, used by Hodgson (1989), is the most 
appropriate functional form for institutional flexibility to take.  
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3. Applying Equation 5.5.3 to a new set of institutional flexibility years (DEMFLX), this 
research finds the variable can explain changes in the rate of economic growth. This is 
a significant contribution as it improves upon the arbitrary nature of the Black years, 
and while not identifying the commencement of EST, does ascertain the highpoint of 
institutional flexibility and the years thereafter when institutional sclerosis set in. The 
coefficient for all DEMFLX variables is positive indicating greater flexibility equates 
to faster growth and greater sclerosis results in slower growth, supporting the Olson 
view of economic development. 
4. The first difference of the democracy data logistic curve (LOGCUR) proves to have 
no statistically significance. This estimation of institutional flexibility moves away 
from the inverted U-shaped function. Finding no statistical significance adds weight 
to Olson’s rise and decline hypothesis, suggesting an inverted U-shape is a more 
appropriate way to model institutional flexibility.       
 
6.4.5 Insignificant Independent Variables  
Table 6.4.1 indicates five of the ten independent variables have no significant explanatory 
power across all three regressions. FREIGHT and VOTECHG consider if increases in freight 
traffic on railway lines and the rate of change in enfranchisement among the adult population 
can explain the rate of economic growth. Both are key indicators of state capacity. Neither is 
found to be statistically significant. The variables DISNAT, DISREV and DISOCC are taken 
from Hodgson (1996). These are run as further tests of the Olsonian hypothesis to establish if 
countries enjoyed an economic ‘take-off’ following national independence, revolution or 
occupation. The failure to find statistical significance in any of the three may be down to the 
crude approach taken to capture the variables. Further investigation in this area is warranted, 
with a more robust approach taken to measure the variables in question necessary.    
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6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this chapter is to bring together what proceeded in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. Data 
collected and described in the previous chapter is used to produce the empirical results 
presented in Sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. These results explain the impact of state development 
and institutional flexibility on economic growth. Section 6.2 presents the different approaches 
taken to model institutional flexibility. Peak years and the ‘rise and decline’ of each state is 
dependent upon the method used to model institutional flexibility. Section 6.3 tests these 
approaches empirically. The research finds that the DEMFLX measure of institutional 
flexibility is the most appropriate method to use when explaining the rate of economic growth 
across countries in the sample.  
 
The research finds use of Black’s years of EST as the peak of institutional flexibility (FLX) is 
not an appropriate technique, as the peak occurred much later than assumed by Black (1966). 
This research suggests the high point of economic and social transformation more likely 
occurred, just after World War I, nearly fifty years later than Black’s EST years would 
suggest. Furthermore, FLX is not statistically significant in the panel regressions conducted. 
The econometric tests in Section 6.3 and discussion in Section 6.4 shed light on reasons 
behind the rate of economic growth across the fifteen countries examined and provide a new 
methodology to investigate this area. Democracy (POPVOTE), a much debated topic in 
growth literature (See Chapter 4), is found to be compatible with economic growth. Support 
is found for the Olsonian hypothesis as regime durability (DURABLE) is seen to negatively 
affect economic growth. Additionally, both ERA 2 and ERA 3 are statistically significant, 
with the latter again supporting the Olsonion hypothesis, as World War II is seen to have 
removed much of the institutional sclerosis in Europe, allowing a new growth trajectory to 
take off. This research finds that the volume of freight traffic per capita on state railway lines 
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(FREIGHT), the rate of change in the percentage of the population above the voting age with 
voting rights (VOTECHG), the incidence of revolution (DISREV), the achievement of 
national independence (DISNAT), foreign occupation (DISOCC) and the third measure of 
institutional flexibility (LOGCUR) are not statistically significant.  
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION TO THE THESIS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
This thesis has sought to address and empirically test the impact of state development and 
institutional flexibility on long run economic growth across fifteen developed countries from 
1880 to 2008. The key theme running through the thesis is the theory of a rise and decline of 
states. The rise is facilitated by the development of complex, flexible, impersonal and robust 
institutional arrangements, allowing the productive capacity of each state to be maximised. 
The decline is a direct result of the ossification of the same institutions, resulting in relatively 
slow economic growth. The passage of time, stability and enfranchisement of the mass of the 
population all contribute to this as self-interested narrow special-interest group’s form and 
solidify once flexibility institutional arrangements. The consequences of this have been the 
slowing of growth rates across the developed world over the past fifty years. 
 
While the focus of this work has been of a historical nature, spanning more than one hundred 
and twenty-five years, lessons can learned from the application of Olson’s hypothesis to the 
modern state. In fact, it is the belief of the author that Mancur Olson’s theory is in serious 
need of rehabilitation. While the extended period of stability the developed world has enjoyed 
has brought with it ever slowing growth rates, institutional sclerosis is not inevitable. Olson 
(1996b) claims countries suffering from institutional ossification or sclerosis can overcome it 
by learning from hard lessons and past mistakes. After all “no historical process that is 
understood is inevitable” (Olson, 1996b:87). 
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7.2 MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
There are a number of key contributions to this work. Each will now be outlined and 
discussed in turn. It is hoped the contributions build on the work of others in the area, 
especially Cyril Black, Mancur Olson, Kwang Choi and Geoffrey Hodgson, and enables 
future researchers to use both constructed data and empirical results to further advance the 
institutional line of enquiry. The main contributions are as follows: 
1. A rehabilitation of Mancur Olson’s ‘rise and decline’ hypothesis and the fusing of 
this with the contributions of Black (1966), Choi (1983), Hodgson (1989 & 1996) 
and North, Wallis & Weingast (2009). Olson’s hypothesis is in need of 
reintegration into wider institutional and economic growth literature. Not only does 
this work rehabilitate Olson, it unites the framework with Black (1966) and North, 
Wallis & Weingast (2009), building on the empirical work of Choi (1983) and 
Hodgson (1989 & 1996). These three empirical papers are between seventeen and 
thirty years old. This work is needed to update these earlier attempts to fuse Olson 
and Black.     
2. An extensive review of literature into the relationship between democracy and 
economic growth is provided. More than thirty papers are considered and the 
results of each compared along six metrics; time period, number of years, sample 
size, level of country development, democracy measure and empirical findings. The 
literature review confirms differences emerge when assessing the impact of 
democracy on economic growth when different measures of democracy are used 
and when considering longer periods. The longer the timeframe considered the 
more likely democracy is to have a positive effect on economic growth. Democracy 
is regarded as compatible with long run growth in both developed and developing 
countries.  
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3. The extended period which is examined in this thesis, from 1880 to 2008, brought 
with it substantial challenges regarding data availability and data collection. Much 
of the data used in the tests has either been converted from raw data, in some cases 
hard copy format, into usable electronic data. Other data has been constructed using 
existing and related information. This thesis presents six new data sets covering the 
years 1880 to 2008 for fifteen developed economies. Electronic data is now 
available for the Rate of GDP per Capita Growth, General Government Revenue as 
Percentage of National Output, Exports as Percentage of National Output, 
Percentage of the Population above the Legal Voting Age with Voting Rights, 
Traffic on State Railways in Metric Tons per Capita and Relative Productivity with 
the United States of America for all fifteen countries from 1880 to 2008. This 
contribution should enable future research in this area and advance the institutional 
perspective as a means of explaining cross-country economic growth rates.  
4. The methods discussed in Chapter 5 demonstrate a new method for calculating 
institutional flexibility. The application of the logistic curve to the newly created 
democracy dataset (See Point 3) is a unique way of measuring institutional 
flexibility across each of the fifteen countries. This approach has allowed for the 
identification of selected years in each country when institutional flexibility 
peaked. This contribution is an advancement of the comparative model of Black 
(1966) as the years selected by Black to mark economic and social transformation, 
amongst other things, are selected without a robust criteria. The new set of years 
presented in this thesis provides a more rigorous and systematic approach to 
measuring institutional flexibility, and by extension, state development. 
5. The empirical results presented in Chapter 6 are the final contribution of this work. 
The results shed light on the impact of the selected variables of state capacity and 
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institutional flexibility on economic growth.  Further discussion of these is now 
presented in Section 7.3. 
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7.3 FINDINGS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This section concentrates on the empirical results presented in sections 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. 
Section 6.2 uses the constructed democracy data and logistic curve to identify peak years of 
institutional flexibility. This approach suggests the peak occurred in each of the fifteen 
countries examined, between 1900 and 1942, with Australia the first (1900) and Italy the last 
(1942). The mean peak year is 1916. These findings indicate the high points of institutional 
flexibility used by Hodgson (1989) based on Black’s (1966) years of EST are in need to 
revision. This work provides a revision of the peak years of institutional flexibility using a 
improved, rigorous approach to identifying each year.   
 
The empirical results presented in Section 6.3 are an extension of all previous works in the 
area. The results illustrate the impact of state capacity and institutional flexibility on 
economic growth over the long run. POPVOTE, FREIGHT and VOTECHG capture the role 
of state capacity in promoting economic growth. DURABLE, FLX, DEMFLX and LOGCUR 
capture Olson’s theory of institutional sclerosis while ERA 2, ERA 3, DISNAT, DISOCC 
and DISREV capture the disruptive events, which Olson suggests should undermine vested 
interests and result in an acceleration of the rate of GDP per capita growth. The results 
confirm the appropriateness of Hodgson’s (1989) inverted U-shaped or hat-shaped 
institutional flexibility model, the application of the logistic curve to the democracy data for 
each country, identification of the inflection point, and the use of the year of inflection to 
coincide with the peak of institutional flexibility (DEMFLX). This approach is now deemed 
superior to both the FLX and LOGCUR measures of institutional flexibility and builds on the 
earlier work of Black (1966), Choi (1983) and Hodgson (1989). The adjusted R² in all three 
cases are respectable, given the length of time in question and nature of the data collected. 
The overall significance of each of the three models, tested by the Wald chi² statistic, finds all 
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three are statistically significant. Democracy, a much debated topic in growth literature (see 
Chapter 4), is found to be compatible with economic growth. Support is found for the 
Olsonian hypothesis as regime durability is seen to negatively affect economic growth. 
Additionally, both ERA 2 and ERA 3 are found to have significant explanatory power with 
the latter again supporting the Olsonion hypothesis as World War II is seen to have removed 
much of the vested interests or institutional sclerosis in Europe at the time allowing a new 
growth trajectory to take off. 
 
The main area of potential future research is the extension of the sample size to include 
countries that were well developed around the last 1800s. Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
New Zealand, Spain and Portugal could all be potentially added to the empirical tests. Some 
independent variables may have to be dropped due to lack of data availability. Since this 
project commenced the global financial crisis has occurred. Despite this fact the work covers 
nearly one hundred and thirty years, not since the Great Depression has the rate of GDP per 
capita growth (dependent variable) displayed a negative coefficient over a five year period. 
This would not be the case with the period 2008 to 2012. It would be interesting to see if the 
results presented here change given the unprecedented nature of the past five years and the 
impact global conditions have had on economic growth across all countries. Furthermore, it 
may be interesting to examine why institutional flexibility peaks at the inflection point of the 
democracy logistic curve. The rationale for this approach, as discussed, assumes the spread of 
democracy at low levels bring with it a diffusion and acceptance of new ideas, routines and 
behaviour. Once democracy moves beyond the inflection point, Olsonian effects are assumed 
to take hold. Testing this logic empirically is a challenge for future work.  
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7.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter seeks to review the main findings and contributions of the empirical work in this 
thesis and demonstrate the impact of state capacity and institutional flexibility on economic 
growth. The research concentrates on rehabilitating the work of Mancur Olson by promoting 
the idea of a ‘rise and decline’ of states. The principal research hypothesis asserts two 
opposing views of institutional development discussed throughout Chapter 2 and Chapter 3; 
the need for institutional development, on the one hand to facilitate growth, coupled with the 
growth-retarding nature the same institutions can cause once ossification sets in. The 
empirical results confirm both state capacity and institutional flexibility explain roughly 40% 
of the variation in the rate of GDP per capita growth from 1880 to 2008 for the fifteen 
countries considered. The results find evidence of the growth-promoting effects of increased 
state development and greater institutional flexibility and in doing so advocates the Olsonian 
hypothesis of a ‘rise and decline’ of states.  
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APPENDIX 3.1 - Changes to Voting Rights in Europe since 1820 – 1975 (Flora, 1983) 
 
AUSTRIA 
 
 
Universal 
Suffrage Suffrage Requirements Voting Procedures 
1873 - 1907 
Restricted and unequal 
manhood suffrage in 4 electoral 
classes: Great land owners, 
Members of chambers of 
commerce and trade, 24 year 
old males of towns and cities 
who paid minimum taxes, 24 
year old males of rural 
communes who paid minimum 
taxes.  
Direct elections by electors of first 
three classes, indirect elections in 
forth class and fifth classes. Secret 
ballot or orally according to 
provincial law. Majority 
representation. 
1907 - 1911 
Abolition of class system. 
Universal and equal suffrage for 
males over 24.  
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Voting compulsory by provincial 
law in 4 provinces. Majority 
representation.  
1919 - 1934 
Universal and equal suffrage for 
all citizens over 20.  
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Voting compulsory by provincial 
law in two provinces. Proportional 
representation in multi member 
constituencies.   
1945 Unchanged Unchanged 
1968 Voting age reduced to 19  
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BELGIUM 
 
Universal 
Suffrage Suffrage Requirements Voting Procedures 
1831 - 1892 
Equal but restricted manhood 
suffrage (regime censitaire): 
high direct tax minima differing 
in urban and rural areas; 
minimum voting age 25. 1848 
reduction and standardisation of 
direct tax minima. 1871 voting 
age reduced to 21. 
Direct elections, but no provisions 
for secrecy. Partial elections in two 
alternate groups of provinces every 
two years; general nationwide 
elections only after dissolution of 
parliament. Majority representation 
in multi-member constituencies: 
absolute majority required. 
1894 - 1914 
Universal and equal manhood 
suffrage: "plural voting" with 1 
additional vote for house 
owners and real estate owners 
over certain value. 2 additional 
votes for citizens with higher 
education diploma and certain 
officials. Max 3 votes per 
person, minimum  
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Partial elections as before: 
compulsory voting. Majority 
representation as before. 1899 
Proportional representation 
introduced. 
1919 - 1946 
Abolition of " plural voting"; 
universal and equal manhood 
suffrage for men over 21 (in 
addition: suffrage for mothers 
and widows of soldiers who had 
died in war). 
Direct elections with secret ballot; 
compulsory voting. Abolition of 
partial elections 
1948 
Universal and equal suffrage for 
all men and women over 21.  Unchanged 
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DENMARK 
 
Universal 
Suffrage Suffrage Requirements Voting Procedures 
1849 - 1915 
Equal but restricted suffrage for 
male citizens of 30 years and 
over, expect servants and farm 
labourers not having their own 
household, and those receiving 
public poor relief (exclusions of 
gradually declining 
significance) 
Direct elections; voting ballot or by 
show of hands. Majority 
representation: simple plurality 
system in single-member 
constituencies. 1901 Secret ballot 
introduced.  
1918 -  
Universal and equal suffrage for 
all men and women of 29 years 
and over. 1920 voting reduced 
to 25 years. 1952 voting 
reduced to 23 years. 1961 
voting reduced to 21 years. 
1971 voting reduced to 20 
years. 
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Proportional representation: from 
1918 mostly in single member 
constituencies with additional seats 
to ensure proportional 
representation; but for 1920 (first 
election) in multi-member 
constituencies with additional seats. 
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FRANCE 
 
Universal 
Suffrage Suffrage Requirements Voting Procedures 
1815 - 1816  
Almost universal and equal 
manhood suffrage (excluding 
dependents) for primary 
elections; Restricted and 
unequal manhood suffrage in 
the electoral colleges because of 
strict criteria of eligibility.   
Indirect elections: Primary 
assemblies elect lifetime members 
of electoral colleges. Electoral 
colleges elect members of 
parliament. Majority representation 
at both stages. 
1824 -1830 
Restricted and unequal suffrage 
for male citizens of 30 years 
and over: general electorate 
restricted by high direct tax 
minima: the upper 25% of the 
general electorate paying 
highest direct taxes constituted 
an additional electoral body 
Direct elections: The general 
electorate elects 60% of members 
of parliament. 40% elected at 
"departement" assemblies of 
highest taxpayers. No strict 
provisions for secrecy. Majority 
representation. Absolute majority 
system in single-member 
constituencies 
1831 - 1846 
Restricted, but almost equal 
manhood suffrage for citizens 
of 25 years and over: high but 
reduced direct tax minima 
(regime censitaire). 
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Majority representation: absolute 
majority system as before.  
1848 - 1936 
Universal and equal suffrage for 
all male citizens of 21 years and 
over. 
Direct elections; No provision for 
secrecy up to 1869. Majority 
representation with several 
variations: 1848: Relative majority 
system in multi-member 
constituencies. 1852: Absolute 
majority on first ballot, relative 
majority on second ballot; single 
member 
1945 -  
Universal and equal suffrage for 
all men and women of 21 years 
and over. 1975 voting age 
reduced to 18. 
Direct Elections with secret ballot. 
Proportional Representation in 
multi-member constituencies. 1958 
Majority representation: absolute 
majority on first ballot, relative 
majority on second. 
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GERMANY 
 
Universal 
Suffrage Suffrage Requirements Voting Procedures 
1848 
Universal and equal suffrage 
(with insignificant exceptions) 
for all male citizens, with 
minimum age differing in the 
German states. 
Indirect and secret elections. 
Primary voters elect electors, 
proportional in number; electors 
elect members of parliament. 
Majority representation: in general, 
absolute majority system with 
second ballot runoff election. 
1871 - 1918 
Universal and equal suffrage for 
all male citizens of 25 years and 
over. 
Direct and secret elections. 
Majority representation in single-
member constituencies: absolute 
majority required first ballot and on 
second ballot runoff election 
between top two candidates.  
1919 - 1933 
Universal and equal suffrage for 
all men and women of 20 years 
and over. 
Direct and secret elections. 
Proportional representation: seats 
allocated to regional and national 
lists. 
1949 - 
Universal and equal suffrage for 
all citizens of 21 years and over. 
1970: Voting age reduced to 18 
years. 
Direct and secret elections. 
Proportional representation: Since 
1953, each voter has two votes.  
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ITALY 
 
Universal 
Suffrage Suffrage Requirements Voting Procedures 
1861 - 1909 
Equal but restricted manhood 
suffrage. 1861: Limited to 
citizens of 25 years and over 
who paid minimum direct taxes 
and who could read and write. 
1882: Limited to citizens of 21 
years and over with 
qualifications as before, but 
reduction of tax minima. 
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Majority representation in single-
member constituencies: absolute 
majority required on first ballot or 
relative majority on second ballot. 
1882: Majority representation: 
simple majority system in multi-
member constitute 
 
 
1913 - 1924 
1913: Almost universal and 
equal suffrage of 30 years and 
over; in addition, for male 
citizens of 21 years and who 
had completed their military 
service or had finished primary 
school, paid minimum tax, 
exercised official functions. 
1919: Universal and equal 
suffrage for all men over 21 
years 
1913: Direct elections with secret 
ballot. Majority representation as 
before. 1919: Direct elections with 
secret ballot. Proportional 
representation in multi-member 
constituencies. 1924: System as 
before, but with bonus for largest 
party (Fascist election).  
1946 -  
Universal and equal suffrage for 
all men and women of 21 years 
and over 
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Proportional representation in 
multi-member constituencies.  
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NETHERLANDS 
 
Universal 
Suffrage Suffrage Requirements Voting Procedures 
1849 - 1894 
Equal but restricted manhood 
suffrage for citizens of 23 years 
and over surpassing relatively 
high direct tax minima. 1887 
reduction of direct tax minima 
and equivalent requirements of 
renting or owning a house 
above a certain rental value. 
Direct Elections with secret ballot. 
Majority representation. Election of 
half of member every two years in 
"double constituencies" so that one 
of the two members is always 
elected for a four year term; 
absolute majority required on first 
ballot, simple majority required. 
1897 - 1917 
Equal but restricted suffrage for 
male citizens of 25 years and 
over, with relatively low 
qualifications: alternatively 
paying direct taxes over certain 
minima, living  in houses with a 
certain rental value, receiving 
wages or pensions over a given 
minim 
Direct Elections with secret ballot. 
Majority representation in single-
member constituencies; majority 
requirements as before. 
1918 
Universal and equal suffrage for 
male citizens of 25 years and 
over. 
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Proportional Representation. 
Compulsory voting introduced. 
1922 -  
Universal and equal suffrage for 
men and women of 25 years and 
more. 1945 age reduced to 23 
years. 1965 age reduced to 21 
years. 1972 age reduced to 18 
years.  
Unchanged. 1970 compulsory 
voting abolished. 
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NORWAY 
 
Universal 
Suffrage Suffrage Requirements Voting Procedures 
1815 - 1897 
Equal but restricted manhood 
suffrage with relatively high 
occupational and property 
requirements such as Kings 
officials, freehold and leasehold 
farmers, owners of urban 
property, citizens licensed as 
merchants or artisans.  
Indirect elections with open voting. 
Majority representation: Electors 
elected by plurality in cities resp. 
parishes; number of electors 
proportional to number of 
enfranchised population. 1885 
Secret ballot introduced. 
1900 - 1912 
Almost universal and equal 
suffrage for male citizens of 25 
years and over; suffrage 
temporarily suspended in cases 
of bankruptcy and for paupers 
receiving public assistance. 
1909: extension of suffrage also 
to women if own or husband's 
income exceeded certain 
minimum. 
Indirect, secret elections. Majority 
representation as before. 1906: 
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Majority representation in single-
member constituencies: absolute 
majority required on first ballot, 
relative majority on second. 
1915 
Almost universal and equal 
adult suffrage for citizens of 23 
years and over. 1946: Voting 
age reduced to 21 years 
Unchanged. 1921: Direct elections 
with secret ballot. Proportional 
representation in multi-member 
constituencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
229 
 
SWEDEN  
 
Universal 
Suffrage Suffrage Requirements Voting Procedures 
1866 - 1908  
Equal but restricted manhood 
suffrage with relatively high 
economic qualifications. 
Alternatively property above a 
certain value, leasing of 
farmland above a certain value, 
income above a given minima. 
Voting age 21 years. 
Partly direct, partly indirect 
elections with secret ballot. 
Majority representation, in most 
cases in single-member 
constituencies. 
1909 - 1920 
Almost universal and equal 
suffrage for male citizens of 24 
years and over, excluding 
recipients of public poor relief. 
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Proportional Representation. 
1921 -  
Universal and equal suffrage for 
men and women of 23 years and 
over (with certain insignificant 
exceptions ended in 1945). 
1945 voting age reduced to 21 
years. 1969: voting age reduced 
to 19 years. Unchanged 
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SWITZERLAND 
 
Universal Suffrage Suffrage Requirements Voting Procedures 
1848 - 1869 
Universal and equal suffrage for 
male citizens of 20 years and 
over. 
Direct elections; secret or oral 
voting according to cantonal 
legislation. Majority representation: 
constituencies of varying size (each 
voter having as many votes as seats 
to be filled in the constituency); 
absolute majority required on first 
and second ballot. 
1872 - 1917 Unchanged 
Direct elections with secret ballot 
according to federal legislation. 
Majority representation as before; 
since 1900, absolute majority 
required only on first ballot, simple 
majority on second. 
1919 - 1967 Unchanged 
Direct and secret elections. 
Proportional representation. 
1971 – 
 
 
 
Universal and equal suffrage for 
men and women of 20 years and 
over. 
 
 
Unchanged 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Universal 
Suffrage Suffrage Requirements Voting Procedures 
Prior to 1832 
Restricted and unequal 
manhood suffrage with 
relatively high, but locally 
different economics 
requirements:                           
In counties; real estate of 
certain rental value,                  
In boroughs: very different 
criteria, mostly local taxes. 
Direct Elections; in most cases, 
public nomination and open voting. 
Majority representation: plurality 
system, mostly in two-member 
constituencies of very different size 
(between the constituent parts of 
the UK and between urban and 
rural areas). 
1832 - 1865  
Electoral Reform 1832: 
Reduction and standardisation 
of income and property 
qualifications:                          
In counties: Freeholders and 
leaseholders with real estate of 
a certain rental value.               
In boroughs: Householders with 
property. 
Redistribution of approx. 140 seats 
out of 658 in order to equalise the 
size of constituencies. 1854 
elimination of corrupt practices 
(bribery, intimidation, etc.) 
1868 - 1880  
Electoral reform 1867/78 for 
England and Scotland: 
reduction of income and 
property qualifications:             
In counties: Freeholders, 
leaseholders and copyholders 
with minimal rent.                    
In boroughs: Householders and 
lodgers paying minimum. 
Redistribution of 52 seats. 1872: 
Secret ballot introduced and public 
nomination abolished. 
1885 -1910 
Electoral Reform 1884/85: 
Reduction and standardisation 
of qualifications for both 
counties and boroughs in all 
parts of the UK. Uniform 
householder and lodger 
franchise. Uniform occupation 
franchise. "plural voting" 
continued (business and 
university vote). 
Redistribution of 134 out of 670 
seats; single-member constituencies 
as a rule. 
1918 - 1924 
Universal and almost equal 
suffrage for male citizens of 21 
years and over; in addition 
suffrage for women of 30 years 
and over who are householders 
of wives of householders; 
"plural voting" restricted to max 
of 2 votes. 
Redistribution of seats on the basis 
of approx. equal electorates. 
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1928 
Universal and almost equal 
suffrage for men and women of 
21 years and over; "plural 
voting" continued (business and 
university votes). 1948 
University seats and all "plural 
voting" abolished. 1969 voting 
age reduced to 18 years. 
Direct Elections with secret ballot. 
Majority representation: relative 
majority system in single member 
constituencies. Redistribution of 
seats and installations of permanent 
boundary commissions. 
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APENDIX 5.1 
Disruption due to National Independence (DISNAT) 
 
1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1913 1925 1930 1938 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
United 
Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
United States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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APPENDIX 5.2 
Disruption due to Occupation (DISOCC) 
  1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1913 1925 1930 1938 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
United 
Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
United 
States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX 5.3 
Disruption due to Revolution or Civil War (DISREV) 
 
1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1913 1925 1930 1938 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Belgium 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
United 
Kingdom 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
United 
States 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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APPENDIX 5.4 
5.4.1 Australia 
Total central government expenditure and central government revenue at current prices are 
presented for Australia from 1901 to 2002 in Australian Dollars. General government 
revenue as a percentage of GDP is available from the Reserve Bank of Australia from 1950 to 
2008. National accounts are available from 1880 to 2000 and are measured using GDP. 
Extrapolation is used to estimate years from 1880 to 1900. No interpolation is required. The 
value of Australian imports and exports is available from 1880 to 1959 in Australian Pounds, 
from 1960 1996 in Australian dollars and from 1997 to 2004 in US Dollars.  Primary school 
enrolment figures are available continuously from 1880 to 2003. The population size is 
observed fourteen times from 1880 to 2008. The year’s this occurs are 1881, 1891, 1901, 
1911, 1921, 1933, 1947, 1954, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1992, 1998 and 2003. The length of open 
railway line in kilometres is recorded from 1880 to 2003. Freight traffic on state railways is 
recorded from 1880 to 1993 in metric tons. The extent of voting rights among the population 
is observed thirty-two times between 1880 and 2008. Polity IV measures of regime durability 
and POLCOMP are available from Australian independence in 1901 to 2008.  
 
5.4.2 Austria 
Nominal total central government expenditure in millions of Gulden is available for Austria 
from 1880 to 1883, in Austrian Kronen from 1894 to 1915, in Austrian Schillings from 1923 
to 1937 and again from 1948 to 1993. Total central government expenditure is available in 
US Dollars from 1994 to 2000. Nominal central government revenue is available in Gulden 
from 1880 to 1892, from 1892 to 1915 in Kronen and from 1924 to 1993 in Schillings. 
General government revenue is available in the years 1925 to 1928 and from 1955 to 2008.   
Nominal national accounts totals are available from 1880 to 1913 in Austrian Kronen, from 
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1924 to 1937 and 1948 to 1998 in Austrian Schillings. From 1880 to 1913 output in measured 
as GDP. From 1924 onwards output is measured as GNP at current prices. Interpolation is 
required for the year 1938. Data is missing for 1946. Current year values of aggregate 
external trade are available from 1880 to 1916 measured in Kronen for Austria. Data is 
available from 1920 to 1937 and from 1947 to 1993 in Schillings. Total aggregate trade is 
measured in US dollars from 1994 – 2000. Primary school numbers are available from 1880 
to 1914, 1917 to 1936 and from 1945 to 2002. The population size is observed in the years 
1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1923, 1934, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001. This allows the 
education variable to be observed twelve times between 1880 and 2008. Railway lines in 
kilometres are recorded from 1880 to 1913 for Austria-Hungary, and from 1919 to 1936 and 
1946 to 2003 (excluding 1947 and 1949) for Austria. The volume of freight traffic, measured 
in metrics tons, is reported for Austria from 1880 to 1912, from 1922 to 1936 (excluding the 
years 1923 and 1926) and from 1948 to 2002.  The prevalence of democratic entitlements is 
observed thirty-two times from 1880 to 2008. From 1880 to 1901 there is restricted and 
unequal manhood suffrage in four electoral classes. The four are land owners, members of 
chambers of commerce, 24 year old males of towns and cities who paid minimum taxes and 
24 year old males of rural communes who paid minimum taxes. Direct elections are held for 
the first three class and indirect elections in forth class. Voting is conducted by secret ballot 
or orally according to provincial law with majority representation. The class system is 
abolished in 1907, with the establishment of universal and equal suffrage for males over 24 
until 1911. In 1919 universal and equal suffrage for all citizens over 20 is introduced. Direct 
elections are conducted by secret ballot, with voting compulsory, according to provincial law, 
in two provinces. Proportional representation is used across multi member constituencies. In 
1968 the legal voting age is reduced to 19. Government durability and POLCOMP are taken 
from Polity IV and are reported, for all years, from 1880 to 2008.  
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5.4.3 Belgium 
Nominal total central government expenditure and nominal total central government revenue 
in millions of Belgian Francs is available from 1880 to 1912 and from 1920 to 1993. General 
government revenue is recorded in 1936 and 1938 and from 1950 to 2008. Nominal national 
accounts totals are available in 1913, 1924, 1927, 1930, 1934 to 1939, 1941 1943, and from 
1946 to 2000. Net National Product (NNP) is used as the measure of national output from 
1913 to 1948; GNP is used thereafter. Interpolation is required for the year 1925. All data 
between 1880 and 1920 is estimated using exponential log extrapolation. Trade data is 
recorded from 1880 to 1913 and from 1919 to 1993 in Belgian Francs. Remaining years are 
presented in US Dollars. Primary school numbers are available from 1881 to 1914 and from 
1919 to 1998. Population figures are presented in the years 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920, 
1930, 1947, 1961, 1970, 1981, 1991, 1998 and 2001. Open kilometres of railway line are 
available for Belgium from 1880 to 1913 and again from 1919 to 2003. The volume of freight 
traffic is recorded, in metric tons, from 1880 to 1913 and from 1920 to 1998. The extent of 
democratisation of the population is observed thirty-two times between 1880 and 2008. From 
1880 to 1892 equal but restricted manhood suffrage exists for all those aged 21 and older. 
Direct elections are held with no provisions for secrecy. Majority representation in multi-
member constituencies is used to determine the outcome of these elections. In 1884 universal 
and equal manhood suffrage with secret ballot is introduced.  Plural voting exists with one 
additional vote for house owners and real estate owners over certain value, two additional 
votes for citizens with higher education diplomas and certain officials. Voting is limited to a 
maximum of three votes per person. Proportional representation is introduced in 1899. In 
1919 plural voting is abolished, with the introduction of universal and equal manhood 
suffrage for men over 21 and suffrage for mothers and widows of soldiers who had died in 
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war. In 1948 universal and equal suffrage for all men and women over 21 is introduced. 
Durability of the government and POLCOMP are taken from Polity IV from 1880 to 2008.  
 
5.4.4 Canada 
Canadian central government expenditure and revenue is presented from 1880 to 2001 in 
Canadian Dollars. General government revenue is available from 1970 to 2008. National 
accounts for Canada are presented for the years 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920 and from 1926 
to 1994 measured using GNP. Accounts are recorded as GNP from 1995 to 2000. All are 
presented at current prices in Canadian Dollars. Linear interpolation is required for the years 
1885, 1895, 1905, 1913 and 1925. Nominal trade totals for imports and exports are recorded 
from 1880 to 2004 in Canadian dollars. Enrolment in all Canadian schools is presented from 
1880 to 2001. The years 1997 and 1999 are omitted. Census data is recorded fourteen times 
between 1880 and 2008 (1881, 1891, 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1941, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 
1991, 1996 and 2002).  Open railway line in kilometres is available from 1880 to 2004. The 
volume of freight traffic in metric tons is recorded from 1880 to 1992. The number of citizens 
in the population above the voting age with a right to vote is reported thirty-two times 
between the years 1880 and 2008. Measures of regime durability are available from 1880 to 
2008. POLCOMP is measured from 1880 to 1887 and from 1920 to 2008. 
 
5.4.5 Denmark 
Danish data on total central government expenditure and revenue is available continuously 
from 1880 to 1993 in Danish Kroner and from 1994 to 2000 in US Dollars. General 
government revenue is recorded in the years 1882, 1887, 1897, 1905, 1906, 1914, 1924, 
1926, 1929, 1932, 1939 and from 1950 to 2008. National accounts are available from 1880 – 
2000 in Danish Kroner. GDP is used as the measure of national output throughout. No 
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interpolation or extrapolation is necessary.  Aggregate trade values are presented from 1880 
to 1993 in Danish Kroner with the remaining values presented in US Dollars. Primary school 
numbers are available for the years 1893, 1897 and 1902, and continuously from 1904 to 
2004.  Population numbers are recorded in the years 1880, 1890, 1901, 1911, 1921, 1930, 
1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1981, 1990, 1998 and 2001; a total of fourteen observations.  The 
length of open railway lines in kilometres is recorded continuously from 1880 to 2003, while 
freight traffic is available from 1880 to 1940, 1944 to 1976 and 1979 to 2004. The extent of 
voting rights among the population is observed forty-four times, more than any other country 
in the sample, between 1880 and 2008. From 1880 to 1915 equal but restricted suffrage exists 
for male citizens of 30 years and above. This does not include servants and farm labourers 
without their own household or those receiving direct welfare payments from the state. Direct 
elections are held with voting by ballot or by show of hands. In 1901 a secret ballot is 
introduced. Majority representation used to determine the outcome with a simple plurality 
system in single-member constituencies. In 1918 universal and equal suffrage for all men and 
women of 29 years and over is introduced. In 1920 the voting age is reduced to 25 years with 
secret ballot and proportional representation also introduced to determine election outcomes. 
The voting age is further reduction in 1952 to 23 years. In 1961 the voting age is reduced to 
21 years and to 20 years in 1971. All Polity IV institutional measures are available from 1880 
to 2008.   
 
5.4.6 France 
Total central government expenditure and revenue is available from 1880 to 1959 in Francs, 
from 1960 to 1993 in new Francs
10
. General government revenue as a percentage of GDP is 
                                                          
10
 In January 1960 the new French franc was circulated for the first time and was the equivalent of 100 existing 
Francs. 
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recorded in 1920, 1925, 1930, 1935 and from 1952 to 2008. GDP figures are available from 
1880 to 1913, from 1920 to 1938 and from 1949 to 1958 in Francs. From 1959 to 1998 GDP 
is available in new Francs at current prices. GDP is presented in US Dollars in 1999 and 
2000. Data is missing for 1946 and 2000. Trade data is available from 1880 – 1958 in French 
Francs and from 1959 to 1993 in new Francs. US Dollars are used to measure aggregate 
external trade volume from 1994 to 2000. Primary school numbers are available from 1880 to 
1912 and from 1917 to 2005. Estimates of the French population are reported a total of 
twenty time. These years are 1881, 1886, 1891, 1896, 1901, 1906, 1911, 1921, 1926, 1931, 
1936, 1946, 1954, 1962, 1968, 1975, 1982, 1991, 1993 and 2001. French railway line length 
in kilometres is presented in an unbroken series from 1880 to 2003. Freight traffic in metric 
tons is reported continuously from 1880 to 1998.  The extent of voting rights among the 
population is observed twenty-nine times between 1880 and 2008. From 1880 to 1936, 
France granted universal and equal suffrage for all male citizens of 21 years and over. Direct 
elections are carried out with secret ballot. In 1945 universal and equal suffrage is granted to 
all men and women of 21 years and over. This is reduced to 18 years of age in 1975. 
Measures of regime durability are available from 1880 to 2008. POLCOMP is measured from 
1880 to 1918 and from 1929 to 2008. 
 
5.4.7 Germany 
German total central government expenditure and revenue at current prices is recorded from 
1880 to 1934 in Marks. Separate data on both expenditure and revenue is available for East 
and West Germany from 1950 until 1989 in Marks. For the purposes of this research, these 
totals are combined. Central government expenditure data is presented from 1990 to 1993 for 
reunified Germany. Central government revenue is only reported for West Germany from 
1990 to 1993. Aggregate totals for Germany become available for both from 1990 to 1993. 
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General government revenue as a percentage of GDP is recorded in 1881, 1891, 1901, 1902, 
1903, 1905, 1907, 1908, 1913, 1925, 1928, 1930, 1933, 1936, 1937 and from 1950 to 2008. 
National accounts, recorded as NNP, are on hand from 1880 to 1913 and from 1925 to 1938. 
National accounts for East Germany measured as NNP is available from 1949 to 1988. 
National accounts for West Germany are presented from 1949 to 1993 in GDP. Again, for the 
purposes of this research the two are combined from 1949 to 1988. Aggregate data for 
Germany is presented in Marks from 1994 to 1998 and in US Dollars in 1999 and 2000. 
Linear interpolation is required for 1935 and 1935. Primary school numbers are available for 
the years 1900, 1905 and 1910, 1921, 1925, 1930, 1935, 1936, 1938, and 1939. Primary 
school numbers from West Germany are presented from 1950 to 1990 and from 1951 to 1988 
for East Germany. Germany data becomes available again from 1991 to 2005, excluding the 
years 1999 to 2002. The size of the German population is recorded seven times between 1880 
and 1939 (1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1925, 1933 and 1939). West German population numbers 
are available in the years 1946, 1950, 1961, 1970 and 1980. East German numbers are 
recorded for the years 1946, 1950, 1964, 1971 and 1981. Population numbers for reunified 
Germany are available for 1990 and 2001. The extent of open railway lines in Germany in 
kilometres is available from 1880 to 1939, from 1949 to 1988 for West Germany, from 1950 
(excluding 1951 to 1958) to 1988 for East Germany and finally for reunified Germany from 
1989 to 2003. Freight traffic on German railway lines is available for the state from 1888 to 
1892 and 1895 to 1938, with the exception of the year 1917. Data is then divided between 
East and West Germany, with the latter reporting freight traffic volume from 1947 to 1990 
and the former from 1949 to 1988. Fright traffic in metric tons is available for the entire state 
from 1991 to 1998. The extent of democratisation of the population is observed thirty-three 
times between 1880 and 2008.  From 1880 to 1918 universal and equal suffrage is granted to 
all male citizens of 25 years and over. Elections are secret with majority representation in 
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single-member constituencies. An absolute majority is required in the first ballot to be 
deemed elected. In 1949, universal and equal suffrage is granted to men and women of 20 
years and over with secret elections and proportional representation. In 1949 universal and 
equal suffrage is granted to all citizens of 21 years and over. This is reduced to 18 years in 
1970. Data for all Polity IV variables is reported for German from 1880 to 1945 and from 
1990 to 2008. 
 
5.4.8 Italy 
Data for Italian total central government expenditure at current price is available from 1880 
to 1998 in Lira and for 1999 and 2000 in Euros. Data for Italian total central government 
revenue is recorded from 1880 to 1993 in Lira. General government revenue as a percentage 
of GDP is available for the years 1880, 1885, 1891, 1895, 1900, 1912, 1921, 1936, 1931, 
1936, 1938, 1939 and from 1951 to 2008. National accounts are presented from 1880 to 1950 
in GNP and from 1951 to 2000 in GDP. All national accounts are recorded at current price in 
Lira with the exception of 1999 and 2000 which are measure in US Dollars. No interpolation 
or extrapolation is required. Primary school enrolment numbers are recorded continuously 
from 1880 to 2002. The size of the Italian population is recorded in the years 1881, 1891, 
1901, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1936, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 2001; a total of thirteen 
observations of the population. Italian railway length is reported in kilometres from 1880 to 
2002, excluding the years 1943 and 1944. Freight traffic data is available from 1880 to 2004 
with the exception of the years 1997 to 1999. Between 1880 and 2008 the number of people 
in the population, aged above the legal voting age that are enfranchised, is observed thirty-
one times. From 1882 to 1913 only Italian citizen 21 years and over, with qualifications, were 
entitled to vote in direct, secret ballot elections. In 1913 universal and equal suffrage is 
granted to all citizens 30 years of age and over. In addition, male citizens of 21 years and who 
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have completed military service or have finished primary school, paid minimum tax or 
exercised official functions, are entitled to vote. In 1946 Italy introduces universal and equal 
suffrage for all men and women of 21 years and over with proportional representation in 
multi-member constituencies used to determine election outcomes. Polity IV measures of 
regime durability and POLCOMP are available from 1800 to 2008.  
 
5.4.9 Japan 
Nominal central government expenditure for Japan is on hand from 1880 to 1993 in yen. 
Nominal central government revenue is available for the same period. General government 
revenue as a percentage of GDP is available from 1970 to 2008. National accounts are 
recorded in Yen from 1885 to 1930 with GNP used as the measure of national output. GDP is 
used from 1931 to 2000. Data is missing for 1995 and 2000. It has been necessary to 
extrapolate trade figures for Japan back to 1880. While export volumes are available, national 
output data is not. An exponential log is estimated from the earliest year that output is report 
to the beginning of the First World War. From these estimates, data is extrapolated back to 
1880. Five observations are extrapolated for Japan (1880 to 1884). Trade data is recorded 
from 1880 to 1943, from 1946 to 1996 in Japanese Yen and from 1997 to 2004 in US Dollars. 
Primary school enrolment figures are available continuously from 1880 to 2001. The 
population size is observed a total of fourteen times in the years 1884, 1893, 1903, 1913, 
1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 1995 and 2003. The length of open railway 
line in kilometres is recorded from 1880 to 2002. Freight traffic on state railways is recorded 
from 1886 to 1998 in metric tons. The extent of democratisation of the population is observed 
thirty-two times between 1880 and 2008.  Government durability and POLCOMP are taken 
from Polity IV and are reported, for all years, from 1880 to 2008.  
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5.4.10 Netherlands  
Dutch central government expenditure is available from 1880 to 1998 in Guilders and for 
1999 and 2000 in Euros. Dutch central government revenue, measured in Gilders, is available 
from 1880 to 1993. General government revenue as a percentage of GDP is recorded in the 
years 1902, 1907, 1912, 1917, 1922, 1927, 1930, 1935 and from 1950 to 2008. Dutch 
national accounts are available from 1900 to 1947 measured as NNP and from 1948 to 2000 
measured as GDP. With the exception of 1999 and 2000, where US Dollars are used, all other 
years are measured in Guilders. Extrapolation is required for the years 1880 to 1899 
inclusive. Primary school enrolment numbers are recorded continuously from 1880 to 2005. 
The size of the Dutch population is available for the years 1879 (used for 1880), 1889, 1899, 
1909, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1947, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991, 1998 and 2001. The extent of Dutch 
railway lines is reported continuously from 1880 to 2004. With the exception of the year 
1890, Dutch freight traffic volumes, measured in metric tons, is available every year from 
1880 to 2004. The prevalence of democratic entitlements is observed thirty-seven times from 
1880 to 2008. From 1880 to 1891 equal but restricted suffrage existed for male citizens of 25 
years and over in direct elections with secret ballot. From 1897 to 1917 equal but restricted 
suffrage is granted to male citizens of 25 years and over, with relatively low qualifications or 
those paying direct taxes over certain minima, living  in houses with a certain rental value, 
receiving wages or pensions over a given minima. In 1918 universal and equal suffrage is 
granted to all male citizens of 25 years and over. Proportional representation and compulsory 
voting are also introduced. In 1922 universal and equal suffrage is extended to women of 25 
years and more. The voting age is reduced to 23 in 1945, 21 in 1965 and 18 in 1972. 
Compulsory voting is abolished in 1970. All Polity IV institutional measures are available 
from 1880 to 2008.   
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5.4.11 Norway 
Total central government expenditure is presented for Norway from 1880 to 2000 in 
Norwegian Kroner with missing data for the year 1998. Total central government revenue is 
presented for Norway from 1880 to 1993 in Norwegian Kroner. Norwegian general 
government revenue as a percentage of GDP is reported every five years from 1880 to 1935 
and continuously from 1950 to 2008. National accounts are presented using GNP as the 
measure of output from 1880 to 1939 as measured in Kroner. National accounts are measured 
using GDP, again in Norwegian Kroner, from 1946 to 1998. National accounts for 1999 and 
2000 are recorded in US dollar with GDP used as the measure of output. No interpolation or 
extrapolation is necessary. Primary school enrolment numbers are recorded continuously 
from 1880 to 2005. Census numbers for Norway are reported thirteen times (1890, 1900, 
1910, 1920, 1930, 1946, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 1998 and 2001) between the years 
1880 and 2008. Both Norwegian open railway line in kilometres and freight traffic on 
railways, measured in metric tons, are available in unbroken series’, with the former reported 
from 1880 to 2003 and the latter from 1880 to 1998. The extent of democratisation of the 
population is observed thirty-five times between 1880 and 2008.  Until 1897 voting rights 
were extended only to males with relatively high occupational and property requirements 
such as the King’s officials, freehold and leasehold farmers, owners of urban property, 
citizens licensed as merchants or artisans. Secret ballot is introduced in 1885. From 1900 to 
1912 universal and equal suffrage for male citizens exists for those aged 25 years and over. 
Suffrage can be temporarily suspended in cases of bankruptcy and for citizens receiving 
benefit assistance. In 1909 sees the extension of suffrage to women if their husband's income 
exceeded a certain minimum. Universal and equal adult suffrage for all citizens of 23 years 
and over is introduced in 1915 with proportional representation introduced in 1921. The 
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voting age reduced to 21 years in 1946. All Polity IV institutional measures are available 
from 1880 to 2008.   
 
5.4.12 Sweden 
Swedish data on central government expenditure is recorded in Swedish Kroner from 1881 to 
2000. Swedish data of central government revenue is reported from in Swedish Kroner 1880 
to 1993. General government revenue as a percentage of GDP for Sweden is available from 
every ten years from 1880 to 1910. It is reported again in 1913, 1918, 1923, 1928, 1933, 1938 
and 1943. General government revenue is available continuously for Sweden from 1949 to 
2008.  National accounts are obtainable from 1880, measured using GDP and run unbroken to 
2000, with the final two years measured in US Dollars as opposed to Kroner elsewhere. 
Primary school numbers are available for the years 1886 and 1890 and continuously from 
1898 to 2004. Records on the population of Sweden are available for thirteen individual years 
between 1880 and 2008. These years are 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 
1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2001. The length of open railway lines and the volume of freight 
traffic in Sweden are both presented continuously from 1880 to 2004, measured in kilometres 
and metric tons respectively. Between 1880 and 2008 the number of people in the population, 
aged above the legal voting age that are enfranchised, is observed thirty-eight times. Until 
1908 voting rights are equal but restricted to males above twenty-four years, with relatively 
high economic qualifications, those with property above a certain value, those leasing 
farmland above a certain value or male citizens with an income above a given minima. From 
1909 universal and equal suffrage is extended to all male citizens of twenty-four years and 
over, excluding recipients of state welfare. A secret ballot and proportional representation are 
introduced. In 1921 suffrage is extended to all men and women of 23 years and over. In 1945 
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the voting age is reduced to 21 years, with a further reduction to 19 years in 1969. Polity IV 
measures of regime durability and POLCOMP are available from 1880 to 2008. 
 
5.4.13 Switzerland 
Swiss central government expenditure data is available from 1880 to 2000 in Swiss Francs. 
Swiss central government revenue data is available from 1880 to 1993 in Swiss Francs. 
General government revenue is available for the years 1910, 1930, 1938, 1945 and from 1950 
to 2008. National accounts first become available in 1913 as measured by NNP. 1924 is the 
next year national accounts are presented, again with NNP used. Output total are then 
available from 1930 to 1949 in NNP, from 1950 – 1979 in GNP and from 1980 to 2000 in 
GDP. All years are recorded in nominal Swiss Francs with the expectation of 1999 and 2000 
where US Dollars are used. Linear interpolation is needed for the years 1920 and 1925. 
Extrapolation is required for years used in the estimations from 180 to 1913. The years 1995 
and 2000 are missing. It has been necessary to extrapolate trade figures for Switzerland back 
to 1880 as while export volumes were available for both countries, national output data is not. 
An exponential log is estimated from the earliest year that output is report to the beginning of 
the First World War. From these estimates, data is extrapolated back to 1880. Nineteen 
observations are extrapolated for Switzerland from 1880 to 1889. Primary school numbers 
are available for the years 1891 and 1884, continuously from 1887 to 1911 and 1915 to 1948. 
Data is presented for the years 1951, 1953, 1956, 1959 and 1961. Population numbers are 
reported in the years 1880, 1888, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1914, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 
1990, 1998 and 2001. Swiss railway length in kilometres is reported from 1880 to 2002. 
Freight traffic on railway lines is available from 1880 to 1996 and from 2000 to 2003. The 
extent of democratisation of the population is observed thirty-four times between 1880 and 
2008. From 1880 to 1971 universal and equal suffrage is granted only to male citizens of 20 
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years and over. From 1880 to 1917 direct elections are decided by secret ballot according to 
federal legislation. Proportional representation is introduced in 1919. After 1971 all citizen 
over twenty are entitled to vote. Government durability and POLCOMP are taken from Polity 
IV and are reported, for all years, from 1880 to 2008.  
 
5.4.14 United Kingdom 
Total central government expenditure data is available for the UK from 1880 to 2003 with 
nominal figure presented in Pounds Sterling. Central government revenue data is recorded 
from 1880 to 1993 in Pounds Sterling. General government revenue in the United Kingdom 
as a percentage of GDP is reported in five year intervals between 1880 and 1950. Annual data 
is available from 1950 to 2008.  National accounts, measured as GDP, are available in British 
Pounds from 1880 to 1998 and from 1999 to 2004 in US dollars.  Trade data is available from 
1880 to 1993 in Pounds Sterling with the remaining data from 1994 to 2005 reported in US 
dollars. Primary school enrolment numbers are presented from 1880 to 1913, 1919 to 1937 
and 1945 to 1998. Population numbers are observed twelve times between 1880 and 2008, in 
the years 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991 and 1999. Open 
railway line length is reported continuously from 1880 to 2003. Freight traffic on railways is 
recorded from 1880 to 1913 and from 1919 to 1998. Both periods are measured in metric 
tons. The percentage of the population above the voting age with voting rights is observed 
thirty-four times between 1880 and 2008. By 1880, voting rights are extended to all those 
over 21 years of age above a certain income, those with qualifications, freeholders and 
leaseholders with real estate of a certain rental value or householders with property of a 
certain rental value. Plural voting is used when certain criteria are met in different 
constituencies, with extra university seats to be elected by university graduates. The Electoral 
Reform Act in 1884 and 1885 reduces the standard of qualifications required to be 
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enfranchised. From 1918 to 1924 universal and almost equal suffrage is granted to all male 
citizens of 21 years and over and all for female citizens of 30 years and over that are wives of 
householders. Plural voting is restricted to a maximum of two votes per person. In 1928 
suffrage is extended to men and women of 21 years and over. The years 1948 see the 
abolition of university seats and all plural voting. In 1969 the voting age is reduced to 18 
years for all citizens. Polity IV measures are available from 1880 to 2010.  
 
5.4.15 United States of America 
US data for central government expenditure is available from 1880 to 1994 in US Dollars. US 
central government revenue is recorded from 1880 to 2005. General government revenue as a 
percentage of GDP is available from 1880 to 2008. National output, measured as GNP, is 
recorded from 1880 to 2005. No interpolation or extrapolation is used. The value of exports 
and imports at current prices is presented from 1880 to 2004. Enrolment in US primary 
schools is reported in the year 1880 and from 1890 to 1919 continuously. Data is presented 
ever second year from 1918 to 1968 and every year from 1970 to 2002.  Census data is 
recorded fourteen times between 1880 and 2008. Data is broken down between whites and 
non-white in the years 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980 
and 1990. Data for the entire population is reported in 1997 and 2002. Open railway line in 
kilometres is available from 1880 to 2004. Freight traffic in metric tons for the United States 
is presented from 1882 to 1890 and from 1899 to 1995. The extent of democratisation of the 
population is observed twenty-six times between 1880 and 2008. Polity IV measures of 
regime durability and POLCOMP are available from 1880 to 2008. 
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APPENDIX 6.1 Hausman Test (FLX) 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              Coefficients 
 (b)  (B)  (b-B)      Sqrt(Diag(V_b-V-B)) 
VARIABLE  FE  RE        Difference    SE 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POPVOTE  |     0.699       1.093            -0.394     0.272     
ERA2   |          -0.659               -0.673             0.014           0.074 
ERA3   |     1.758       1.816            -0.058                
DURABLE  |          -0.007               -0.005            -0.001         0.003 
DISNAT  |     1.610       0.265             1.345         0.473 
DISOCC  |      0.306       0.014             0.292         0.290 
DISREV  |     0.507       0.022             0.485         0.455 
FREIGH  |     0.000       0.007            -0.006         0.006 
VOTECHG  |     1.067       0.954             0.113                
FLX   |     0.007       0.006             0.000               
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
Test:  Ho:  Difference in Coefficients not Systematic 
          chi²(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =  3.70 
          Prob>chi² =      0.960 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
APPENDIX 6.2 Variance Inflation Factor Test (FLX) 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
VARIABLE  VIF  1/VIF   
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
POPVOTE  |      5.53      0.181 
DURABLE  |      2.91      0.343 
DISOCC  |      2.11      0.474 
DISREV  |      1.66      0.602 
ERA3   |       1.60      0.626 
DISNAT  |       1.57      0.636 
FREIGH  |       1.50      0.669 
FLX   |       1.47      0.681 
ERA2   |       1.30      0.768 
VOTECHG  |       1.22      0.820 
-------------+-------------------------------------------- 
MEAN VIF  |       2.09 
-------------+-------------------------------------------- 
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APPENDIX 6.3 Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test (FLX) 
 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
ChgGDPCap [Country,t] = Xb + u[Country] + e[Country,t] 
 
Estimated results: 
            |         Var       Sd = Sqrt(Var) 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
ChgGDPCap |   0.028        1.673 
e  |   0.017        1.288 
u   |   0.001       0.340 
 
Test:     Var(u)  =            0 
                        chi²(1)  =       3.36 
                        Prob > chi²  =     0.067 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
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APPENDIX 6.4 Hausman Test (DEMFLX) 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              Coefficients 
 (b)  (B)  (b-B)      Sqrt(Diag(V_b-V-B)) 
VARIABLE  FE  RE        Difference    SE 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POPVOTE  |       0.853       1.296            -0.443     0.258     
ERA2   |    -0.827             -0.869             0.041          0.051 
ERA3   |      1.706       1.758            -0.051                
DURABLE  |    -0.005             -0.005             0.000         0.003 
DISNAT  |      1.505       0.312             1.193         0.473 
DISOCC  |       0.436      -0.004             0.440         0.314 
DISREV  |      0.357       0.037             0.320         0.460 
FREIGH  |      0.000       0.007            -0.006         0.005 
VOTECHG  |      0.841       0.691             0.151                
DEMLFX |      0.009       0.000             0.002                0.001 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
Test:  Ho:  Difference in Coefficients not Systematic 
          chi²(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =  6.42 
          Prob>chi² =      0.779 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
APPENDIX 6.5 Variance Inflation Factor Test (DEMFLX) 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
VARIABLE  VIF  1/VIF   
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
POPVOTE  |      5.55      0.181 
DURABLE  |      3.08      0.343 
DEMFLX |      2.20      0.474 
DISOCC  |      2.10      0.474 
ERA3   |      1.62      0.626 
DISREV  |       1.61      0.637 
DISNAT |       1.59  0.623 
ERA2  |       1.56      0.681 
FREIGHT |       1.52      0.768 
VOTECHG  |       1.28      0.820 
-------------+-------------------------------------------- 
MEAN VIF  |       2.21 
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APPENDIX 6.6 Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test (DEMFLX) 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ChgGDPCap [Country,t] = Xb + u[Country] + e[Country,t] 
 
Estimated results: 
            |         Var       Sd = Sqrt(Var) 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ChgGDPCap |   0.028          1.673 
e  |   0.016          1.279 
u   |   0.002         0.402 
 
Test:     Var(u)  =    0 
                        chi²(1)  =       5.84 
                        Prob > chi²  =     0.016 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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APPENDIX 6.7 Hausman Test (LOGCUR) 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              Coefficients 
 (b)  (B)  (b-B)      Sqrt(Diag(V_b-V-B)) 
VARIABLE  FE  RE        Difference    SE 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POPVOTE  |       0.550       0.843            -0.294     0.267     
ERA2   |    -0.709             -0.691            -0.018         0.079 
ERA3   |      1.728       1.768            -0.041                
DURABLE  |    -0.008             -0.007            -0.000         0.003 
DISNAT  |      1.433       0.278             1.155         0.435 
DISOCC  |       0.177      -0.043             0.221         0.286 
DISREV  |      0.451       0.029             0.422         0.449 
FREIGH  |      0.000       0.006            -0.006         0.005 
VOTECHG  |      1.242       1.311            -0.069                
LOGCUR  |     -0.021      -0.091             0.072                0.061 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------    
Test:  Ho:  Difference in Coefficients not Systematic 
          chi²(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =  4.26 
          Prob>chi² =      0.9028 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
APPENDIX 6.8 Variance Inflation Factor Test (LOGCUR) 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
VARIABLE  VIF  1/VIF   
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
POPVOTE  |      5.51      0.181 
DURABLE  |      2.96      0.338 
DISOCC |      2.08      0.482 
LOGCUR  |      1.76      0.569 
ERA3   |      1.60      0.626 
DISNAT |      1.55      0.644 
DISREV |      1.54  0.650 
FREIGHT |      1.50      0.669 
VOTECHG |      1.45      0.692 
ERA2   |      1.40      0.714 
-------------+-------------------------------------------- 
MEAN VIF  |      2.13 
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APPENDIX 6.9 Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test (LOGCUR) 
 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ChgGDPCap [Country,t] = Xb + u[Country] + e[Country,t] 
 
Estimated results: 
            |         Var       Sd = Sqrt(Var) 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ChgGDPCap |   0.02799        1.673 
e  |   0.01671        1.293 
u   |   0.0021        0.458 
 
Test:     Var(u)  =    0 
                        chi²(1)  =       4.77 
                        Prob > chi²  =     0.029 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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APPENDIX 6.10 Random Effects GLS Regression (FLX Years) 
             
Number of Observations = 119 
Group variable: Country      
Number of Groups = 15 
 
Adjusted R² = 0.41.61                                       
Wald chi²  = 72.77 
Prob > chi²  = 0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
%CHGGDPCAP         Coefficient Standard Error  t-stat  P-value       [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 GGREV   -2.359  1.806   -1.31    0.192         -5.900       1.181 
 EXPORTS    0.187  0.717    0.26      0.794         -1.217       1.592 
 EDUC    -1.925  1.715   -1.12      0.262        -5.287            1.437 
 RELPRO   -1.311  1.209   -1.08    0.278         -3.679           1.058 
 POPVOTE    0.675             1.055                 0.64      0.521         -1.392       2.745 
 VOTECHG               2.289             1.133    2.02    0.043          0.069           4.510 
 FREIGHT     0.012  0.008    1.49    0.135         -0.004       0.028 
 ERA 2    -0.716  0.596   -1.20    0.229         -1.885       0.452 
 ERA 3     2.603  0.907    2.87    0.004          0.826       4.380 
 ERA 4       1.578             1.107    1.43    0.154         -0.059       3.778 
 DURABLE      0.002  0.006    0.34    0.737         -0.011       0.149 
 POLCOMP    0.135  0.124    1.09    0.275         -0.107           0.378 
 DISNAT      -0.349  0.340   -1.03      0.304         -1.015        0.316 
 DISOCC      0.051  0.246    0.21      0.836         -0.431           0.532 
 DISREV       0.005  0.107    0.05    0.962         -0.205       0.215 
 FLX        0.010  0.009    1.12      0.261         -0.007           0.027 
 CONSTANT     1.944             1.351               1.44      0.150         -0.704           4.591 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sigma_u | 0.0000 
Sigma_e | 0.0143 
rho      | 0.0000 (fraction of  variance due to u_i) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Levels of significance: **** 0.1%, *** 1%, **5%, *10%   
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APPENDIX 6.11 Random Effects GLS Regression (DEMFLX Years) 
 
Number of Observations = 119 
Group variable: Country      
Number of Groups = 15 
 
Adjusted R² = 0.4203                                        
Wald chi²  = 73.96 
Prob > chi²  = 0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
%CHGGDPCAP         Coefficient Standard Error  t-stat  P-value       [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 GGREV   -2.229  1.805   -1.23    0.217         -5.768       1.310 
 EXPORTS    0.064  0.710   -0.09      0.928         -1.456       1.327 
 EDUC    -1.381  1.642   -0.84      0.400         -4.599           1.837 
 RELPRO   -1.675  1.130   -1.48    0.138         -3.890           0.538 
 POPVOTE    1.024             1.022                 1.00      0.316         -0.979       3.026 
 VOTECHG               1.826             1.182    1.54    0.123         -0.492           4.143 
 FREIGHT     0.014  0.008    1.64    0.101         -0.003       0.030 
 ERA 2    -0.882  0.566   -1.56    0.119         -1.991       0.227 
 ERA 3     2.655  0.885    3.00    0.003          0.920       4.389 
 ERA 4       1.769             1.126    1.57    0.116         -0.437       3.975 
 DURABLE      0.002  0.006   -0.00    0.998         -0.013       0.013 
 POLCOMP    0.085  0.122    0.70    0.486         -0.155           0.325 
 DISNAT      -0.372  0.337   -1.11      0.269         -1.032        0.287 
 DISOCC     -0.008  0.241   -0.04      0.971         -0.482           0.464 
 DISREV      -0.009  0.108   -0.08    0.936         -0.220       0.203 
 DEMFLX       0.013  0.009    1.40      0.161         -0.005           0.030 
 CONSTANT     2.046             1.242               1.65      0.099         -0.388           4.480 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Sigma_u | 0.0000 
Sigma_e | 0.0144 
rho      | 0.0000 (fraction of  variance due to u_i) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Levels of significance: **** 0.1%, *** 1%, **5%, *10%   
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APPENDIX 6.12 Random Effects GLS Regression (LOGCUR) 
 
Number of Observations = 119 
Group variable: Country      
Number of Groups = 15 
 
Adjusted R² = 0.4123                                        
Wald chi²  = 71.56 
Prob > chi²  = 0.0000 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
%CHGGDPCAP         Coefficient Standard Error  t-stat  P-value       [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 GGREV   -2.723  1.781   -1.53    0.126         -6.213       0.767 
 EXPORTS    0.116  0.714    0.16      0.871         -1.284       1.515 
 EDUC    -1.403  1.653   -0.85      0.396        -4.643            1.837 
 RELPRO   -1.807  1.135   -1.59    0.111         -4.031           0.417 
 POPVOTE    0.951             1.028                 0.92      0.355         -1.392       2.965 
 VOTECHG               2.689             1.242    2.17    0.030          0.255           5.123 
 FREIGHT     0.013  0.008    1.51    0.130         -0.004       0.029 
 ERA 1    -0.940  1.064   -0.88    0.377         -3.025       1.145 
 ERA 2    -1.920  0.907    2.12    0.034         -3.697      -0.143 
 ERA 3       1.034             0.474    2.18    0.029          0.104       1.964 
 DURABLE      0.007  0.006    0.12    0.902         -0.012       0.013 
 POLCOMP    0.122  0.123    0.99    0.322         -0.119           0.364 
 DISNAT      -0.397  0.339   -1.17      0.241         -1.061        0.266 
 DISOCC     -0.008  0.243   -0.03      0.974         -0.485           0.469 
 DISREV       0.015  0.107    0.14    0.888         -0.194       0.224 
 LOGCUR      -0.148  0.200   -0.74      0.461         -0.539           0.244 
 CONSTANT     3.814             1.821               2.09      0.036         -0.245           7.382 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sigma_u | 0.0000 
Sigma_e | 0.0143 
rho      | 0.0000 (fraction of  variance due to u_i) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Levels of significance: **** 0.1%, *** 1%, **5%, *10%   
 
 
